Thomas v. Williams, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-2711
| Decision Date | 31 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-2711 |
| Parties | BARBARA ANN THOMAS, et al, Plaintiffs, v. J.J. WILLIAMS, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Texas |
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 48), Defendant J.J. Williams' ("Williams") Response and Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 52), Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of its Motion (Document No. 65), Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 74), and Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief (Document No. 100). Having considered these filings, the facts in the record, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Plaintiffs, Barbara Ann Thomas and her son, John Thomas, reside at 5816 Hirsch Road, in Houston, Texas (Document No. 32 at 2-3). Defendant Williams is a peace officer employed by the Houston Police Department ("HPD"). Id. at 2.
According to Williams' affidavit, the relevant investigation began in April of 2014, because complaints had been submitted to HPD about marijuana and drug dealer activity on the 5800 Hirsch Road block (Document No. 52-3 at 3). One complaint stated the address as "5814 1/," without providing a final digit, and another complaint stated that activity was occurring at 5814 Hirsch Road. Id.
On May 7, 2014, Officers Williams and Caldwell took a confidential informant (the "C.I.") to the location to attempt to make a narcotics purchase. Id. at 4. During this attempted buy the officers "maintained distant and rolling surveillance, so not to be 'picked off' by any 'look-outs,'" which had happened before with other attempted narcotics purchases in the complex. Id. The C.I. was sent to look for the apartment numbered 5814 ½, and returned having successfully purchased .27 grams of crack cocaine from a "black male on the porch." Id. Williams explains in his affidavit that this is referred to as a "dirty buy," and "a search warrant cannot be generated under these circumstances because there is no proof the crack came out of the apartment." Id.
Therefore the officers continued investigating, and identified a suspect named "Nash" as the seller. Id. Williams continued to survey the area and the suspect, but never saw him enter or leave a specific apartment; Williams "always noticed suspect Nash to be in the common areas of the complex or the parking lot of an adjacent corner store." Id. at 5. During this continued investigation Williams also used hcad.org attempt to "verify the addresses within the complex," but "found there is only 5812 and 5820 listed for the six buildings and twelve apartments." Id. at 4. Williams also used Google Earth to obtain a satellite photo of the complex. Id.
Id. The C.I. returned with .19 grams of crack cocaine, and told the officers that he or sheobserved Nash come out of his apartment, numbered 5818. Id. at 5-6. To confirm which door Nash used, Williams verified with the C.I. that Nash used the right door, "as far in the corner of the complex as you can go." Id. at 6. Williams was hesitant to walk through the complex to identify the numbers himself, "[k]nowing the dealers in and around the complex were organized with look-outs," and could not see the numbers from the across the street. Id. However Williams was confident in the information supplied by the C.I., and prepared a probable cause affidavit and search warrant for 5818 Hirsch Road. Id. at 6-7.
Williams and other officers executed this search warrant on May 24, 2014. Id. at 8. Williams stated that:
As we approached the door of the far right apartment described by the C.I., I observed the last digit of the address of that apartment was a "6" instead of an "8", so it read "5816". I recognized the difference in the address in the probable cause affidavit and search warrant to that over the door of the subject apartment, [...] But, based on past experiences, and the facts I have referenced above, I knew that address numbers can be misread for many reasons, and in fact it is not uncommon to encounter drug-related premises without an address.
Id. at 8-9. The officers then pried open the burglar bars and "[a]lmost simultaneously, Ms. Thomas opened her door and stepped back." Id. at 9. The team then conducted a security sweep of the apartment, "which took approximately 30 to 45 seconds," but Id. at 9-10.
Williams then apologized to Ms. Thomas, and asked her various questions to determine if another person was using her apartment to sell drugs. Id. at 10. Later, Williams returned to the complex with the C.I. who realized that he or she had made a mistake, because "the brick wall that runs partially between the two apartments blocked their view of Ms. Thomas' door." Id. at 11.
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs describe the search as follows. The officers:
(Document No. 32 at 5-6). Therefore Plaintiffs allege that each officer1 "violated their clearly established rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to remain free from unreasonable searches of their home" and to "remain free from unreasonable seizures." Id. at 10, 15. Plaintiffs also allege that Williams "acquired a warrant to enter their home by swearing out an affidavit with materially false statements either knowingly or in reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 16.
Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The substantive law governing the claims determines the elements essential to the outcome of the case and thus determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute over such a fact is genuine if the evidence presents an issue "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. The moving party bears the burden of identifying evidence that no genuineissue of material fact exists, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), and the court must view this evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The defense of "[q]ualified immunity shields government officials from liability when" they act within their discretionary authority and their actions do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known." Gates v. Texas Dept. of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). The purpose of this defense is to "balance[ ] two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably," Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009), and its effect is to "provide[ ] ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
Because "qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012) (alterations omitted) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009)), this "defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof" in that "[o]nce an official pleads the defense, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law." Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). Although all inferences are still drawn in the plaintiff's favor, it is the plaintiff who "bears the burden of negating qualified immunity." Id. The qualified immunity analysis consists of two prongs—one, whether an official's conduct violates a constitutionalright; the other, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation—and the court may rely on either prong in its analysis. Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2433, 182 L. Ed. 2d 1062 (U.S. 2012).
Under the second prong of the qualified immunity defense, the standard is whether the defendant's actions were "'objectively reasonable' in light of 'law which was clearly established at the time of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial