Thomas v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

• Decision Date: 29 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10–CV–464 (SLT).,10–CV–464 (SLT).
• Citation: 938 F.Supp.2d 334
• Parties: Anna–Marie THOMAS, Ed.D., Plaintiff, v. The NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, f/k/a Board of Education of the City School District of New York, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

938 F.Supp.2d 334

Anna–Marie THOMAS, Ed.D., Plaintiff,

v.The NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, f/k/a Board of Education of the City School District of New York, et al., Defendants.

No. 10–CV–464 (SLT).

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

March 29, 2013.

Joy Hochstadt, Joy Hochstadt, P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Maxwell Douglas Leighton, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TOWNES, District Judge:

Plaintiff Anna–Marie Thomas (“Plaintiff”), a teacher employed by defendant New York City Department of Education (the “DOE”), brings this action against the DOE; its former Chancellor, Joel I. Klein; and four individuals who, at certain times relevant to this action, worked with Plaintiff at the Brooklyn High School of the Arts (collectively, the “BHSA Defendants”). Plaintiff's complaint (the “Complaint”) principally alleges employment discrimination, advancing causes of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (the “ADEA”); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (the “ADA”); the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 296 (the “NYSHRL”); and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–101 et seq. (the “NYCHRL”), and alluding to—but not specifically alleging—violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. However, the Complaint also includes a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and state-law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants—all six of whom are represented by the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York—now move to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants argue that certain of Plaintiff's employment discrimination claims are time-barred, that most of Plaintiff's six causes of action fail to state a claim, and that Plaintiff's claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL must be dismissed because the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff filed a notice of claim as required by section 3813 of the New York Education Law. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are drawn from the Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff was 64 years old and had been employed by defendant DOE for 35 years at the time this action was commenced (Complaint at ¶¶ 11, 18). Plaintiff began her career with the DOE in 1973, and became “permanently certified” and unconditionally tenured in 1978 ( id. at ¶¶ 22–23). At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff held New York State and City licenses to teach physical education (including health) and to work as a Secondary School Guidance Counselor ( id. at ¶¶ 20–21).

In 2002, after working for many years at Boys and Girls High School in Brooklyn, Plaintiff was “recruited” to work at the newly established Brooklyn High School of the Arts (“BHSA”) ( id. at ¶¶ 24–25).¹ At that time, Plaintiff wanted to work as a guidance counselor—a job that paid $3,000 more annually than did her job as a physical education teacher ( id. at ¶ 32). However, because BHSA had only ninth- and tenth-grade students when it opened in September 2002, BHSA did not yet need guidance counselors ( id.). Accordingly, Plaintiff agreed to work at BHSA on the condition that she “would be appointed as a guidance counselor as the need arose” ( id.).

In each of the next three academic years, BHSA hired one new guidance counselor. In both of the first two years, Plaintiff was “passed over for the Guidance Counselor position” in favor of women in their mid-thirties ( id. at ¶¶ 30–31). In September 2005, defendant Robert Finley—then the principal of BHSA—appointed Drew Martir, a teacher whom Plaintiff believed to be in his mid-twenties, even though Martir was not certified to work as a guidance counselor ( id. at ¶ 44). According to Plaintiff, Martir nonetheless “did the same work as a guidance counselor,” even though he could not receive the $3,000 annual pay differential ( id.).

In October 2006, Plaintiff, who had been teaching health to ninth-graders since 2003, was assigned to replace Dr. Catherine Cabeza, a physical education teacher who had been granted an “extended Health Restoration Leave” ( id. at ¶¶ 46–47). This new assignment involved “teamteaching” in that Plaintiff taught the girls while defendant Daniel Paradis, a 30–year–old Spanish teacher who was then working toward a physical education teaching license, taught the boys ( id. at ¶¶ 48–49, 70). Plaintiff “sensitively attempted to mentor” Paradis by, inter alia, “politely and cautiously” suggesting to Paradis that “many of his practices created hazards” to the students' safety ( id. at ¶¶ 51, 53). Paradis apparently did not welcome this mentoring, but became “more and more reactive and agitated when Plaintiff interacted with him” ( id. at ¶ 53).

