Thomas v. Stevens
| Decision Date | 16 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-160 |
| Parties | RONNIE DANTE THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. UNKNOWN STEVENS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner. Plaintiff previously sought and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 10.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 5.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendant(s) is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) ().
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....”
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way that they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) ().[1]
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint[2] for failure to state a claim. Further, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 11), motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 13), and motion for free copies (ECF No. 15).
T. Factual allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Muskegon Correctional Facility (MCF) in Muskegon, Muskegon County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the following MCF officials: Corrections Officer Unknown Stevens and Warden James Schiebner.
In Plaintiff's amended complaint, he states that on August 23, 2021, he was acting as a trustee of the Thomas Family Trust and was engaged in “administrative duties of [the] Trust,” including “drafting a Managerial Trust Agreement . . . for the management and effectuation of present/future financial interest[] and appurtenance rights of the Thomas Family Trust.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 7-1 PageID.41.) While Plaintiff was working on “said trust administration,” he was interrupted by Defendant Stevens[3] who ordered Plaintiff and his cellmate to exit the cell and to go to the housing unit dayroom. (Id.) Before Plaintiff went to the dayroom, Plaintiff informed Defendant Stevens “of the private nature of the legal documents/property” in the cell and advised him that “if there was going to be a search of ‘any' of that material, Plaintiff needed to be present.” (Id.) Defendant Stevens “dismissed Plaintiff[']s protest, and then repeated the initial order.” (Id.) Plaintiff complied with Defendant Stevens's order. (Id., PageID.42.)
Subsequently, after Defendant Stevens “engag[ed] [in] a formal cell/room search (shake-down),” Sergeant Brown and an unnamed correctional officer, both of whom are not parties to this action, escorted Plaintiff to the temporary administrative segregation housing unit. (Id.) Approximately three hours later, Plaintiff was released from that unit and returned to his cell. (Id.) When Plaintiff arrived back at his cell, Plaintiff noticed that “‘all' legal documents/property relative to Plaintiff[']s criminal/civil proceedings i.e. trial-transcripts, copies of filed civil rights complaints, dispositive motions, etc.[] were thrown, scattered, ripped, and stepped-on throughout Plaintiff[']s cell/room.” (Id.) Upon further examination, “Plaintiff discovered that the Trust Agreement” and the “‘semi' drafted Management Trust Agreement,” both of which were on Plaintiff's desk prior to being ordered out of the cell by Defendant Stevens, were missing. (Id.) Additionally, “[c]opies of ‘all' legal documents” related to civil action nos. 1:20-cv-938 and 1:21-cv-296 were missing. (Id.) After sorting through the remaining documents in his cell, Plaintiff found an “‘odd' note left behind by Defendant [Stevens],” which stated, (Id.)
Subsequently, on October 25, 2021, civil action no. 1:21-cv-296, which named state officials S. Burt, E. Hardiman, and P. Mercer as Defendants, was dismissed by this Court. (See id., PageID.41-42.) Plaintiff alleges that he “was unable to file a Rule 52 or 59 motion under [the] Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and was ‘forced' to file a ‘notice of appeal' as a result of not having the primary legal documents/property required for ‘meaningful' litigation.” (Id., PageID.42 (emphasis omitted).) Thereafter, on November 24, 2021, “Plaintiff was ‘forced' to settle the civil rights action that was pending against state official Tim Antes [(1:20-cv-938)] as a result of not having the primary legal documents . . . required for ‘meaningful' litigation.” (Id., PageID.41-42.) Plaintiff also contends that he “could not perform the administrative (Fiduciary) duties pursuant to the . . . Thomas Family Trust agreement/instrument” or “pursue ‘valuable investment opportunities for Trust assets[] and ‘effective management' via a trust conduit (Thomas Family Management Trust).” (Id., PageID.42.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff avers that Defendants violated his “rights under 42 U.S.C. §§[] 1981, 1982, 1985(3).” (Id., PageID.43.) Plaintiff also avers that Defendants intentionally interfered “with contractual relations” and interfered “with prospective business relations (under Michigan State Law)” in violation of “18 U.S.C. §[§] 1961-1968.” (Id. (parentheses in original).) Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions violated: his right “to make a contract” under the Fourteenth Amendment and the “Privileges or Immunities Clause;” his right to “‘meaningful' access to the courts under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and/or Immunities Clauses of the [Fourteenth] Amendment;” the “Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 4 and the [Thirteenth] Amendment (involuntary [s]ervitude);” his right to be free from retaliation under the First Amendment; and the “Fifth [] Amendment[] ‘Takings Clause.'” (Id. (parentheses in original).) As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, on behalf of himself and the Thomas Family Trust. (Id., PageID.43-44.)
II. Plaintiff's Pending Motions
In addition to filing a motion to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff also filed (i) a motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 11); (ii) a motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 13); and (iii) a motion requesting free copies (ECF No. 15).
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