Thomas v. Oldham

• Decision Date: 16 March 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. D-4559,94-0207,s. D-4559
• Citation: 895 S.W.2d 352
• Parties: 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 375 Sharon P. THOMAS and Alice McNeal, Petitioners, v. Howard OLDHAM and City of Houston, Respondents. Daniel GIBSON, Petitioner, v. Candace Katamay SPINKS, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 352

895 S.W.2d 352

38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 375

Sharon P. THOMAS and Alice McNeal, Petitioners, v. Howard OLDHAM and City of Houston, Respondents.

Daniel GIBSON, Petitioner, v. Candace Katamay SPINKS, Respondent.

Nos. D-4559, 94-0207.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Sept. 21, 1994.

Decided March 16, 1995.

Alan D. Bynum, James H. Brannon, Houston, for Sharon P. Thomas and Alice McNeal.

Andrea Chan, Houston, for Howard Oldham and City of Houston.

J. Arnold Aguilar, Lisa Marie Ellis, Charles V. Willette, Jr., Brownsville, Ronald H. Clark, Sherman, for Daniel Gibson.

Dennis Sanchez, John Haywood, Brownsville, for Candace Katamay Spinks.

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GONZALEZ, HIGHTOWER, HECHT, CORNYN, ENOCH, SPECTOR and OWEN, Justices, joined.

A judgment in an action against a governmental unit under the Texas Tort Claims Act "bars any action involving the same subject matter" against the employee whose acts gave rise to the claim. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.106. The primary issue presented in these consolidated cases is whether section 101.106 bars the simultaneous rendition of judgment against a governmental unit and its employee. Holding that it does, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the courts of appeals in Oldham v. Thomas, 864 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.App.--Houston, 1993), and Gibson v. Spinks, 869 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi, 1993).

I Oldham v. Thomas

Howard Oldham, while driving in the course and scope of his employment with the City of Houston, rear-ended a car driven by Sharon Thomas and owned by Thomas' mother Alice McNeal. Thomas suffered injuries to her neck requiring surgery, while McNeal, who was not in the car at the time of the accident, suffered only property damage. Thomas and McNeal sued both Oldham and the City of Houston under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 101.001-101.109.

At trial, the jury awarded Thomas $500,000 for her personal injuries and McNeal $3,300 for her property damage. The court rendered judgment for Thomas against Oldham and the City jointly and severally for $250,000, the City's limit of liability for personal injuries under the Tort Claims Act. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.023(c). The court rendered judgment solely against Oldham for the balance of Thomas' injuries, plus prejudgment interest, totalling $429,508.

For McNeal, the court rendered judgment against Oldham and the City jointly and severally for her property damage, which was well within a municipality's separate liability cap of $100,000 for injury to property. See id.

Both Oldham and the City appealed. Oldham argued that, under section 101.106, the judgment rendered against the City barred the concurrent judgment rendered against him. The court of appeals agreed, reforming the trial court's judgment to provide that Thomas and McNeal recover nothing from Oldham. ¹ The City additionally urged that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on "sudden emergency," and that the evidence was factually and legally insufficient to support Thomas' and McNeal's damage awards. The court of appeals rejected these arguments, affirming the judgment against the City in all respects.

Gibson v. Spinks

While driving in the course and scope of his employment with the Town of South Padre Island, Daniel Gibson ran a red light, colliding with the vehicle in which Candace Spinks was riding. Spinks, who suffered a lower back injury, sued the Town and Gibson. At trial, the court, sitting without a jury, awarded Spinks $350,000 for her injuries. The court rendered judgment against Gibson and the Town, jointly and severally, for $350,000 plus interest and costs, but further ordered that the Town's liability "be limited as a municipality to Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars." See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.023(c). The Town subsequently paid its liability limit of $250,000 to Spinks.

Gibson appealed, raising the bar of section 101.106. The court, expressly disagreeing with the court of appeals' holding in Oldham, held that section 101.106 does not bar the rendition of concurrent judgments against a governmental unit and its employee. The court accordingly affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

We granted writ of error in both Oldham and Gibson to resolve the conflict concerning the scope of section 101.106.