Tensions also developed when Plaintiff discontinued a practice, developed prior to Dr. Cabeza's departure, of having two girls attend the boys' class for purposes of taking attendance ( id. at ¶¶ 54–55). Believing that the girls' “regular non-attendance at class and ... performance of a teacher-only duty of making entries on the official attendance records were both highly impermissible,” Plaintiff entered Paradis's class to retrieve the two girls ( id. at ¶ 56). When she did so, “Paradis became highly irate and made various utterances to indicate that he believed that plaintiff was overreaching her authority ...” ( id. at ¶ 57). At some point thereafter, while speaking to Plaintiff, Paradis “threw up to Plaintiff that she was the highest paid teacher in the school” ( id. at ¶ 58). According to Plaintiff, that information “could only have been shared with ... Paradis by school administration” ( id. at ¶ 60).

Tensions escalated on December 4, 2006, when Plaintiff retrieved gym equipment from “a common-use room to which all Phys. Ed. Faculty had access” ( id. at ¶¶ 61–62). At around 1:30 p.m., Paradis approached Plaintiff in a corridor near the students' locker room, calling her “crazy” and otherwise shouting at her for having taken the equipment from “his office” ( id. at ¶ 63). Although Paradis did not actually strike her, Plaintiff alleges that his “menacing tirade would have resulted in aggravated assault” had a third-party not stepped between them ( id. at ¶ 65).

Plaintiff promptly reported the incident to Finley and defendant John Reedy, an Assistant Principal, telling them that she no longer felt safe team-teaching with Paradis and would not conduct her classes in his presence ( id. at ¶¶ 69–70). Although Plaintiff specifically requested that they “admonish ... Paradis for his inappropriate conduct unbecoming a professional,” Finley and Reedy took no action whatsoever ( id. at ¶¶ 71–72). Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that Finley “encouraged ... students to whisper behind her back as they went around and signed a petition to have her fired.” Id. at ¶ 174.

Finley's inaction “emboldened” Paradis, and Plaintiff “experienced an all-encompassing pervasive hostile work environment that she found intolerable” ( id. at ¶ 78). According to Plaintiff, “[t]he acquiescence that BHSA administration displayed ... made Plaintiff suspect that there came a time when ... Paradis was being encouraged to create the hostile work environment so as to harass Plaintiff” ( id. at ¶ 74).

Plaintiff's Reassignment to a Teacher Reassignment Center

On November 16, 2007, Finley, in the presence of Reedy, handed Plaintiff a letter informing her that she was being “reassigned, effective immediately, pending investigation” into an allegation made against her ( id. at ¶¶ 85–88). Although Finley initially claimed to have “no idea” as to what prompted the reassignment, Plaintiff subsequently learned that Finley himself had requested a psychiatric examination of Plaintiff ( id. at ¶¶ 90, 103–04).

On November 19, 2007, Plaintiff was assigned to a Teacher Reassignment Center (“TRC”), colloquially referred to as a “rubber room” ( id. at ¶¶ 95–98). On January 3, 2008, Plaintiff was evaluated by a DOE staff psychiatrist, who “shar [ed]” Finley's request with Plaintiff ( id. at ¶¶ 103–04).² Appended to Finley's request were statements from six students who asserted that Plaintiff had made inappropriate comments in class on November 1, 2007 ( id. at ¶¶ 104–05). Plaintiff, who denies making the inappropriate comments, alleges that two of the statements were made by students who were not enrolled in any of Plaintiff's class, and that the other four statements were made by students who had just received failing grades from Plaintiff on their report cards ( id. at ¶ ¶ 105–06).

Although the psychiatrist found Plaintiff “fit for duty,” Plaintiff remained in the TRC and did not even “become aware of the charges against her” until June 18, 2008 ( id. at ¶¶ 99, 110). An arbitrator was not appointed to Plaintiff's case until October 21, 2008, and a pre-hearing conference was not held until November 14, 2008 ( id. at ¶¶ 153, 157). The hearing itself began on February 10, 2009, but did not conclude until June 24, 2009 ( id. at ¶¶ 164–65). During that hearing, Finley produced transcripts to show that the four students whom Plaintiff had failed were passing Plaintiff's class. Plaintiff “alleges that ... Finley changed their grades to passing, either as a quid pro quo for their statements or simply to demonstrate that they had no motive to retaliate against Plaintiff” ( id. at ¶¶ 108–09). Plaintiff was “completely cleared of all charges” on July 13, 2009 ( id. at ¶ 169).

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered both physically and mentally during her time in the TRC. Plaintiff alleges that she had been walking “with a slight limp” for “about a year prior...