Thomas v. State
| Decision Date | 18 April 1978 |
| Docket Number | 2 Div. 215 |
| Citation | 357 So.2d 1015 |
| Parties | Charlie G. THOMAS v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
William H. Traeger, III, for Lloyd, Dinning & Boggs, Demopolis, for appellant.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen. and David W. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State, appellee.
This is an appeal from an indictment and conviction of assault with intent to ravish. Sentence was fixed by the trial court at twelve years' imprisonment. The appellant is represented by court appointed counsel both at trial and on appeal.
At trial there was no motion to exclude the evidence presented by the state, no motion for a directed verdict or request for an affirmative charge, and no exception to the oral charge of the court. The motion for new trial did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence that the appellant is guilty as charged is undisputed. The record reveals that on December 11, 1976, the appellant attacked the prosecutrix, rendered her unconscious, pulled her pants and underwear down around her knees, "straddled" her as she lay on the sidewalk and beat her about the face and head. The only witness for the appellant presented testimony on the issue of insanity.
Initially the appellant predicates error on the failure of the trial court to employ a jury in determining the issue of the appellant's competency to stand trial.
Prior to trial defense counsel filed a "petition for inquisition upon alleged insane prisoner". Pursuant to Title 15, Section 428, Code of Alabama 1940, the trial judge, being "reasonably satisfied" that the appellant was insane, ordered the appellant committed to Bryce State Mental Hospital until "restored to his right mind". In April of 1977 the Forensic Evaluation Board of Bryce Hospital reported that the appellant was "so restored" and requested that criminal proceedings be resumed.
On the day of trial, defense counsel filed a motion reciting that the appellant was incompetent and unable to aid and assist in his own defense. At that time the trial judge heard evidence on the competency of the appellant to stand trial.
The Honorable Thomas H. Boggs, one of the court appointed attorneys for the appellant, testified that he was convinced that the appellant was incompetent to stand trial, that he could not communicate with his client, that he received no cooperation, and that the appellant was "either unable, or unwilling, to participate in his own defense".
On cross examination by the state, Mr. Boggs admitted that the appellant had been certified competent by Bryce Hospital, that he could not tell whether the appellant was malingering, and that the appellant probably knew that he was charged with a crime but did not know the reason for it or "anything about the incident". In response to a question by the court, counsel acknowledged that the trial judge had sent the appellant to Bryce Hospital on two or three occasions and each time the hospital had certified the appellant as sane.
William H. Smith, Sheriff of Marengo County, testified that while the appellant had been in the county jail during the past couple of months, he had been screaming, yelling, beating on the walls and causing general disruption. However the Sheriff stated that the appellant would yell, scream, and beat when he wanted something or did not get exactly what he wanted. The Sheriff stated that "I've never been in the jail that he didn't want something." "He wants something all the time." Sheriff Smith also testified to a suicide attempt by the appellant where the appellant tied a sheet around his neck and tied it to the bars. The appellant did not choke because he had also tied the sheet under his arms so that when "hanging" the sheet was tighter under his arms than around his neck.
Dr. Mike Haley, a counseling psychologist for the West Alabama Mental Health Center, was called as a witness by the state. He stated that he knew the appellant well, that he had seen the appellant very frequently in the past two years, and that he had spent probably one hundred hours interviewing and counseling him. Dr. Haley stated that the appellant was a paranoid schizophrenic but that his schizophrenia was under control through medication. Dr. Haley interviewed the appellant the day before the hearing and found it difficult to communicate with him because the appellant "was intentionally making it difficult; that he was malingering". Malingering, very simply, means faking. In Dr. Haley's opinion the appellant was competent and not psychotic on the day of the hearing.
Dr. Mundy concluded that he did not think the appellant could participate in his own defense and understand the charges against him.
On cross examination Dr. Mundy stated that the appellant would be more apt to malinger, or feign, at the time when his trial was coming up than at any other time. He affirmed that he simply could not determine whether the appellant was malingering or truly psychotic in the interview held one day past.
Based on this testimony the trial judge found the appellant competent for trial.
"I've sent him to Bryce two or three times and they keep sending him back saying nothing is wrong with him; and based on that, and based on the file and based on the testimony, and based on the testimony I've heard today, and based on the past actions of the whole file from Bryce, I find him competent for trial."
After this finding the jury was brought into the courtroom whereupon the appellant caused some disruption of the proceedings, making statements to the trial judge and referring to him as "Jesus Christ". The trial judge then instructed the bailiff to take the jury back to the jury room, instructed the deputy sheriff to handcuff the appellant because of his disruptive behavior and warned the appellant that upon further disruption he would be removed from the courtroom.
On appeal the appellant argues that Title 15, Section 426, Code of Alabama 1940, and Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) require that the issue of the competency of the accused to stand trial be submitted to a jury.
The pertinent portion of Title 15, Section 426, reads as follows:
"If any person charged with any felony be held in confinement under indictment, and the trial court shall have reasonable ground to doubt his sanity, the trial of such person for such offense shall be suspended until the jury shall inquire into the fact of such sanity, such jury to be impaneled from the regular jurors in attendance for the week or from a special venire, as the court may direct."
The Supreme Court of Alabama explained the function of this statute in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Pate v. Robinson.
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