*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
In 2012, Appellant Guy Thomas was charged with the first-degree murder of Dexter Jones, related firearms offenses, and with drug-related charges after 10 bags of marijuana were recovered from his person near the scene of the murder. In his second jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Appellant twice explored the possibility of discharging his assigned public defender, but decided, upon advisement by the court, to retain counsel. After a lengthy trial, Appellant was acquitted of the murder of Mr. Jones but convicted of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person; carrying a handgun; possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute; and possession of marijuana.1 Appellant presents the following questions on appeal, which we have slightly re-phrased:
I. Did the hearing court err when it failed to inquire under Md. Rule 4-215(e) into Appellant's reasons for wanting to discharge counsel?
II. Was Appellant denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial?
III. Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion for mistrial based on the State's allegedly improper closing argument?
IV. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute because the State failed to prove Appellant intended to distribute?
V. Did the sentencing court err when it failed to merge Appellant's sentence for possession of a firearm into his sentence for carrying a handgun?
For the reasons that follow, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the determinations of the circuit court. We affirm.
On the evening of March 20, 2012, Dexter Maurice Jones, was fatally shot near the intersection of North Avenue and Ashburton Avenue in Baltimore City. Appellant was arrested nearby while attempting to flee the area. The police searched Appellant and recovered ten baggies of marijuana from his pant pocket. Appellant was charged with crimes related to the shooting and the recovered controlled dangerous substance ("CDS"). The two indictments, dated April 17, 2012, charged Appellant with (1) possession of a regulated firearm by an individual previously convicted of a disqualifying crime; (2) wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun on or about his person; (3) first-degree murder; (4) first-degree assault; (5) use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence; (6) possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime; (7) possession of CDS (marijuana) with intent to distribute; and (8) possession of CDS (marijuana). An attorney for the Office of the Public Defender entered his appearance on Appellant's behalf on May 21, 2012.
For reasons not relevant here, Appellant's first trial ended in a mistrial on March 14, 2013. After numerous postponements, Appellant's case was called for re-trial on March 19, 2014. At that time, Appellant requested that the case be postponed to "the week of March 31st or April the 4th" because a defense witness was unavailable due to a family death out of State. The State responded that it was ready to proceed immediatelybut, if the trial was postponed, it would need a bit more time to make sure the medical examiner (who had taken a position as a "professor at a University in Washington") could be available for trial. The State suggested that a postponement to May 6 would allow time to secure the necessary witness. After further discussion, during which the court and the parties attempted to find a mutually convenient trial date, the court granted the postponement and reset the trial for May 6, 2014. The Court stated:
. . . Well, I'm prone to do the May 6th date just because I'm sensitive to both sides' need to coordinate matters. And the State's ready today, they're going to need to marshal their forces, may take more time than just 10 days to two weeks to be able to do that. . . .
* * *
For the reasons outlined at the bench, I will find good cause for the postponement request in this matter. There's an available date of May the 6th, 2014, Part 46 at 2:00 p.m. And understand counsel for [Appellant] in this matter wanted the postponement but didn't want to put it off so far. So, there was an objection if you want to articulate further, feel free to do so.
Appellant's attorney objected to the trial date, stating:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . And I would note that [Appellant] now has been incarcerated for two years. This case has been tried once before . . . one year ago. But, he is very anxious to go to trial. And it's upsetting for him to come to [c]ourt expecting to go forward and then last minute information comes forward which prevents us from doing so. So, I'd most respectfully object to such a lengthy postponement, I would ask that this case be held until next week.
Following the court's grant of Appellant's requested postponement, Appellant requested the opportunity to address the court:
[APPELLANT]: Your Honor, can I speak, can I say something?
THE COURT: Yeah. I would suggest you talk to counsel before you say something.
[APPELLANT]: But (inaudible) I want my attorney. I (inaudible) want to fire my attorney.
THE COURT: If you want --
[APPELLANT]: I represent myself until I get a paid attorney.
THE COURT: Well, sir, that's something you should talk to your attorney about before [] articulating in here.
[APPELLANT]: That's -- that's a choice I want to make.
THE COURT: I understand and you have that right to make that choice. Are you indicating that you want to fire counsel of record at the moment?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you realize that may postpone even further your trial date?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you indicating that you want to represent yourself or that you want to hire an attorney of your own choosing through your own funds?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, which is it? You know, are you going to represent yourself or -
[APPELLANT]: I will represent myself until I get a paid attorney.
THE COURT: So you're not waiving an attorney is what you're saying?
[APPELLANT]: Huh?
THE COURT: You're not indicating that you want to waive an attorney to represent you?
[APPELLANT]: Yeah, until further notice.
THE COURT: Well, let me - let me explain this a little better than I am. Are you indicating that you want to represent yourself in trial or are you indicating that you want to have time to get a new attorney?
[APPELLANT]: I mean, as for now, if I don't have a paid attorney I represent myself.
THE COURT: Well, here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to hold your motion in that regard, what we call sub curia. I'm not going to rule on it right now. I'm [going to] allow counsel of record to stay as counsel of record. If in the meanwhile you, A) either want to hire your own attorney, you're free to do so. But in the meanwhile, there will be someone [who] will be standing by to represent you in case a trial becomes necessary. And you decide in the future that you don't want to represent yourself, that you want competent counsel, and I can tell you that you have very competent counsel. That being said, you can always opt on the eve of trial, if you haven't hired an attorney in the meanwhile to represent yourself. That is a constitutional right as much as it is to have representation on your behalf.
So you don't have to make that decision right now. And in the meanwhile it will facilitate two things. One, perhaps you'll be able to have a reappraisal of whether you want this particular counsel or not. Or B) go out, hire your own attorney of your own choosing with your own money, and be hopefully satisfied with your choice in that regard. And actually, C) when the day comes for the trial, which I think is pretty firm on going forward on the 6th of May, you can at that point opt not to have any representation whatsoever. All right?
[APPELLANT]: All right. I just --
THE COURT; So you're no worse off at this stage, in fact you are better off by not firing your attorney at this time. You can fire your attorney at the time of the trial if you so choose. And in the meanwhile, you are certainly free to hire your own representation.
A pretrial motions hearing was held on May 5, 2014, in which Appellant was represented by the same public defender as in the March 19 hearing. However, Appellantdid not, at that time, reiterate his request to discharge counsel. Rather, Defense Counsel, in Appellant's presence, proceeded to represent Appellant through the motions hearing.
At the outset of the hearing on May 6, 2014, Appellant moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Appellant had been denied his right to a speedy trial. Appellant argued that his first trial ended in a mistrial and the commencement of the retrial approximately 14 months later was a delay of constitutional dimension. Noting the numerous postponements attributed to both the State and Appellant, the circuit court stated:
Looking at the factors -- the Barker v. Wingo factors -- first, the Court does agree that the length of the delay itself is of constitutional dimension, which then gets us to look at other factors.
Certainly the right was asserted on five occasions that were set forth and proffered by Counsel, on May the 21st, 2012; June the 7th, 2013; January the 10th, 2014; February the 4th, 2014; and March the 19th, 2014.
With respect to the reasons for the delay, the Court agrees with the State's assessment of the reasons and the weight to be assigned to those reasons.
The June 7th -- the first trial date when it was postponed -- it was over objection. There was an unavailable State's
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