Thomas v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources

• Citation: 124 N.C.App. 698,478 S.E.2d 816
• Decision Date: 17 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. COA95-1310,COA95-1310
• Court: Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
• Parties: Sherry D. THOMAS, both individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Defendant, and Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, Intervenor-Defendant.

Page 816

478 S.E.2d 816

124 N.C.App. 698

Sherry D. THOMAS, both individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Defendant and Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Dan Glickman Intervenor-Defendant.

No. COA95-1310.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Dec. 17, 1996.

Central Carolina Legal Services, Inc. by Stanley B. Sprague, Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

Attorney General Michael F. Easley by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert J. Blum and Associate Attorney General Elizabeth L. Oxley, for defendant-appellee North Carolina Department of Human Resources.

EAGLES, Judge.

In Anderson I, we determined "that 7 U.S.C.A. § 2015(b)(1) (1991) requires that food stamp disqualification periods begin immediately upon a finding that a violation has been committed." 109 N.C.App. at 682, 428 S.E.2d at 268. In reaching this conclusion the Anderson I court supplied the following reasoning:

The Food Stamp Act of 1977 provides that:

Any person who has been found by any State or federal court or administrative agency to have intentionally (A) made a false or misleading statement ... for the purpose of ... receiving ... coupons ... shall, immediately upon the rendering of such determination, become ineligible for further participation in the program ... (ii) for a period of one year upon the second occasion of any such determination.

7 U.S.C.A.2015(b)(1) (1991) (emphasis added). The federal regulations interpreting this statute, enacted by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to 7 U.S.C.A.2013(c) (1991), however, postpone the penalty period mandated by the statute. 7 C.F.R. 273.16(e)(8)(iii) (1992) provides that "[i]f the individual is not eligible for the Program at the time the disqualification period is to begin, the period shall be postponed until the individual applies for and is determined eligible for benefits...."

In reviewing the validity of an agency's regulation, a court "must first determine if the regulation is consistent with the language of the statute." K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1817-18, 100 L.Ed.2d 313, 324 (1988). Both the courts and the agencies "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694, 703, reh'g denied,468 U.S. 1227, 105 S.Ct. 28, 82 L.Ed.2d 921 (1984)). Therefore, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and the regulation is contrary to that language, "that is the end of the matter" and the regulation must be declared invalid. See K mart, 486 U.S. at 291-92, 108 S.Ct. at 1817-18, 100 L.Ed.2d at 324; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d at 703. While traditionally the courts pay deference to an agency regulation, such deference is inappropriate where the regulation alters the clearly expressed intent of Congress. K mart, 486 U.S. at 291, 108 S.Ct. at 1817-18, 100 L.Ed.2d at 324. Only where the language of the statute is unclear, ambiguous, or fails to answer the specific question at issue should deference be paid to a contested agency interpretation. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d at 703.

The specific issue in the case at bar is clearly resolved by the statute. The language of the statute requires a penalty of a specified period of time, to commence immediately upon a determination that a food stamp recipient has violated the provisions of the Food Stamp Act.

Anderson I, 109 N.C.App. at 682-83, 428 S.E.2d at 268-69. Since Anderson I, and during the pendency of this appeal, the USDA amended its regulations to eliminate the postponement period declared invalid in Anderson I. The current appeal arises and persists because, in the period between the issuance of Anderson I on 20 April 1993 and the effective date the USDA changed its regulations on 1 February 1996, the NCDHR refused to apply the rule of Anderson I to other similarly situated plaintiffs; instead, the NCDHR continued to enforce its regulations interpreting the Food Stamp Act in contravention of the opinion of this Court.

I.

Plaintiff first argues that each member of the class affected is entitled to the Food Stamps they would have received between 20 April 1993 and 1 February 1996 had the NCDHR uniformly applied Anderson I. Plaintiff bases this argument on the principle first articulated in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), that "[f]ood-stamp benefits ... 'are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.' " Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128, 105 S.Ct. 2520, 2528, 86 L.Ed.2d 81, 92 (1985) (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262, 90 S.Ct. at 1017, 25 L.Ed.2d at 295). We need not further address plaintiff's argument here, however, because defendant NCDHR has conceded in a response filed here to an order of this Court that the members of the class identified by plaintiff are entitled to the full monetary compensation prayed for by plaintiff. Subject to some further refinement, the NCDHR has established a compensation plan to this effect this goal with a target completion date of 31 March 1997.

