Thomas v. E. Penn Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:19CV312 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | ASIYAH THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. EAST PENN MANUFACTURING CO., Defendant. |
Before this court is Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. 14.) Asiyah Thomas ("Plaintiff") brings racial discrimination claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and North Carolina Public Policy against her former employer, East Penn Manufacturing Co. ("Defendant"). Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated against her based on her race when she was terminated, retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity, and subjected her to a racially hostile work environment. (Id.) Defendant counters that Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata or, alternatively, failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
When considering a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), a district court is "required to accept all well-pleaded allegations of [the] complaint as true and draw all reasonable factual inferences in [plaintiff's] favor." Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2014). The following facts are taken from the Complaint, Answer, and documents attached to the Answer. Defendant, for the purposes of its motion, concedes all facts as stated in the Complaint. (Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Def.'s Br.") (Doc. 15) at 3.)
Plaintiff is a resident of Forsyth County, North Carolina, and a former "employee" of Defendant as defined in Title VII. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 3.) Plaintiff is an African-American woman. (Id. ¶ 5.) She was employed by Defendant from March 2015 until December 18, 2018. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant is a company incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant owned the Winston-Salem location where Plaintiff was employed. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Soon after she began working for Defendant in 2015, Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to racial discrimination. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleged numerous instances ofdiscriminatory behavior. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff reported the alleged conduct to her supervisors, both of whom told her to stop complaining. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff eventually retained counsel, and on December 1, 2016, she filed her first EEOC Charge. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 17.) That charge alleged ongoing racial and pregnancy discrimination by both coworkers and supervisors. (Answer (Doc. 12) at 30-59, 61, 64-66.)
Plaintiff alleges that, after she filed her 2016 EEOC Charge, she continued to face discrimination. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 18; Answer (Doc. 12) at 17 (Plaintiff's 2018 EEOC Charge).) Plaintiff alleges numerous additional instances of discriminatory conduct by her coworkers and at least one supervisor. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 18.) Plaintiff's supervisors again told her to stop complaining and took no action. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff filed a pro se lawsuit in this court on April 4, 2017 ("Thomas I"). (Id. ¶ 23.) That lawsuit was based on her December 1, 2016 EEOC charge. (Id.) Plaintiff broadly alleged racial and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. Thomas v. E. Penn Mfg. Co., No. 1:17CV306, 2018 WL 1578156, at *1, *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2018). This court dismissed that lawsuit as time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) since Plaintiff filed her charge of discrimination more than 180 days from thedate of the last alleged act of discrimination. Id. at *4-5. On March 29, 2018, the court dismissed Thomas I with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. at *5-6; (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 26.)
Just after Plaintiff filed Thomas I, she participated in the investigation of a coworker's own EEOC Charge (the "Lindsay EEOC Charge Investigation"). (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.)
Plaintiff alleges that from "March 29, 2018 until December 18, 2018 plaintiff continued to be subjected to severe, pervasive, and continuous discrimination and retaliation . . . ." (Id. ¶ 27.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the following facts:
(Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that she received a disciplinary write-up shortly after Thomas I was dismissed. (Id. ¶ 28.)
Plaintiff alleges the safety-related infraction cited in the write-up never occurred. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed another EEOC Charge in April 2018 alleging a hostile work environment and retaliation for her previous lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 31.) That EEOC Charge cited the disciplinary write-up and actions by white-coworkers to disrupt her workspace. (Answer (Doc 12.) at 17.) Plaintiff received her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on December 26, 2018. (Id. at 18.)
On December 11, 2018, a large snowstorm impacted the Winston-Salem area. (Id. ¶ 32.) Though it is not entirely clear from the Complaint, it appears to suggest that Defendant's "sign out" system was impacted by the weather, and employees were not able to sign out on December 11, 2018. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she was given permission by a supervisor to leave early on December 11, though she was not able to sign out. (Id.) "Upon information and believe [sic], on December 12, 2018, defendant had other employees backdate the December 11, 2018 sign-out sheet while plaintiff was not present, in order to create a pretextual reason to terminate plaintiff." (Id. ¶ 33.) The incident was investigated by Defendant, and Plaintiff was subsequently terminated on December 18, 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.)Plaintiff's vacant position was filled by a "less qualified white employee." (Id. ¶ 36.)
Plaintiff filed another EEOC Charge on February 1, 2019, citing her allegedly discriminatory termination. (Id. ¶ 39.) The EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter for that charge on February 20, 2019. (Id. ¶ 40.)
Plaintiff filed this present suit ("Thomas II") on March 19, 2019. (Id. at 17.) The Thomas II Complaint's allegation in paragraphs 6 through 181 encompass many of the same factual allegations raised in Thomas I. (Compare Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 6-16, with Answer (Doc. 12) at 22-66.)
Plaintiff brings four claims for relief. Claim One is for Race Discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 42-47.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant discriminated against her by "[s]ubjecting plaintiff to a racially hostile workplace" and by "[t]erminating plaintiff's employment," both acts in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). (Id. ¶ 44.) Claim Two is for Defendant's allegedretaliation against Plaintiff for engaging in protected activity, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3. (Id. ¶¶ 48-53.) Claim Three alleges race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, specifically Defendant's racially hostile work environment and its racially discriminatory discharge of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 54-59.) Finally, Claim Four is for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of the Public Policy of North Carolina as stated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2. (Id. ¶¶ 60-65.)
Defendant filed an Answer raising the affirmative defense of res judicata. (Answer (Doc. 12) at 11.) Shortly after filing its Answer, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). (Doc. 14.) Defendant filed a supporting brief, (Def.'s Br. (Doc. 15)), Plaintiff responded, , and Defendant replied, (Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Def.'s Reply") (Doc. 23)). The Magistrate Judge stayed discovery pending this court's adjudication of Defendant's 12(c) motion. (Text Order 10/07/2019.)
For the reasons stated herein, the court will grant Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's retaliation and hostile work environment claims. The court will deny the motion as toPlaintiff's wrongful discharge claims under Title VII, § 1981, and North Carolina Public Policy.
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Such motions are "designed to dispose of cases when the material facts are not in dispute and the court can judge the case on its merits by considering the pleadings." Preston v. Leake, 629 F. Supp. 2d 517, 521 (E.D.N.C. 2009). The pleadings, matters of public record, exhibits to the pleadings, "and exhibits to the Rule 12(c) motions that [are] integral to the complaint and authentic" may be considered. Massey, 759 F.3d at 347-48 (citation omitted).
"The standard of review for Rule 12(c) motions is the same as that under Rule 12(b)(6)." Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2014). Since the standards are the same, a court reviewing a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) must "apply the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion," meaning that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 814 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "[T]hecourt must accept all of the non-movant's factual averments as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor." SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., No. 1:15CV360, 2016 WL 922792, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2016) (citations omitted). This court does not, however,...
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