Thomas v. Reynolds
Decision Date | 27 May 1937 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 211 |
Parties | THOMAS v. REYNOLDS. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; Walter B. Jones Judge.
Bill in equity by Elizabeth S. Reynolds against Elizabeth Reynolds, a minor, for construction of the will of Gibson Reynolds deceased. From a decree for a complainant, J. Render Thomas Jr., as guardian ad litem for the minor respondent, appeals.
Affirmed.
Where language of testamentary instrument is clear and unambiguous there is no field for construction, and court will ascertain intent from instrument alone.
J. Render Thomas, Jr., of Montgomery, for appellant.
Rushton, Crenshaw & Rushton, of Montgomery, for appellee.
The administration of the estate was duly moved into a court of equity and construction of a will is sought by the executrix under such instrument.
The bill is aided by the exhibit thereto. Grimsley v. First Ave. C. & L. Co., 217 Ala. 159, 115 So. 90.
The salient facts averred are thus stated by the pleader:
The guardian for the after-born child answered saying:
The executrix as a witness gave the names and ages of her children, all of whom were born before the death of testator on March 13, 1937; that testator was a practicing physician on October 24, 1935, when the will was made , and at such time he knew that another child would shortly be born as the result of their marriage, and which duly eventuated to his knowledge.
The trial court rendered decree, saying: "*** upon consideration of the testimony, which was taken orally before the Court, is of the opinion that the testator, Dr. Gibson Reynolds, who is shown by the evidence to have been a practicing physician of over thirty years' experience, was well aware, at the time he executed his last will and testament, on October 24, 1935, that another child would be born to him and his wife within a few weeks; and the Court is further of the opinion that, under the provision of the last sentence of Item IX of said will, viz.: 'I have made no provision for my children for the reason that I have confidence in my wife and I feel that she will deal justly with them and provide suitably for them', the testator had in mind and intended to exclude from the provisions of the will the unborn child as well as the two children then living at the time of the making of said will."
The pertinent provisions of the statute, to which reference is made in respective pleadings, are:
"Whenever a testator has a child, born after the making of his will, either in his lifetime or after his death, and no provision is made in the will in any way for such contingency, such birth operates as a revocation of the will, so far as to allow such child to take the same share of the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate." Code, § 10585.
The rule of the common law only protected a subsequent marriage and birth of issue; the birth of issue alone had no effect upon and such issue was cut off by will as to property so devised. Doe v. Lancashire, 3 Durn. & E. 24, 5 Term R. 48. It was to meet this inconsistency that the statute was incorporated into our several codes. Woodliff v. Dunlap, 187 Ala. 255, 65 So. 936.
The subject-matter is dealt with by Mr. Freeman in his note to Wilson v. Fosket, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 400, 39 Am.Dec. 736, 740, 741. The authorities collected by that eminent editor of law reports are to the effect:
"In very many of the states and territories statutes have been passed similar to that of Massachusetts, providing that when any testator omits in his will to provide for any of his children, or for the issue of any deceased child, such child or issue shall take the same share to which it would have been entitled if the decedent had died intestate, unless it shall appear that such omission was intentional and not by mistake or accident: California, Civ.Code, sec. 1307; Dakota, Rev.Code (1877), 2d ed., p. 315, sec. 715; Michigan, 2 Comp.L. (1871), p. 1375; Maine, R.S. (1871), p. 564; Minnesota, Statutes (1878), p. 570; Nebraska, Gen.Stat. (1873), p. 304; Nevada, 1 Comp.L. (1873), p. 201; Utah, Comp.L. (1876), p. 272; Vermont, Gen.Stat. (1862), p. 380. In Missouri, New Hampshire, and Oregon similar provision is made for children and the issue of deceased children, living at the making of the will or born afterwards, and not 'named' or referred to or...
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...is necessary to look to facts outside of the will, such facts will be considered as of the time when the will was made. Thomas v. Reynolds, 234 Ala. 212, 174 So. 753; Fillmore v. Yarbrough, 246 Ala. 375, 20 So.2d But in the foregoing situation there is no statute to consider as there is in ......
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Ide v. Harris, 7 Div. 237
...reading all the provisions of the will in the light of the environment of such testator at the time he executed the will. Thomas v. Reynolds, 234 Ala. 212, 174 So. 753; Kimbrough v. Dickinson, 247 Ala. 324, 24 So.2d 424; Adams v. Jeffcoat, 252 Ala. 501, 41 So.2d * * * * * * 'In connection w......
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