Plaintiff nevertheless expresses concern regarding the administration of the NCDHR's proposed compensation plan. Specifically, plaintiff worries that the NCDHR's plan will afford each member of the class affected only an average compensation rate, rather than affording each an amount specifically tailored to that person's individual circumstances. We note, however, that no class has of yet been certified by the trial court in this action and that no potential claimant's rights have been prejudiced. If an individual is inadequately compensated, that person retains every right to pursue their claim administratively before the NCDHR and thereafter in the courts of this State.

II.

Plaintiff next argues that the North Carolina Constitution requires the NCDHR to acquiesce in statutory interpretations made by North Carolina's appellate courts to the extent that they conflict with the NCDHR's interpretations. Plaintiff contends that the NCDHR and other administrative agencies of the State must give full effect to the statutory constructions of this court both as to the named litigants and as to all persons similarly situated. We agree.

A.

Prior to addressing the merits of plaintiff's argument, we note that a question of mootness arises here. Now that the USDA has revised its regulations in accordance with this Court's order in Anderson I to eliminate the disqualification postponement requirement, defendant NCDHR assures this Court that it has voluntarily ceased its refusal to apply the principles of Anderson I equally to all similarly situated persons. Defendant argues that, by voluntarily ceasing to apply Anderson I uniformly, the challenged conduct no longer exists to be challenged and the case is rendered moot. In turn, plaintiff counters that an exception to the mootness doctrine applies and that we must therefore reach the merits of this issue. We agree with plaintiff's contention that the mootness doctrine does not preclude our review of the merits here.

For over a century, both the courts of this State and the federal courts have generally refrained from addressing questions deemed moot. See, e.g., Crawley v. Woodfin, 78 N.C. 4, 4 (1878); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 132-33, 40 L.Ed. 293, 293-94 (1895). In State court, the exclusion of moot questions is considered "a principle of judicial restraint ...," N.C. Council of Churches v. State of North Carolina, 120 N.C.App. 84, 88, 461 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1995), aff'd, 343 N.C. 117, 468 S.E.2d 58 (1996), while in federal court the mootness doctrine is considered to have constitutional jurisdictional underpinnings. E.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317-18, 108 S.Ct. 592, 600-02, 98 L.Ed.2d 686, 703 (1988). Despite this difference in origin, the limits of the mootness doctrine are articulated almost identically in the federal courts and the courts of this State. E.g., In re Jackson, 84 N.C.App. 167, 170-71, 352 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1987) (citing Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 1494-95, 23 L.Ed.2d 1, 4 (1969)). If anything, the mootness doctrine is less restrictive in the courts of North Carolina than in the federal courts. See, e.g., Matthews v. Dept. of Transportation, 35 N.C.App. 768, 770, 242 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1978).

"The general rule is that an appeal presenting a question which has become moot will be dismissed." Matthews, 35 N.C.App. at 770, 242 S.E.2d at 654. This general rule, however, is subject to at least five well-known exceptions. E.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 1074, 71 L.Ed.2d 152, 159 (1982) (holding that "a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a ... court of its power to determine the legality of the practice."); In re Jackson, 84 N.C.App. at 170-71, 352 S.E.2d at 452 (citing Moore, 394 U.S. at 816, 89 S.Ct. at 1494-95, 23 L.Ed.2d at 4) (holding that courts may review cases that are otherwise moot but that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."); Matthews, 35 N.C.App. at 770, 242 S.E.2d at 654 (citing Leak v. High Point City Council, 25 N.C.App. 394, 397, 213 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1975)) (holding that the court has a "duty" to address an otherwise moot case when the "question involved is a matter of public interest."); In re Hatley, 291 N.C. 693, 694, 231 S.E.2d 633, 634 (1977) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-56, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1898-99, 20 L.Ed.2d 917, 930-31 (1968)) (stating that a case must be decided, "even when the terms of the judgment below have been fully carried out, if collateral legal consequences of an adverse nature can reasonably be expected to result therefrom...."); Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C....