Thomas v. Southdown Sugars, Inc., Civ. A. No. 78-1916.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1980
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 78-1916.
• Citation: 484 F. Supp. 1317
• Parties: Jules THOMAS, Jr. v. SOUTHDOWN SUGARS, INC. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

484 F. Supp. 1317

Jules THOMAS, Jr. v. SOUTHDOWN SUGARS, INC. et al.

Civ. A. No. 78-1916.

United States District Court, E. D. Louisiana.

February 26, 1980.

Donald Juneau, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.

Robert K. McCalla, New Orleans, La., for defendants.

CHARLES SCHWARTZ, Jr., District Judge.

This matter came on for hearing on February 20, 1980 on motion of defendant to dismiss. After careful consideration of the memoranda of the parties, oral argument of counsel, the record, and the law, the Court assigns the following reasons for ruling:

The original and amended complaints and record reflect the following sequence of events. Plaintiff, a black, was employed by Southdown Sugars, Inc. as a carbon (filtration) house working foreman. During August 1975 he applied for the position of sugar boiler. Two other employees also applied for the position of sugar boiler — Willie Scott, a black, and Steve Melancon, a white. Willie Scott had seniority over plaintiff, but Steve Melancon did not. The position of sugar boiler has two such classifications, a "white sugar boiler" and a "raw sugar boiler." Although both sugar boiler positions have the same job classification and receive the same rate of pay, the raw sugar boiler is considered the superior position.¹

Willie Scott was awarded the position, apparently because of his seniority. However, during the 1975 grinding season Scott was transferred to the job of evaporator (a superior position), plaintiff was the given the job of white sugar boiler, and Steve Melancon was awarded the job of raw sugar boiler. At the end of the grinding season plaintiff was told his assignment had only been a temporary one and Willie Scott was transferred back to white sugar boiler while plaintiff was transferred back to his old job as carbon (filtration) house working foreman. Steve Melancon remained in his position as raw sugar boiler.

On January 19, 1976 plaintiff filed Charge No. XXX-XX-XXXX (Charge I) with the E.E.O.C. which alleged the following:

"I believe that the above-named company discriminated against me because of my race, black, by demoting me in status and pay. I was promoted to a sugar boiler in 8/75. In 1/76 I was demoted from a sugar boiler to a working foreman. I have not received any warnings about my work performance. I believe John Campbell (W/M) is responsible for my demotion.

Also I believe that the above named union failed to represent me because of my race, black."

A notice of right to sue for Charge I was issued on March 17, 1978, and this proceeding was timely filed on June 13, 1978.

Although plaintiff in his charge uses the word "demotion" to describe his complaint, it is obvious that he is referring to the chain of events which resulted in a white (Melancon) with less seniority being retained in the higher job classification at the end of the grinding season and he was sent back (or one might say demoted) to the lower job. It would be grossly unfair to restrict this laborer to a strict definition of the word "demotion" or to expect him to be as articulate as those whose occupation depends in large measure upon their choice of language.

On February 13, 1976, plaintiff filed Charge No. XXX-XX-XXXX (Charge II) with the E.E.O.C. which alleged the following:

"Since I filed a charge of discrimination based on racial discrimination I have been continually harassed and intimidated by company officials. I am being required to perform duties out of my job description."

In accordance with E.E.O.C. procedures defendant Southdown Sugars, Inc. received timely notice of this complaint. However, for some unexplained reason (unless we conclude that the E.E.O.C. felt that the investigation of Charge I implicitly encompassed these charges) a right to sue notice for Charge II was not issued until October 3, 1978, or almost four months after this suit was filed.

Whether or not it was motivated by Charges I and II is not known, but in June 1976 plaintiff was promoted to the position of white sugar boiler and in May of 1977 was promoted to raw sugar boiler, i. e., he was finally placed on a par with Steven Melancon over whom he enjoyed a senior status. However, this promotion was short-lived and he was demoted back to white sugar boiler. Defendant claims that the demotion was due to poor job performance and this remains a material allegation of fact which is in dispute between the parties. After this action on the part of defendant Southdown Sugars, Inc., plaintiff on July 26, 1977 filed Charge No. XXX-XX-XXXX (Charge III) with the E.E.O.C. which alleged the following:

"I have been discriminated against because of my race, black and because I filed previous charges of discrimination against this company. Specifically:

About two months ago i. e. May 1977 I was given the position of Raw Sugar Boiler. I performed this job until today July 26, 1977 when I was demoted. The reason given for demoting me was that I was causing the company to lose money. I was never warned or reprimanded while performing the job.

I feel that I was treated unfairly by the company because of my race and because I filed previous charges against them. I have been confronted many times by company officials regarding these charges."

A notice of right to sue for Charge III was issued on March 17, 1978 and this proceeding was filed within ninety days.

Plaintiff has amended his original complaint to offset defendant Southdown Sugars, Inc.'s contention that the complaint alleged facts which are only sufficient to sustain those matters referred to in Charge I and therefore he has not proceeded timely to sue for matters in Charges II and III and thus he is barred from asserting them. Plaintiff has also amended his complaint to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Insofar as Charge I is concerned (and since for the reasons hereinabove set forth we do not restrict the interpretation of the word "demotion" as sought by defendant Southdown Sugars, Inc.), plaintiff alleges a prima facie case under Title VII, McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978), and because there are material facts in dispute, summary judgment is not appropriate.

Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to pursue Charges II and III depends on whether the allegations of the original complaint are sufficient to encompass them and whether or not, if an amendment is required, the amended facts arise out of the same act or occurrence as set forth in the original complaint which permits them to relate back to the date of the original pleading in accordance with ...