Thomas v. Warren

Decision Date29 July 2013
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 13-4150 (FLW)
PartiesWILLIAM THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES E. WARREN, JR., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Wolfson, District Judge:

Plaintiff William Thomas ("Plaintiff"), an inmate confined at New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;1 he is alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Based on Plaintiff's affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant his application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). For the reasons expressed below, Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend his denial of clothing and food claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts that, after prison officials discovered that he had inserted an asthma inhaler into his rectum, he was disrobed and placed into a so-called "dry cell" with no running water.2 (See Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that he remained absolutely naked throughout the entire period whenhe was housed in that cell - which, seemingly, was from May 6, 2013, to May 29, 2013, i.e., for twenty-three days.3 (See id.)

Plaintiff concedes that he was provided with drinking water while held in the dry cell, but he alleges that he had to "beg" and "scream" in order "to get it." (See id.) Plaintiff also asserts that he had not been "fed" throughout the entire period of being housed in the dry cell. (Id.) In addition, he alleges that the dry cell was insufficiently lighted and that he was denied outdoor recreation and social interaction with the general population inmates. Plaintiff also expresses concerns about the medical problems he might potentially develop in the future as a result of being housed in the dry cell.4 (See id. at 6-8.) Plaintiff names the warden as Defendant in this action, asserting that he was placed in the dry cell pursuant to the warden's express order. (See id. at 4.) In addition, he asserts that he has filed inmate grievance forms to no avail - they have not been responded to by the warden. For these alleged wrongs, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and unspecified "sanctions" against the warden on behalf of all inmates. (See id. at 8.)

II. STANDARDS FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b), or brings a claim withrespect to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1917e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and he is challenging his prison conditions.

According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim,5 the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

III. DISCUSSION

It appears from the complaint that Plaintiff is attempting to raise various conditions of confinement claims. In order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant denied him "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" while acting with "deliberate indifference" to the plaintiff's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); see also Fantone v. Herbik, No. 13-1644, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11811, at *9 (3d Cir. June 12, 2013). Notably, only "extreme deprivations" are sufficient to support a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.6 Fantone, No. 13-1644, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11811, at *9 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.1, 8-9 (1992)).

Under that standard, the bulk of Plaintiff's challenges are facially without merit. For a prisoner not provided any access to fluids, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found that such a deprivation could be "sufficiently serious" to sustain a claim. Collier v. Martinez, 474 F. App'x 870, 874 (3d Cir. 2012). However, the Court of Appeals has further noted, "[i]f [a plaintiff] had access to adequate hydration during the period in question, even in conjunction with meals he otherwise did not desire to eat, his claim would necessarily fail, as he would not be able to show that the complained of deprivation was 'sufficiently serious.'" Id. at n.5 (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiff concedes that he had been given water regularly. Thus, with respect to access to water, Plaintiff fails to allege a "sufficiently serious" deprivation even if Plaintiff found demeaning the manner in which he was forced to request the water. See Calhoun v. Wagner, No. 93-4075, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10121 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1997) (no constitutional violation where the inmate's cell was without water but he was provided fluids three times a day); accord Jackson v. Kane County, No. 09-4154, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6154, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2010) ("Drawing on judicial experience and common sense, the court finds that a lack of running water . . . , though uncomfortable by itself, is not a serious deprivation of a basic human need") (internal citation omitted). Therefore, the supply of water claim will be dismissed.

In addition, Plaintiff's lack of recreation challenge is without merit. While the denial of exercise or recreation may, under certain circumstances, result in a violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Fantone v. Herbik, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11811, at *9 (citing Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1031-33 (3d Cir. 1988)), "a temporary denial of outdoor exercise [without detrimental] medical effects is not a substantial deprivation" for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment analysis. May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). In other words, to assert a sufficient deprivation, the inmate must state facts showing that the denial of recreation was such that it caused injury to the inmate's ability to control his muscular functions or to maintain his range of physical motions. See Cary v. Rose, 902 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1990) (where the inmates alleged that they were denied adequate exercise and recreation but admitted that they had room in their cells and in the hallway to run in place or perform calisthenics, their allegations could not amount to a constitutional claim because, unless extreme and prolonged, lack of exercise could not be equated to a medically-threatening situation); see also Diaz v. Cumberland Cty, No. 10-3932, 2010 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 101449, at *14-16 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2010) (dismissing a claim by pretrial detainee asserting that he was afforded only one hour of yard recreation per day); Ellis v. Crowe, No. 09-3061, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125154, at *36 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 2009) (denial of recreation claim should be dismissed if the facts the inmate alleges do not show that he was so deprived of recreation that he suffered a physical injury, such as muscle atrophy or loss of range of motion).

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that he may experience medical problems in the future, such allegations are speculative. See Hood v. Cumberland County Dep't of Corr., No. 12-6395, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52907, at *13 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 2013). "Speculation as to what might or might not happen in the future" cannot serve as a basis for a valid claim. Dawson v. Frias, No. 09-6050, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30513 at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2010) (citing Rouse v. Pauliilo, No. 05-5157, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17225 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2006) (dismissing speculative claim and citing Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Pilkey v. Lappin, No. 05-5314, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44418, at *45 (D.N.J. June 26, 2006) ("Plaintiff's [anxiety regarding future events] fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted"); Patterson v. Lilley, No. 02-6056, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11097 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2003).

Plaintiff's challenge based on poor lighting also fails to state a viable claim, see Vasquez v. Frank, No. 07-3965, 290 F. App'x 927, 930 (7th Cir. 2008) ("24-hour lighting involving a single, 9-watt fluorescent bulb does not objectively constitute an 'extreme deprivation'"),7 as does Plaintiff's challenge based on the lack of socialization with the general population inmates. See Sandin v.Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995) (housing in a segregated unit is constitutional because the Due Process Clause confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken "within the sentence imposed") (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (interests protected by the Due Process Clause are limited only to the restraints on prisoners that impose an "atypical and significant...

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