Thomas v. State, No. 1279S359
Docket Nº | No. 1279S359 |
Citation | 420 N.E.2d 1216 |
Case Date | May 14, 1981 |
Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Page 1216
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
Page 1217
F. Laurence Anderson, Jr., Gary, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jeff G. Fihn, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
GIVAN, Chief Justice.
A jury found appellant guilty of murder. He was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. Appellant appeals. We affirm.
The record indicates that on June 23, 1978, appellant entered the office of an apartment complex and shot and killed James Smith, a maintenance man. Bernice White, a clerk, was present at the time of the shooting. Although Mrs. White was unable to see the appellant's face, she did see his clothing and could identify his physical characteristics. Acting on information supplied by the victim's wife, a police officer went to appellant's apartment and identified himself. Appellant stated he wouldn't leave the apartment until the press was there. Another police officer identified himself as a reporter. Appellant opened the door and stepped out of the apartment. Miranda rights were read to the appellant, and he was placed under arrest. The officer who had identified himself as a reporter saw a small caliber pistol lying on a table in the apartment. He seized the weapon which was later determined to be the gun from which the fatal bullet was fired.
Appellant first argues that the defense of insanity was established as a matter of law. He acknowledges that I.C. 35-41-4-1 (Burns Supp.1978) applies to this case. The statute requires one who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. The cases cited by appellant to support his argument were all decided under prior law which required the State to prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt once the defense of insanity was raised. Appellant also cites Pilon v. Bordenkircher, (1979) 444 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 7, 62 L.Ed.2d 1, wherein the United States Supreme Court simply set forth the constitutional test for assessing sufficiency of the evidence to support a state court conviction. Under the test in Pilon, a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
After extensively reciting evidence from the record in this case, appellant concludes that from all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, one could only conclude that the defendant was insane at the time of the alleged criminal act.
Page 1218
As to the evidence or lack of evidence on the issue of defendant's insanity, we first point out:
"(w)here the party with the burden of proof suffers a negative judgment, a question on the evidence on which he has the burden of proof cannot be raised by an assignment of insufficiency of the evidence. Graves v. City of Muncie, (1970) 255 Ind. 360, 264 N.E.2d 607. Such a question must be raised on assignment that the verdict is contrary to law. Graves, supra, at 361, 264 N.E.2d 607, 608." Price v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 783, 786.
Furthermore, a negative judgment will be reversed on appeal only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion. Garbe v. Excel Mold, Inc., (1979) Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 296. This Court has previously held where the defendant in a criminal case must prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, the foregoing rules concerning the appeal of negative judgments apply. Price v. State, supra, at 786.
In the case at bar, there was, in fact, conflicting evidence on the issue of insanity. Appellant's mother, sister and father all testified that he had mental problems. His sister stated she thought he was "sick and antisocial", but that neither she nor any member of the family had ever attempted to have defendant permanently committed even after he shot his mother.
Neither the State nor the defendant called a psychiatrist as a witness. The jury, however, heard testimony from two court-appointed psychiatrists. Both psychiatrists stated they believed appellant to be insane at the time he shot and killed Smith. However, cross-examination by the deputy-prosecutrix disclosed that Dr. Battican conducted two one-half hour interviews during which the defendant never spoke to him; nor did the Doctor conduct or cause to be conducted any physical or mental examinations. The Doctor's opinion was based solely on the medical records of appellant, an interview with appellant's family, and physical observation of appellant.
In cross-examination of the second psychiatrist, he testified that it would be important to determine what a subject was like before, during and after a criminal act to formulate a conclusion as to sanity, but further stated that he had no knowledge of what the defendant did twenty-four hours prior to and after the shooting and that he made no effort to discover these facts.
On the other hand, the prosecution did provide evidence from officers who were present when appellant was arrested, a short time after the shooting, concerning appellant's demeanor and his reactions to their questioning. From this evidence, the jury was justified in finding that the appellant was sane at the time of the occurrence.
Appellant also claims "there is no evidence which clearly shows that defendant performed the act involved in this alleged offense". Mrs. White testified that although she could not see appellant's face, "he was a negro male, light colored, weighing between 175 and 180 pounds, and wearing a golf cap and poplin jacket which were light in...
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Joy v. State, No. 1-783A228
...trial court adequately informed the jury of the elements. Bryan v. State, (1983) Ind., 450 N.E.2d 53, 62; Thomas v. State, (1981) Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1216, 1219; Shanholt v. State, (1983) Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 308, 318, trans. Issue Three The defendant next submits the trial court erred in deny......
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Lowery v. State, No. 02S00-8606-CR-591
...to a single conclusion opposite the one reached at trial. Gentry v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 263; Thomas v. State (1981), Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1216. While one psychiatrist testified that in his opinion the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, two other psychiat......
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State v. Beuhler-May, No. 91,470
...mental condition as a mitigating factor at sentencing. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 475 S.E.2d 637 (1996); Thomas v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1981); State v. Bentley, 155 Mont. 383, 472 P.2d 864 (1970); State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. Similarly, the notice requirements......
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State v. Buehler-May, No. 91,470 (KS 4/22/2005), No. 91,470
...mental condition as a mitigating factor at sentencing. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 475 S.E.2d 637 (1996); Thomas v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1981); State v. Bentley, 155 Mont. 383, 472 P.2d 864 (1970); State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. Similarly, the notice requirements......
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Joy v. State, No. 1-783A228
...trial court adequately informed the jury of the elements. Bryan v. State, (1983) Ind., 450 N.E.2d 53, 62; Thomas v. State, (1981) Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1216, 1219; Shanholt v. State, (1983) Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 308, 318, trans. Issue Three The defendant next submits the trial court erred in deny......
-
Lowery v. State, No. 02S00-8606-CR-591
...to a single conclusion opposite the one reached at trial. Gentry v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 263; Thomas v. State (1981), Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1216. While one psychiatrist testified that in his opinion the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, two other psychiat......
-
State v. Beuhler-May, No. 91,470
...mental condition as a mitigating factor at sentencing. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 475 S.E.2d 637 (1996); Thomas v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1981); State v. Bentley, 155 Mont. 383, 472 P.2d 864 (1970); State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. Similarly, the notice requirements......
-
State v. Buehler-May, No. 91,470 (KS 4/22/2005), No. 91,470
...mental condition as a mitigating factor at sentencing. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 475 S.E.2d 637 (1996); Thomas v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1981); State v. Bentley, 155 Mont. 383, 472 P.2d 864 (1970); State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. Similarly, the notice requirements......