II

Section 101.106 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code provides as follows:

A judgment in an action or a settlement of a claim under this chapter bars any action involving the same subject matter by the claimant against the employee of the governmental unit whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.

Oldham and Gibson argue that this provision bars the rendition of judgment against an employee concurrently with rendition of judgment against the governmental employer. We agree.

It is, of course, beyond dispute that a prior judgment against the governmental employer bars continuation of an action against the employee that has not yet proceeded to judgment. See, e.g., Cox v. Klug, 855 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1993, no writ); Davis v. Mathis, 846 S.W.2d 84, 88-89 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, no writ); City of Bedford v. Schattman, 776 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1989, orig. proceeding); Steele v. Barbian, 620 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1981, no writ). This Court, however, has never addressed the extent to which section 101.106 might provide broader protection.

The express language of section 101.106 states that a judgment in an action against the governmental unit bars any action against the employee. It does not require that the judgment against the governmental unit precede any judgment against the employee, or otherwise impose particular timing requirements. Under these circumstances, we hold that the bar of section 101.106 applies if the settlement or judgment in the action against the governmental unit occurs at any time before or during the pendency of the "action" against the employee.

Thomas and Spinks do not directly dispute this conclusion, but argue that an "action" culminates when judgment is first rendered. Further, they interpret section 101.106 as applying only if the judgment against the government is in place before the action against the employee culminates in judgment. Thus, a judgment against the governmental unit does not bar a concurrent judgment against the employee.

We believe that the statute is unclear as to whether it would apply when the action against the employee concludes simultaneously with rendition of judgment against the government. It is not necessary to resolve that issue here, however, because we disagree that an "action" ends with the trial court's rendition of judgment.

The term "action" is generally synonymous with "suit," which is a demand of one's rights in court. See Bradley v. Etessam, 703 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This Court has likewise equated "action" with "suit." See United Production Corp. v. Hughes, 137 Tex. 21, 152 S.W.2d 327, 330 (1941) ("To constitute the proceeding 'a suit' or 'action,' in any legal sense, it is essential that it rest in a court, with the power to hear it.").

Under Texas procedure, a plaintiff's suit does not end with rendition of judgment. Rather, the parties may file one or more motions for new trial within 30 days after rendition of judgment. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(a), (b). The trial court may in its discretion grant such a motion within 75 days after the judgment is signed, continuing the action for a new trial. Also, the parties may file motions to modify, correct, or reform the judgment within thirty days after the judgment is signed, which may result in a new and different judgment being rendered. Id. If a motion for new trial or motion to modify the judgment is overruled, the trial court still retains plenary power to vacate, modify, correct or reform the judgment for an additional thirty day period. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(e).

We hold that a party's "suit" or "action" continues at least until the expiration of the trial court's plenary power over the proceeding. ² Because the judgments against the municipal employers in these cases were rendered during the period in which the trial court retained plenary power over the actions against the employees, those actions were barred under section 101.106.

Thomas and Spinks rely on Garcia v. Jones, 147 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1940, writ dism'd judgm't cor.), in which the court stated that "a final judgment is one that terminates an action." Thomas and Spinks conclude from this authority that an action terminates when judgment is first rendered. The issue in Garcia, however, was not when an action terminates, but whether the proceeding underlying the appeal constituted an "action" in the first place. ³ The broad language from Garcia cited by Thomas and Spinks will not support their position here.

Thomas and Spinks also rely on Madisonville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kyle, 658 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.1983) (per curiam). There, the trial court rendered a joint and several judgment against the defendant school district and its employee whose actions gave rise to the claim. Both the school district and the employee appealed, arguing that the damages were excessive. Because this Court affirmed the award against both defendants, ⁴ Thomas and Spinks contend that we adopted their construction of section 101.106. The individual defendant in Kyle, however, did not raise section 101.106, and the scope of that provision was not an issue before the Court. ⁵

Our construction accords with the federal courts' treatment of a similar federal statute. A judgment against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act "constitute[s] a complete bar to any action by the claimant by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." 28 U.S.C. § 2676. ...