Thomason v. Deutsche Bank
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:22-cv-52-ECM (WO) |
| Decision Date | 21 September 2022 |
| Parties | STEVEN CLAYTON THOMASON, Plaintiff, v. DEUTSCHE BANK, TRUSTEE FOR HOME EQUITY MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET-BACKED TRUST SERIES INABA 2006-A, HOME EQUITY MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES SERIES INABS2006-A8, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Pro se Plaintiff Steven Clayton Thomason (“Thomason”) filed suit in State court seeking inter alia, to set aside Defendant Deutsche Bank's (“Deutsche Bank”) foreclosure of his property. (Doc. 1-1). Deutsche Bank removed the case to federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction as the basis of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 2). Now pending before the Court is Deutsche Bank's Motion to Dismiss (doc. 5), Thomason's Motion to Remand (doc. 11), and Thomason's Motion for Mediation (doc. 16). For the reasons that follow, Thomason's Motion to Remand is due to be denied; Deutsche Bank's Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted; and Thomason's Motion for Mediation is due to be denied as moot.
Thomason alleges that in 2005 he and his wife owned property (the “property”) in Montgomery, Alabama. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). On November 28, 2005, Thomason's wife executed two promissory notes in favor of Eva Bank for approximately $78,000. Id. Thomason was not a party to the notes. Id. He avers that Eva Bank verbally informed his wife that it would re-finance the notes with her after two years to create a single note at a more acceptable and agreeable fixed interest rate. Id.
Thomason and his wife executed a mortgage (the “Mortgage”) on the property with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) to secure the notes. Id. at 3. Thomason's wife died in October 2009. Id. The Mortgage was reassigned multiple times to different entities in the following years. Id. Thomason contends he was unsuccessful in “modify[ing] the loans into one loan with a fair interest rate” with the various holders of the Mortgage. Id. In March 2011, Thomason claims that Deutsche Bank, to whom the Mortgage was eventually transferred, notified him that “it had accelerated the unpaid balance of the debt owed . . . and was seeking a non-judicial foreclosure [of the property] pursuant [to] the mortgage.” Id. After multiple delays and litigation spanning several years, Thomason asserts that Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the property on September 29, 2021. Id. at 4.
In December 2021, Thomason filed his present complaint in Montgomery County Circuit Court seeking to set aside the foreclosure of the property and to obtain a permanent injunction preventing any future foreclosure attempts. (Doc. 1-1 at 1-8). In January 2022, Deutsche Bank removed the case to this Court and thereafter filed the pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. 5). Four months after removal, Thomason filed a Motion to Remand, (doc. 11), arguing that this Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
This is not the first dispute between Thomason and Deutsche Bank concerning the mortgage on the property. In fact, there have been at least four previous lawsuits filed by Thomason in which he asserted various claims against Deutsche Bank regarding the loan, mortgage, default, and/or foreclosure of the property. The Court takes judicial notice of the pleadings, orders, and judgments entered in those cases. McGuire v. Marshall, 512 F.Supp.3d 1189, 1212-13 (M.D. Ala. 2021) () (citing Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 704 F.3d 882, 892 (11th Cir. 2013)).
Thomason filed his first suit in this Court regarding the loan and mortgage on the property in July 2012. Thomason v. One West Bank, FSB, Indy Mac Bank, et al., 2:12-cv-604-MHT-WC (“Thomason I”) (Docs. 1, 89). In that case, Thomason asserted claims arising from the loan and default related to the property. (Id. at doc. 89 at 4-34). The Court granted summary judgment and entered judgment in the favor of the Defendants. (Thomason I, at doc. 214). Thomason then filed a notice of appeal that was dismissed because he failed to pay the filing and docketing fees. (Id. at doc. 234). The Court denied Thomason's motion for relief from final judgment and directed the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment. (Id. at doc. 243).
Thomason filed a second suit against Deutsche Bank in April 2019 in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. Thomason v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, et al., 2:19-cv-256-ECM-SMD (“Thomason II”) (Doc. 1). Thomason again asserted claims arising from the loan and default related to the property. (Id. at 3-21). After the defendants removed the case to this Court, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice finding that the claims were barred by res judicata. . Thomason filed a notice of appeal which was again dismissed because of his failure to pay the filing fee. (Id. at doc. 28).
Thomason filed his third action against Deutsche Bank in April 2020, again in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, asserting claims arising from the loan and default related to the property. Thomason v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. as Trustee for Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust Series INABA 2006-A, Home Equity Mortgage Loan asset-Backed Certificates Series INABS 2006-A8, 2:20-cv-292-WKW-KFP (“Thomason III”) (Doc. 1-1). The Court found that Thomason's claims were barred by both res judicata and a failure to meet the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. (Id. at doc. 26). Accordingly, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice and entered final judgment. .
Thomason appealed and, in October 2021, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal based on Thomason's failure to prosecute. (Id. at doc. 33). In January 2022, the Circuit reinstated the appeal, which remains pending. (Id. at doc. 34).
Thomason filed his fourth action against Deutsche Bank in August 2021, again in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, asserting claims arising from the loan and default related to the property. Thomason v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. as Trustee for Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust Series INABA 2006-A, Home Equity Mortgage Loan asset-Backed Certificates Series INABS 2006-A8, 2:21-cv-650-ECM-SMD (“Thomason IV”) (Doc. 1-1). After removal to this Court, Deutsche Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that Thomason's claims were barred by res judicata. (Doc. 5 at 10-12). Thomason filed Motions to Remand, asserting that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. . The Court ordered the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery and ultimately denied the motion to remand. (Doc. 33). Thereafter, Thomason filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). (Doc. 34). After the self-executing dismissal, Deutsche Bank filed a motion for permanent injunction, seeking to enjoin Thomason from filing future cases involving the same property in the State court. (Doc. 36). The Court denied the request and noted that Deutsche Bank should seek its requested relief in State court. (Doc. 38).
“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). When removal is based on diversity jurisdiction, the defendant “bears the burden of establishing the jurisdictional amount [in controversy] by a preponderance of the evidence.” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007). Likewise, the removing party also bears the burden of establishing the citizenship of the parties. Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings, L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Ray v. Bird & Son & Asset Realization Co., 519 F.2d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 1975)[1] (“The burden of pleading diversity of citizenship is upon the party invoking federal jurisdiction, and if jurisdiction is properly challenged, that party also bears the burden of proof.”). “A defendant . . . desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file . . . a notice of removal . . . containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). In the removal context, jurisdictional facts are judged at the time of removal. Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000).
Generally after a case has been removed to a federal court, a plaintiff may file a motion to remand the case to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447. When considering a motion to remand, a court must examine whether it has jurisdiction over the case. Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 1999). “[28 U.S.C.] § 1447(c) implicitly recognizes two bases upon which a district court may . . . order a remand: when there is (1) a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect other than a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id.; see also Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (). “[A]ll doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Amer. Tobacco Co.,...
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