Thompson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 45023,45023
• Citation: 440 P.2d 548,201 Kan. 296
• Parties: Naoml F. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 548

440 P.2d 548

201 Kan. 296

Naoml F. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee.

No. 45023.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

May 11, 1968.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the record clearly discloses that all parties to an action have submitted their entire case for decision on all issues, they are held to have consented that the court decide such issues notwithstanding that an issue so decided may-in a strict technical sense-be deemed to be outside the literal scope of the pretrial order.

2. In an action to recover the accidental death benefits under a life insurance policy the record is examined and it is held (1) the record clearly discloses that plaintiff understood and consented that the court decide all issues in the case, and (2) the finding by the court as to the cause of death was fully supported by the medical evidence.

Lee R. Meador, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Jerry G. Elliott, Wichita, argued the cause, and George B. Powers, John F. Eberhardt, Stuart R. Carter, Robert C. Foulston, Malcolm Miller, Robert N. Partridge, Robert M. Siefkin, Richard C. Harris, Gerald Sawatzky, Donald L. Cordes, Robert L. Howard, Charles J. Woodin, Mikel L. Stout, Benjamin C. Langel, Phillip S. Frick, John E. Foulston, and Stanley G. Andeel, Wichita, were with him on the brief for appellee.

PRICE, Chief Justice.

This is an action by a widow-beneficiary to recover the 'double indemnity for accidental death' benefits under a life insurance policy.

Judgment was rendered for defendant insurance company, and plaintiff has appealed.

The insured was an employee of the Boeing Company in Wichita, and was insured under a group life insurance policy which provided for payment of double the amount of the policy in the event the insured met accidental death resulting--

'* * * directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries * * * sustained solely from accidental means'.

An exclusionary clause of the policy provided there was no coverage for accidental death--

'caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, or contributed to substantially, by bodily or mental infirmity * * * or any-kind of disease.'

Following the death of insured the basic death benefits of the policy were paid to plaintiff. Payment of the double indemnity benefits was refused-hence this action.

On the evening in question the insured, upon returning to his home from work, ate a rather hurried meal-for he was to show a movie film at his church. About 7:15, while carrying his moving picture equipment through a side door of the church, he 'bumped' his head on the door. He mentioned the matter to his son, who was with him. He went ahead and showed the film. About 8:30 he packed up his equipment and carried it back down stairs and across the street to his car. He remarked to his wife that he had bumped his head and that it ached terribly. While in the process of driving away from the church he collapsed at the wheel. His wife drove him to a hospital where he died about two hours later.

The pertinent portion of the death certificate stated--

'Cause of Death: Immediate cause (a) cerebral hemorrhage; interval between onset and death-3 hours; (b) arteriosclerosis-5 years.'

The depositions of three physicians were taken, and their medical opinions as to the cause of death were--

One physician, who had treated the insured for an arteriosclerosis condition for several years was of the opinion the bump on the head was in no way connected with the cause of death-cerebral hemorrhage.

Another physician, after reviewing all of the evidence, stated there was no objective evidence that insured had sustained a trauma of any kind and that in his opinion insured died of a spontaneous hemorrhage not associated with trauma.

The other physician was of the opinion it was possible for there to have been a causal relationship between the bump on the head and the massive hemorrhage.

A pretrial conference was held on December 21, 1965, at which time defendant orally moved for summary judgment on the ground that notwithstanding the evidence of the one physician to the effect the bump on the head possibly precipitated the cerebral hemorrhage and ultimate death, recovery was precluded by reason of the exclusionary clause in the policy.

Following some discussion and argument of the matter the court did not rule on the motion but decided that additional medical evidence should be submitted. The matter was continued until February 28, 1966 but no further action was taken until May 3, 1966. In the meantime, additional medical evidence-as above related-was obtained and the parties submitted briefs on the questions involved. The brief of defendant stated the question to be whether defendant was entitled to summary judgment in view of the fact the most favorable evidence to plaintiff-that of her own doctor-showed that the alleged blow on the head could not have caused death without the presence of an abnormal blood vessel and that the diseased blood vessel played the major part in the whole process. Plaintiff's brief agreed that the question as stated by defendant was the only question and concluded that the matter was a question of law to be determined by the court.

At the second pretrial conference on May 3, 1966, considerable discussion was had. Counsel for defendant stated that all of the evidence was before the court and that the court could weigh it and reach a decision. Counsel for plaintiff replied that the court could determine from the briefs the issues involved. The court inquired if the issue was whether the insured died as a result of accident or as the result of other causes-and both counsel answered in the affirmative. After further discussion the record then shows that counsel for defendant stated--

'Let us see if we can't agree this is it: First, based on the evidence, I think the Court has to determine whether or not the blow that everybody reports the plaintiff received at the side of his head had anything to do with his death. That is the first thing the Court has to decide.' Counsel for plaintiff replied--

'Correct.'

Counsel for defendant--

'And the second thing the Court has to decide is whether or not this man had an infirmity in the base of the skull in the vessel, and if he did have that infirmity, whether that infirmity was a major cause of his death and then whether the exceptions in the policy-it says: 'There is no coverage for accidental death caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partially or contributed...