Thomas v. Mundell

• Decision Date: 15 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-15388.,07-15388.
• Citation: 572 F.3d 756
• Parties: Andrew Peyton THOMAS, Maricopa County Attorney; Lorenzo Arenivaz; Timothy Willis; Barbara Willis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Barbara MUNDELL, Judge of the Superior Court of Arizona; Carey Snyder Hyatt, Judge of the Superior Court of Arizona; Aimee Anderson, Commissioner, Superior Court of Arizona; Richard Nothwehr, Commissioner, Superior Court of Arizona; Steven Lynch, Commissioner, Superior Court of Arizona; James T. Blomo, Commissioner, Superior Court of Arizona, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

572 F.3d 756

Andrew Peyton THOMAS, Maricopa CountyAttorney; Lorenzo Arenivaz; Timothy Willis; Barbara Willis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.Barbara MUNDELL, Judge of the Superior Court of Arizona; Carey Snyder Hyatt, Judge of the Superior Court of Arizona; Aimee Anderson, Commissioner, Superior Court of Arizona; Richard Nothwehr, Commissioner, Superior Court of Arizona; Steven Lynch, Commissioner, Superior Court of Arizona; James T. Blomo, Commissioner, Superior Court of Arizona, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-15388.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted October 23, 2008.

Filed July 15, 2009.

Michael A. Carvin, Jones Day, Washington, D.C., for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Scot L. Claus, Mariscal, Weeks, McIntyre & Friedlander, P.A., Phoenix, AZ, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Earl H. Carroll, District Judge, Presiding.D.C.No. CV-06-00598-PHX-EHC.

Before: J. CLIFFORD WALLACE, SIDNEY R. THOMAS and SUSAN P. GRABER, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge:

Andrew Peyton Thomas, the County Attorney for Maricopa County, Arizona, in his official capacity (Thomas), along with Lorenzo Arenivaz, Timothy Willis, and Barbara Willis(individual plaintiffs), sued several judges and commissioners of the Arizona Superior Court for injunctive and declaratory relief.They allege that certain post-sentencing probation programs adopted and supervised by the superior court violate their federal constitutional and statutory rights.The district court dismissed their claims for lack of standing.Thomas and the individual plaintiffs timely appealed from the district court's dismissal.Because we agree that Thomas and the individual plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the probation programs at issue, we affirm the district court's dismissal.

I.

In 1998, the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department instituted a separate and specialized probation program for individuals convicted of aggravated driving-under-the-influence (DUI) offenses.This program was funded through a grant from the National Traffic Safety Administration, and is commonly known as the "DUI court."Eligible persons were enrolled in the DUI court after having completed their respective sentences.The DUI court differs from traditional criminal probation in several respects.For example, probationers in the DUI court engage in more frequent contact with their assigned probation officers, participate in substance abuse treatment courses and counseling, and take part in peer support groups and observation.Probationers are also required to attend monthly status hearings before a superior court judge, who tracks and monitors their progress.

Subsequently, Maricopa County instituted separate DUI courts for Spanish-speaking and for Native American probationers.These programs were meant in part to address observed deficiencies in the treatment and rehabilitation services rendered to these groups of probationers in the standard DUI court program.The "Spanish-speaking DUI court" was established in December 2002, and the "Native American DUI court" followed in 2003(collectively, separate DUI courts).The separate DUI courts were funded through a grant from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the United States Department of Health and Human Services.

Thomas and the individual plaintiffs allege that the separate DUI courts"segregate targeted recipients and treat them differently than the `regular' DUI court."Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that proceedings in the Spanish-speaking DUI court are conducted in Spanish and are presided over exclusively by defendant Judge Barbara Mundell.Thomas and the individual plaintiffs allege that probationers in the Spanish-speaking DUI court receive more positive reinforcement and fewer or lighter punishments as compared to probationers in the "regular" DUI court.Also, the headphone translation system employed in the Spanish-speaking DUI court is allegedly outdated and inadequate, preventing members of the public and the press from receiving "translation in a timely and appropriate manner."

With respect to the Native American DUI court, the amended complaint alleges that probationers here are generally required to appear on the same day.Probationers in the Native American DUI court also allegedly participate in "cultural programs, specially designed for them, such as being sent to sweat lodges and participating in talking circles."Administrators of the DUI court program also allegedly treat participants in the Native American DUI court"as a separate group" for grant reporting purposes.

Thomas filed the original complaint on February 28, 2006.An amended complaint was filed on March 13, 2006, adding the individual plaintiffs to this action.As described above, Thomas is the County Attorney for Maricopa County.Arenivaz is a resident of Maricopa County, and a victim of a DUI crime perpetrated by a probationer who participated in the "regular" DUI court.The Willises are residents of Maricopa County, and victims of a DUI crime committed by a probationer who participated in the Spanish-speaking DUI court.

Thomas and the individual plaintiffs assert claims under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and42 U.S.C. § 1981.They seek an order declaring the separate DUI courts unconstitutional, and enjoining the defendants from operating these probation programs.The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), asserting, among other claims, that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action in federal court.The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient injury in fact to establish their standing to bring suit under Article III.This appeal followed.

II.

Standing is a necessary element of federal-court jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution.Warth v. Seldin,422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343(1975)."A threshold question in every federal case is, therefore, whether at least one plaintiff has standing."City of South Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,625 F.2d 231, 233(9th Cir.1980), citingConstr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma,522 F.2d 897, 903(9th Cir.1975).We review the district court's determination on that issue de novo.Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan,207 F.3d 1143, 1148(9th Cir.2000).Because the standing issue was raised before the district court in a motion to dismiss, we"must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party."Warth,422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197.

To have standing to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must allege "`such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf."Id. at 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, quotingBaker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663(1962).Therefore, "the plaintiff must have suffered an `injury in fact'—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351(1992)(citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted).A "particularized" injury is one that "affect[s]the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."Id. at 560 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130.Thus, a plaintiff normally does not have standing where the only "asserted harm is a `generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens."Warth,422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, citingUnited States v. Richardson,418 U.S. 166, 174-80, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678(1974).

A.

We first hold that Thomas lacks standing to bring this suit under our well-settled precedent South Lake Tahoe.In that case, the mayor and city councilmembers of the City of South Lake Tahoe(collectively, councilmembers) sought to enjoin the enforcement of certain land use regulations and regional and transportation plans adopted by the California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency(Agency), a political subdivision of the State of California.625 F.2d at 232-33.They alleged that the regulations and plans violated various federal constitutional guarantees.Id.The councilmembers argued that they had standing to challenge these regulations because "they are required by law to enforce the [Agency's] regulations, and yet by voting to enforce these [purportedly unconstitutional] regulations[, they] would violate their oaths of office to uphold the U.S. Constitution."Id. at 233(internal citation omitted).

In rejecting the councilmembers' standing arguments, we concluded that the source of the councilmembers' complaint was "just abstract outrage at the enactment of an unconstitutional law.Apart from the highly speculative potential exposure to civil liability [for enforcing an unconstitutional regulation] ..., the councilmembers will lose nothing by enforcing the [Agency's] ordinances save an abstract measure of constitutional principle."Id. at 237.We reasoned that to confer standing on the councilmembers based on their "abstract disagreement with the legislature over land use" would conflict with the fundamental premise of federal standing doctrine—that a litigant's standing cannot be based on the "`generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.'"Id. at 237-38, quotingSchlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,418 U.S. 208, 217, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706(1974).Thus, we held that the councilmembers' interest in that case was "`off...