Thomas v. State

• Decision Date: 09 December 1904
• Citation: Thomas v. State, 121 Ga. 331, 49 S. E. 273 (Ga. 1904)
• Parties: THOMAS v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

49 S.E. 273

121 Ga. 331

THOMAS

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Dec. 9, 1904.

HOMICIDE—VERDICT—CONSTRUCTION.

1. According to the express decision in Wright v. State, 2 S. E. 693, 78 Ga. 192, and the oft-followed principle announced in Bulloch v. State, 10 Ga. 47 (4), 54 Am. Dec. 369, a verdict that the defendant is guilty of involuntary manslaughter will be referred to the highest grade of that offense, and be treated as equivalent toa rinding that he was guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act

2. The decision to the contrary in Thomas v. State, 38 Ga. 117, is, on review, overruled.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Spalding County; E. J. Reagan, Judge.

Joe Thomas was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and brings error. Affirmed.

Thomas was indicted for murder, for that with force and arms, and acting with malice aforethought, he did unlawfully kill Will Benton by striking him and beating him with a stick. At the August term, 1904, of Spalding superior court, a trial was had, resulting in the following verdict: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter." The verdict was received and recorded, and the jury trying the case were discharged and dispersed. At the same term of the court the defendant moved in arrest because the verdict was too uncertain and indefinite, was unlawful, not justified by the pleadings, did not find whether the killing was in the commission of a lawful or an unlawful act, and that no legal judgment could be rendered, since the court could not tell what grade of involuntary manslaughter was meant. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant excepted.

Marcus W. Beck and J. R. Williams, for plaintiff in error.

O. H. B. Bloodworth, Sol. Gen., for the State.

LAMAR, J. The careful and thorough review of the authorities, and the convincing opinion of Justice Cobb in Watson v. State, 116 Ga. 607, 43 S. E. 32, make it unnecessary to re-examine the question as to the possible verdicts which may be rendered in a trial on an indictment for murder. It was there shown that under such a charge the defendant might be found guilty of murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act without due care, assault with intent to murder, shooting at another, stabbing, or assault. In other words, whatever may be the rule elsewhere, under the Penal Code of this state each of these minor offenses may by inclusion be as well charged as though the indictment contained separate counts for each of these distinct offenses. Treating the indictment, therefore, as in effect containing several counts, the rule is that a general verdict of guilty will be referred to that count charging the greatest offense. "Verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment and are to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from necessity." Pen. Code 1895, § 1033. As far as possible, they must be construed according to uniform rules. At the beginning it would no doubt have been quite as logical to say that a verdict of guilty in such cases should be referred to the lowest instead of to the highest offense charged. But whether because there was a conclusive presumption that the jury would have indicated that fact if they intended to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, or whether because, after the verdict of guilty, the presumption of innocence had been removed, and in vindication of the law the defendant would be considered as guilty of the highest offense named, the...