Thomas v. Town of Davie

• Decision Date: 21 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-5207,87-5207
• Citation: 847 F.2d 771
• Parties: Everett Earl THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF DAVIE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 771

847 F.2d 771

11 Fed.R.Serv.3d 568

Everett Earl THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF DAVIE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-5207.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 21, 1988.

Cathy Jackson Lerman, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael T. Burke, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for Town of Davie, et al.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

The district court dismissed Earl Thomas' Sec. 1983 claim with prejudice and denied his motion for reconsideration. In the latter motion, plaintiff alleged "each of the defects found by this Court to render the complaint untenable are clearly subject to amendment and easily curable." We agree, and therefore reverse, and direct the district court to allow Thomas to amend his complaint.

I.

Thomas filed a five-count complaint against the defendants in state court. Because count II of the complaint was a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the defendants removed the case to federal court.

Thomas' complaint alleged the following facts. On August 2, 1984, Thomas was approached by Officer Paul Yawn after Thomas had been involved in an automobile accident. When Yawn approached his vehicle, Thomas got out of the vehicle "and was in obvious need of immediate medical attention. Despite the fact that ... Yawn knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that [Thomas] was in need of medical attention, Yawn proceeded to handcuff [Thomas] and drive him to the scene of the accident. [Yawn] acted with a gross and willful disregard for [Thomas'] welfare." In spite of his "medically emergent and deteriorating ... condition," and his inability to follow directions, Thomas was then given a roadside sobriety test by Officer Gregory Behrends. Both Yawn and Behrends knew or should have known that Thomas was in need of immediate attention, and they acted with a "gross and willful disregard for [his] welfare, thereby injuring, further injuring, or aggravating injuries already sustained by [him] as a direct and proximate result of [their] acts." The sobriety test showed that Thomas had a blood alcohol content of 0.0%, and Thomas was transported to the Broward County Sheriff's Office despite the fact that the defendants knew or should have known that he was in need of immediate medical attention. Thomas was held in custody until he posted bond. Employees of the Sheriff's Office, who knew or should have known of Thomas' need for immediate medical attention, then released him on to the street adjacent to the Broward County Jail, where he collapsed and was injured.

In count II of the complaint, Thomas alleged that Yawn and Behrends, through "willful, malicious and wanton disregard for [his] constitutional rights," deprived him of certain constitutional rights, while acting under color of state law. In addition, Thomas claimed that the Town of Davie and Chief of Police Robert Weatherholt, "through negligence and/or gross negligence" deprived him of the same rights, and that the Town of Davie's policy and custom regarding "the extent of training and supervision of its police officers as to the appropriate method of recognizing and handling persons in need of medical attention" was grossly inadequate and its adoption demonstrated a "conscious disregard for the constitutional rights and safety of the public."

The district court dismissed Thomas' complaint with prejudice, finding that Thomas had no claim under federal law. The court withheld judgment on the state law claims (counts I, III-V) and remanded them to state court. The court found that Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), was controlling, that Thomas had failed to allege that the defendants had deliberately and intentionally denied him medical care, that Thomas' allegations were not sufficient to establish gross negligence or recklessness, and that the Town of Davie could not be held liable for the inadequate training of its officers.

II.

A.

Thomas' basic claim is that he was denied proper medical care and that his need for care was apparent. Because Thomas had not been convicted at the time he allegedly required medical care, the Eighth Amendment has no application to his claim; rather, the relevant constitutional provision is the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 2983, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983). That clause "require[s] the responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical care to persons ... who have been injured while being apprehended by police." Id. at 245-46, 103 S.Ct. at 2983.

Although the Supreme Court in City of Revere did not define a city's due process obligations to a pretrial detainee, we have applied the Estelle v. Gamble "deliberate indifference" standard to claims of improper medical care by plaintiffs like Thomas. See Aldridge v. Montgomery, 753 F.2d 970, 972 (11th Cir.1985). Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs may be shown by failure to provide prompt attention to those needs by delaying necessary medical treatment for nonmedical reasons or by "proving a policy of deficiencies in staffing or procedures such that the [pretrial detainee] is effectively denied access to adequate medical care." Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 686 n. 12 (11th Cir.1985); Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir.1985); Aldridge, 753 F.2d at 970.

B.

A complaint should not be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In addition, a district court's discretion to dismiss a complaint without leave to amend is "severely restrict[ed]" by Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), which directs that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 (Former 5th Cir.1981). "[U]nless there is a substantial reason to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial." Id. at 598. The same standards apply when a plaintiff seeks to amend after a judgment of dismissal has been entered by asking the district court to vacate its order of dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Id. at 597 n. 1.

We cannot say that dismissal of Thomas' Sec. 1983 claim without leave to amend was proper. More specific allegations (e.g., why Thomas' need for medical attention was obvious, why the defendants should have known that Thomas needed medical attention) would have remedied the pleading problems found by the district court. In addition, there was no undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on Thomas' part, and the defendants would not have been prejudiced by amendment of count II of the complaint. Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598-99. Furthermore, it does not appear beyond doubt that Thomas cannot prove a set of facts which would entitle him to relief. See, e.g., Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir.1985) (reversing dismissal of a Sec. 1983 "deliberate indifference" claim against a county, its sheriff, an entity which provided health care services to county inmates, and employees of the entity).

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the dismissal of Thomas' complaint. On remand, Thomas will be allowed to amend his complaint.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

The majority recites that the district court dismissed plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim with prejudice and denied his motion for reconsideration. In the motion for reconsideration plaintiff alleged "each of the defects found by the court to render the complaint untenable are clearly subject to amendment and easily curable." The majority agreed with this recitation in the motion for reconsideration and reversed with directions to the district court to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint. ¹ While in Part III of the majority opinion, the court states "... we reverse the dismissal of Thomas' complaint ...", the opinion is not clear on whether the majority holds the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint or in denying the motion for reconsideration. This is critical since the standard of review is different depending on which order the majority was reversing. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (establishing the standard for granting a motion to dismiss as being a conclusion "... beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."), Rhodes v. Amarillo Hospital Dist., 654 F.2d 1148, 1153-54 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.1981) (no reversal required on abuse of discretion review of denial of leave to amend provided the record discloses an apparent substantive reason for the district court's action).

It seems apparent, however, from the text of the opinion that the majority in discussing the possible amendment which could be made to the complaint, conceded deficiencies in the complaint and reversed the denial of the motion for reconsideration which sought leave to amend the complaint. Our standard of...