Thomas v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 09 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 11-240-GPM |
| Parties | BRYAN THOMAS, IDOC # R12763, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GLADYSE TAYLOR, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiffs Bryan Thomas and Alfonso Paka are prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"); Thomas currently is confined in the Pontiac Correctional Center, ("Pontiac") while Paka is confined in the Robinson Correctional Center ("Robinson").1 Thomas and Paka bring this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of their constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law. This case is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides, in relevant part:
fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Though a court must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, "some factual allegations will be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to defendants of the plaintiff's claim." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Also, "courts should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. The factual allegations of a pro se complaint must be liberally construed. See Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
According to the pro se complaint in this case, Thomas and Paka are Muslims. They allege that it is IDOC policy not to serve Halal meals to Muslim prisoners, although Jewish prisoners are furnished with Kosher meat. Thomas and Paka argue that they should be permitted to receive Kosher meals, and that IDOC's refusal to permit them, as Muslims, to receive a Jewish religious diet is an infringement of their religious freedom. Named as Defendants in the case are Gladyse Taylor, the former acting director of IDOC, Randy Grounds, the warden of Robinson, Dana Tylka, the assistant warden of programs at Robinson, Pat Quinn, the governor of Illinois, and Sangamon County, Illinois.2
As an initial matter, the Court expresses considerable skepticism that any of the parties named as Defendants by Thomas and Paka were personally involved in a deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v.. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). However, "Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation." Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983)). See also Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)) ( that "Section 1983 does not establish a system of vicarious responsibility" and thus "public employees are responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else's."); Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2002) (). While it is the case that Taylor, Grounds, and Tylka are IDOC officials and thus acting under state law, the Court finds it exceedingly unlikely that any of these Defendants have responsibility for the meals that are served in IDOC facilities. Moreover, the Court is at a complete loss to understand how Sangamon County might have violated Plaintiffs' civil rights. See Willis v. Hulick, Civil No. 09-cv-447-JPG, 2010 WL 358836, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2010) (citing Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003)) (a Section 1983 plaintiff must make allegations that "associate specific defendantswith specific claims . . . so [the] defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint.").
Furthermore, Thomas and Paka have failed to state a claim for a violation of their First Amendment right of free exercise of their religion. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that "the fact of confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights, including those derived from the First Amendment, which are implicit in incarceration." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977). A prisoner is entitled to practice his or her religion as long as the practice does not unduly burden the institution. See Richards v. White, 957 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 1992). However, a prisoner's right to exercise his or her religion is balanced against the legitimate goals of the institution. See Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 783 (7th Cir. 1987). To constitute a violation of the First Amendment, the government must place a substantial burden on a prisoner's observation of a central religious belief or practice. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). If a plaintiff is successful at showing such a burden, the government must then show a compelling interest justifies the burden. See id. at 221. The United States Supreme Court has established that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a "reasonableness" test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). Accordingly, restrictions that infringe upon a prisoner's exercise of his or her religion will be upheld if they are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See id. Relevant factors include: (1) whether a valid, rational connection exists between the regulation and a legitimate government interest; (2) whether there are other means of exercising the right in question for prisoners; (3) the impact accommodating the claimed right wouldhave on guards, other inmates, and prison resources; and (4) the availability of obvious and easy alternatives to the regulation. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). Legitimate penological demands include security and economic concerns. See Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1991). The prisoner has the burden of disproving the validity of a challenged prison regulation. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). Also, within the state penal system context, federal courts accord deference to the decisions of prison administrators. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. In this instance, Thomas and Paka do not allege that their Muslim faith requires them to eat Halal-certified meat, and they concede that IDOC makes available to prisoners who believe that the consumption of meat that is not Halal-certified is contrary to their religion an alternative vegetarian diet. Thus, IDOC has done nothing to prevent Thomas and Paka from practicing their religious beliefs; although Thomas and Paka have not been provided with a Halal diet, which, in any event, as discussed, their religion does not require, they have been furnished with an alternative diet that does not require them to consume any food that they believe is inconsistent with their faith. Therefore, prison officials have not substantially burdened Plaintiffs' free exercise of their religion.3
To the extent that Thomas and Paka are attempting to assert a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., the Court likewise finds that such a claim fails. The RLUIPA provides that institutions receiving federal financial assistance may not "impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise" of an institutionalized person unless it is the "least restrictive means" of furthering a "compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(2). The United States Supreme Court has held that religious accommodations cannot override an institution's other significant interests. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (). Rather, RLUIPA is to be "applied in an appropriately balanced way, with particular sensitivity to security concerns," and courts are to "apply the Act's standard with due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources." Id. at 722-23 (quotation omitted). Thomas and Paka have failed to state a claim under RLUIPA because the statute only affords relief when there has been a "substantial burden" on one's right to exercise his or her religion. While the statute...
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