Thomas v. United Steelworkers Local 1938, 12-3625

• Decision Date: 20 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12-3625,12-3625
• Parties: Dave Thomas Plaintiff - Appellant v. United Steelworkers Local 1938; United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union; John Malek Defendants - Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Dave Thomas Plaintiff - Appellant v. United Steelworkers Local 1938; United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber,

Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International

Union; John Malek¹ Defendants - Appellees

No. 12-3625

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

Submitted: October 23, 2013

Filed: February 20, 2014

Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

Before GRUENDER, BEAM, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Dave Thomas appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of United Steelworkers Local 1938 (Local 1938); United Steel, Paper and Forestry,Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW);² and Jon Malek on Thomas's state-law defamation claim arising out of a fact-finding meeting concerning a workplace dispute. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand.

I.

A.

Thomas is an employee of United States Steel (USS), a steel company that operates and owns several iron ore mines. Thomas works in the pit³ at USS's Minntac facility in Mountain Iron, Minnesota and has been a member of USW and Local 1938 since he began his employment in 1973. In 2003, Thomas was assigned team leader duties in the pit and performed these duties until his removal in 2009. As a team leader, Thomas was responsible for assisting the shift managers in working with the crews.

While a team leader, Thomas worked under two area managers—Lou Janezich from 2003 to 2008 and Mike Sterk from 2008 to 2009. During his time as area manager, Janezich recalls only receiving one complaint about Thomas's treatment of his crew. Sterk testified that the only complaint he received about Thomas while area manager was in regard to an incident occurring on April 4, 2009 between Thomas and one of his crew drivers, Roy Varani. On that day, Thomas scolded Varani for not following the company's safety procedure. Specifically, Thomas and Varani began yelling at each other and Thomas eventually told Varani, "No wonder the crew said you were a dumb f---ing truck driver."

Varani reported the incident as harassment, and a fact-finding meeting was called by Sterk on April 6, 2009, to determine what happened. The meeting was attended by Sterk, crew member Dan Sixberry, USS Labor Relations department representatives Nicholas Simonson and Katrina Dononvan, vice president of Local 1938 Jon Malek, USS employee and Local 1938 grievance representative Jake Schmelzer, and USS assistant area manager Jason Croteau. Varani, Sixberry, and Thomas met with the team of representatives separately.

During the meeting, Varani stated that he and Thomas had apologized and that he did not believe Thomas had harassed him on the day of the incident. Thomas related what happened between him and Varani and indicated that it was an isolated incident. Malek then replied that he had received "20 complaints on Dave Thomas." Malek also said "[Thomas] has been verbally abusive to others for the past five years," "[Thomas has] been making threats and throwing his weight around for the past five years," "[Thomas] and two other team leaders in the Pit are the biggest complaints I get," "[Thomas] is an absolute prick," "I'm tired of [Thomas's] crap," and "I'm not going to put up with [Thomas's] sh-- anymore." Thomas also remembers Malek stating at the meeting that "if I had it my way [Thomas] would be off the property."

Two days after the meeting, Thomas was removed from his position as team leader. Although Thomas was reassigned to the position in 2010, Sterk received a call from Malek, in which Malek claimed to have received three anonymous phone calls from individuals complaining about Thomas's reassignment. Malek said that the reassignment would cause problems, and Sterk removed Thomas again. Thomas filed an internal union complaint against Malek in April 2010 claiming unfair representation.

B.

After learning that both unions declined to do any further investigation as to the complaint, Thomas brought this action. In his second amended complaint, Thomas asserted the following claims against the defendants:⁴ (1) violation of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.; (2) breach of fair representation under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); (3) violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act,⁵ Minn. Stat. § 181.932, Subd. 1; and (4) state-law claims of defamation, tortious interference with contract, and conspiracy. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all of the claims. In his memorandum in opposition to the motion, Thomas stated "the CBA is not implicated in any of Plaintiff's claims and as such [he is] dismissing all claims except the defamation claim and the breach of the union constitution claim."⁶ See Memorandum in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment 34.

In its order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the second amended complaint, the district court acknowledged Thomas's admission that the CBA was not implicated and that he was therefore dismissing all of his claims except the defamation claim and the breach of union constitution claim. The court, accordingly, only discussed the remaining claims at issue. First, the court found that the breach of union constitution claim was not properly before the courtas it was not raised in Thomas's second amended complaint, and the court denied further leave to amend the complaint. Second, the court determined that Malek's alleged defamatory statements were conditionally privileged because the statements were made in the context of an investigation into whether Thomas should continue to perform lead duties and were based on "reasonable or probable grounds." The court also found that Thomas failed to overcome the privilege because Thomas presented no evidence showing Malek acted with actual malice. Finally, the court concluded that the defamation claim was without merit because Thomas failed to prove that Malek did not actually receive complaints on Thomas and many of the statements made were not actionable. Thomas now appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his defamation claim.

II.

A.

Although not raised by the parties, a threshold question in this appeal is whether the district court maintained subject matter jurisdiction in this case. We have an obligation to consider sua sponte both our jurisdiction to entertain a case and the jurisdiction of the district court. Robins v. Ritchie, 631 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we must raise jurisdictional issues "when there is an indication that jurisdiction is lacking, even if the parties concede the issue." Thomas v. Basham, 931 F.2d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 1991). Due to (1) Thomas's statement in his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment that he was "dismissing all claims except the defamation claim and the breach of the union constitution claim," (2) the district court's denial of leave to amend the second amended compliant to add the federal breach of union constitution claim,⁷ and (3) the inapplicability of diversityjurisdiction, we asked the parties to brief whether the district court properly exercised federal subject matter jurisdiction over the state-law defamation claim. After thorough review, we conclude that despite Thomas's statement of dismissal, the district court maintained its subject matter jurisdiction and properly exercised its supplemental jurisdiction over Thomas's state-law claim.

In response to our jurisdictional inquiry, Thomas claims that his statement in his memorandum in opposition to the appellants' motion for summary judgment—that he was "dismissing all claims except the defamation claim and the breach of union constitution claim"—removed all the federal claims on which the court based its subject matter jurisdiction. To support his position, Thomas cites cases holding that when a plaintiff amends his complaint and omits the federal claim that originally gave rise to the federal court's federal question jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473-74 (2007) ("[W]hen a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction."); see also Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243-44 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that plaintiff's failure to include in his amended complaint federal claims initially asserted in his original complaint destroyed the district court's jurisdiction, and the district court should have dismissed the state claims without prejudice); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985). We find these cases inapplicable to the circumstances before us because the plaintiff in each of these cases filed an amended complaint that omitted the federal causes of action initially asserted. This did not happen here, and this distinction is critical.

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal question must exist on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint in order to establish federal questionsubject matter jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). When a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original complaint is superseded and has no legal effect. In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000). As such, we "resolve questions of subject matter jurisdiction by examining the face of the amended complaint." Id. Here, Thomas was given leave from the court to file two amended complaints; however, each complaint, and more importantly the second amended complaint, reasserted his federal causes of actions—violation of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and breach of duty of fair representation under the Labor Management Relations Act. No further amended...