Thomas v. SH Pawley Lumber Company

• Decision Date: 13 July 1962
• Docket Number: No. 13524.,13524.
• Citation: 303 F.2d 604
• Parties: Mrs. Jessie Mae THOMAS, as Administratrix of the Estate of James Everette Thomas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. S. H. PAWLEY LUMBER COMPANY, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

303 F.2d 604 (1962)

Mrs. Jessie Mae THOMAS, as Administratrix of the Estate of James Everette Thomas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. S. H. PAWLEY LUMBER COMPANY, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13524.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

April 2, 1962.

Rehearing Denied July 13, 1962.

David E. Rosenfeld, Terre Haute, Ind., for appellant.

Robert G. Wolfe, Terre Haute, Ind., for defendant-appellant.

C. William Allen, Terre Haute, Ind., Harold H. Clokey, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.

Before SCHNACKENBERG and KILEY, Circuit Judges, and MERCER, District Judge.

MERCER, District Judge.

Plaintiff's decedent, James Everette Thomas, died May 13, 1960, as a result of a collision between a tractor-trailer combination then being operated by him and a truck owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff filed suit for damages for wrongful death. By its verdict, the jury found the issues for plaintiff and awarded her damages in the amount of $175,000.00. Defendant appeals from a judgment entered on that verdict.

On May 13, 1960, plaintiff's decedent was engaged in the operation of a tractor-trailer combination from Atlanta, Georgia, to Chicago, Illinois, over U. S. Highway 41. On the same day, defendant's employee, Godbey, driving a Chevrolet truck owned by defendant was engaged in towing a disabled Ford truck also owned by defendant, from Burlington, Indiana, to defendant's principal place of business at Cayuga, Indiana.

Defendant's trucks were fastened together by a log chain, fourteen feet in length, connected from the left rear of the towing vehicle to the left front of the towed vehicle. The vehicle being towed was steered by defendant's employee, Sayre.

At about 9:30 p. m., defendant's vehicles, southbound on U. S. 41, and the northbound vehicle being then operated by decedent met on a bridge over a stream known as Coal Creek, near Attica, Indiana. While thus meeting upon that bridge, the towed vehicle and decedent's vehicle collided. After the collision, decedent's tractor-trailer continued its northerly progress, off the bridge and across the west, or southbound, lane of the highway where it then overturned off the travelled portion of the highway. The tractor-trailer was demolished. The decedent was thrown therefrom and was dead when located shortly after the collision.

The principal contentions advanced for reversal relate to instructions. At the close of the evidence, plaintiff tendered nineteen instructions and defendant tendered twenty-seven. The record discloses that on the evening prior to those tenders, the court submitted forty-six instructions to counsel for each party for inspection. The court refused all instructions tendered by the parties and gave the instructions prepared by the court.

Principally, defendant contends that its tendered instruction No. 14 should have been given and that certain of the given instructions were not supported by the evidence.

Defendant's tendered instruction No. 14 would have advised the jurors that their verdict must be for the defendant if the jury found that "defendant's truck" was at all times west of the center of the pavement, or if, from all the evidence, the jury should be unable to determine whether defendant's truck was, immediately prior to the collision, to the east of the center of the pavement.¹

That contention must be rejected, inasmuch as the instruction, if given, would mandatorily have removed from the jury's consideration all questions except the question of who crossed the center line. Improper lane usage is prima facie negligence, only, under Indiana law, not negligence per se. E. g., Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 98 N.E. 2d 896, 900; Hancock Truck Lines v. Butcher, 229 Ind. 36, 94 N.E.2d 537, 542; Lee v. Dickerson, Ind.App., 171 N.E.2d 698, 702-703.

In the Lee case, error was assigned upon the refusal of an instruction which, after quoting the statutory requirement that all vehicles be driven on the right half of the roadway,² would have told the jury that if it found that defendant had violated the statute "such conduct" "would constitute negligence." The court held the instruction properly refused because it failed to advise the jury that such a violation is prima facie negligence, only, which "may be rebutted by a showing of reasonable excuse or justification." 171 N.E.2d at 703.

In the Larkins case, the court said: "Upon proof that the defendant had violated the statute requiring motorists to drive on the right side of the road we think it would be proper to instruct the jury that if they find from a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the provisions of the statute, he was guilty of negligence, unless they further find from a fair preponderance of the evidence that compliance was impossible or noncompliance was excusable because of circumstances beyond his control." 98 N.E.2d at 900.

Again in Freeport Motor Cas. Co. v. Chafin, Ind.App., 170 N.E.2d 819, 822, the court said that evidence of improper lane usage, coupled with evidence that compliance with the statute was made impossible by forces beyond the control of the violator, presents a question of fact for the jury upon the issue of negligence.

We need not further belabor the point, since we are convinced that the evidence adduced was, at least, sufficient to present a fact question for the jury whether defendant's vehicle was or was not in its proper lane. The instruction was incomplete and, as posed, was an erroneous and misleading statement of the law. It was properly refused.

Moreover, the appendix filed by defendant contains a part, only, of the instructions given by the court. Without the whole of the court's charge before us, we must assume that the court's charge adequately stated to the jury the law with respect to lane usage.

Defendant next contends that there was not sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury upon the specifications of negligence alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff's theory was that defendant was negligent in towing the Ford truck in the manner in which it was towed, and that the towed truck struck the west bannister of the bridge and caromed off the bannister into the east lane of the pavement and decedent's path of travel.

Actually defendant's contention rests largely upon the premise that its employees testified positively that the Ford truck was at all times west of the center line of the pavement. We find that premise faulty, both because the testimony of defendant's employees was contradictory and because their testimony is in part contradicted by evidence of physical facts and the testimony of other witnesses.

Thus, although Godbey, the driver of the towing vehicle, did testify that he had observed the towed vehicle enter the bridge in the west lane of the pavement and intimated by his testimony that the towed vehicle broke loose from his truck at the time of the impact of the collision, he later testified that he felt the towed vehicle break loose when decedent's vehicle was "on the east side of my vehicle in the north bound lane." Although Sayre, driver of the towed vehicle, testified that his truck had been west of the center line at all times, he also testified that he felt the rear end of his truck being pushed to the left side of the bridge "almost instantaneously" as decedent's cab "passed my cab."

Defendant's Ford truck involved in the collision was approximately 22½ feet in length overall. The point of impact upon the Ford was approximately at the rear wheels thereof.

Plaintiff's witness, Taylor, testified that Godbey had told him within a few minutes after the collision that the towed truck had hit the bridge and broken loose or had broken loose and hit the bridge.

The front end of the bed of the towing truck was solid wood extending to within eight or nine inches of the edge of the bed proper, except that a hole had been cut to correspond with the rear window of the cab. Sayre testified that he could not see the road directly in front of the attached vehicles, but that he could see all of the rear of the towing vehicle, the lights of approaching traffic through the hole in the front of the bed of the towing vehicle, a part...