Thompson Tractor Co. v. Daily Express Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-02210 |
| Parties | THOMPSON TRACTOR CO. INC., Plaintiff, v. DAILY EXPRESS INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
JOE BILLY McDADE United States Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on cross-Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the parties. Both Motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for review. For the following reasons Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 21) is denied, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc 23) is granted in part and denied in part.
Background[1]
In May 2019, Plaintiff Thompson Tractor Co., Inc., purchased and agreed to deliver an industrial-grade generator manufactured by Caterpillar, Incorporated, to a third-party purchaser and solicited Defendant Daily Express, Inc., to transport the generator from the Caterpillar facility in East Peoria Illinois, to the third-party purchaser's jobsite in Huntsville, Alabama. . On May 20 2019, Dan Gladu, a driver contracted by Defendant, received the generator at the Caterpillar facility in apparent good working order and condition, as indicated by Gladu's signature on the bill of lading, which was issued by Caterpillar. (Doc. 3).
At some point during transport Gladu's tractor-trailer partially left the roadway, requiring the use of a tow truck to place the tractor-trailer back onto the roadway. (Doc. 24-3 at 6-8). Gladu arrived at the Alabama jobsite on May 22, but the generator could not be offloaded on that date because the crane at the jobsite was inoperable. (Docs. 3; 22-1 at 18). At some point after arriving, Gladu was greeted by Mark Waddell, an employee of Plaintiff's, who observed the generator while it was on Gladu's trailer; Waddell did not note any damage thereto. (Doc. 22-1 at 22).
On May 25, the generator was offloaded, and Eleazar Torres, Jr., an employee of SBE (the electrical subcontractor for the third-party purchaser's jobsite) conducted an offload damage inspection and signed the bill of lading without indicating any damage to the generator (docs. 3; 22-1 at 19); no employee or representative of Plaintiff was present for the offloading or the offload damage inspection (docs. 22-1 at 19-20; 24-1), and no employee or representative of Plaintiff signed the bill of lading (see doc. 3). When employees of Plaintiff returned to the jobsite three days later, [2]Kevin Meadows, an employee of Plaintiff's, conducted a damage inspection and discovered damage to the generator's fuel tank. (Doc. 25-9).[3] The cost to transport the generator back to the Caterpillar facility, repair the damage, and transport the generator back to the Alabama jobsite totaled $202, 631.66.[4] Plaintiff now seeks damages in that amount pursuant to the Carmack Amendment.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' ” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The nonmovant bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Aregood v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 904 F.3d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 2018). The parties must support their assertions that a fact is disputed or cannot be genuinely disputed by citing to admissible evidence in the record. Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 2018).
The record is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and the Court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the nonmovant's favor. BRC Rubber & Plastics, Inc. v. Cont'l Carbon Co., 900 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2018). When presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider the motions separately, which necessarily means the nonmovant differs depending on the motion being considered. See Schlaf v. Safeguard Prop., LLC, 899 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 1998)). This, however, does not alter the standard for reviewing a motion for summary judgment or the parties' respective burdens.
Defendant seeks summary judgment on numerous procedural grounds. First, Defendant asserts multiple arguments challenging Plaintiff's prudential standing to litigate the claim at bar. (Doc. 22 at 5). Second, Defendant claims Plaintiff's prelitigation written claim was inadequate, precluding this lawsuit. (Doc. 22 at 9).
Congress enacted the Carmack Amendment to create “a nationally uniform rule of carrier liability concerning interstate shipments.” REI Transp., Inc. v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 519 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (REI) (quoting North Am. Van Lines v. Pinkerton Sec. Sys., 89 F.3d 452, 454 (7th Cir. 1996)). Per the Carmack Amendment, a carrier of an interstate shipment is “liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading.” 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). “The ‘person entitled to recover' can bring suit against either the delivering carrier or the originating carrier for the ‘actual loss or injury to the property caused' by any carrier in the course of the interstate shipment.” REI, 519 F.3d at 697 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1)). Id.
Pursuant to the Carmack Amendment, the carrier is responsible for issuing a receipt or bill of lading, but “failure to issue a receipt or bill of lading does not affect the liability of a carrier.” § 14706(a)(1). Here, Defendant, the carrier, did not issue a bill of lading or receipt; rather, Caterpillar, the manufacturer of the generator, issued the bill of lading. (Doc. 3). That bill of lading identified Plaintiff (Thompson) as the “dealer” who, the undisputed facts establish, purchased the cargo from Caterpillar and arranged its shipment to the Alabama jobsite (docs. 3; 22 at 2 (Defendant's assertion Plaintiff purchased[5] the cargo); 25 at 3[6] ()). In other words, Plaintiff was the owner/shipper/consignor of the cargo at issue. Shippers of cargo are generally considered persons entitled to recover under a bill of lading, as Defendant begrudgingly concedes (doc. 28 at 2). See generally REI, 519 F.3d at 697 ().
Defendant's arguments regarding Plaintiff's status under the bill of lading are unavailing, and the case law on which it relies is nonbinding and distinguishable. (See doc. 22 at 6-7). Firstly, it was Defendant's responsibility to issue an accurate bill of lading or receipt for the shipment. § 14706(a)(1); see also 49 C.F.R. § 373.101. Defendant's attempt to evade liability based on perceived inadequacies or inaccuracies in the bill of lading here thus flies in the face of justice and is an attempt to shift the consequences of its own failure to Plaintiff. Secondly, the failure to issue a bill of lading or receipt does not affect the liability of a carrier, § 14706(a)(1), so a perceived failure to expressly name the proper parties thereto cannot affect a proper party's standing to recover. Finally, Defendant's position that the bill of lading does not identify Plaintiff as an interested party is patently false, as discussed above.
For these reasons, Plaintiff is a person entitled to recover under the bill of lading issued here.
Defendant's next argument is somewhat of a theme throughout its challenge to Plaintiff's prudential standing. It argues Plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed with its claim because it was compensated for the loss at issue by its insurer, suggesting the insurer, rather than Plaintiff, is the real party of interest; according to Defendant, Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if it prevails on its claim. (Docs. 22 at 7; 28 at 9). This one-paragraph argument, however, cites no legal authority whatsoever and is wildly undeveloped. To obtain summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). This undeveloped and unsupported argument does not do that.
Even if the Court agreed Plaintiff's insurer was the real party in interest, the Court could not grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant on this ground. The proper vehicle for Defendant's argument is a motion or objection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, which states:
The court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action. After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action proceeds as if it had been originally commenced by the real party in interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3). Thus, the proper remedy is not summary dismissal of Plaintiff's claim.
Motions or objections under Rule 17 must “be raised when such joinder is practical and convenient.” RK Co. v See, 622 F.3d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, Defendant chose to wait until the summary judgment stage to raise its concerns-in an improper form-despite learning of the facts necessary to...
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