Thompson v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 09 November 1993
• Citation: 429 Pa.Super. 532,632 A.2d 1349
• Parties: Debra THOMPSON, Individually and as Guardian and Natural Mother of Jonathan Caulder and Jonathan Caulder in His own Right, Appellants, v. Barbara Willene ANDERSON and Walter Caulder and Joseph Albano, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1349

632 A.2d 1349

429 Pa.Super. 532

Debra THOMPSON, Individually and as Guardian and Natural Mother of Jonathan Caulder and Jonathan Caulder in His own Right, Appellants, v. Barbara Willene ANDERSON and Walter Caulder and Joseph Albano, Appellees.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 2, 1993.

Filed Nov. 9, 1993.

Michael Casey, Media, for appellants.

Lawrence S. Sarowitz, Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before OLSZEWSKI, JOHNSON and HUDOCK, JJ.

HUDOCK, Judge:

This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Before we can state the issues on appeal, we must set forth the rather complex factual and procedural history of this case.

First, Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees alleging negligent conduct which resulted in injuries to both Appellants. The complaint claims that Appellees negligently caused injury to Appellant Debra Thompson when she slid off the hood of the vehicle driven by Appellee Barbara Willene Anderson. ¹ Subsequent to filing this complaint, Appellee Joseph Albano's insurance carrier (EDS) filed an appearance and reservation of rights to disclaim coverage based on an exclusion in his policy for "intentional acts." Appellants' counsel then notified their uninsured motorist carrier (General Accident) of the possible intentional nature of the events, thus putting them on notice of a potential uninsured motorist claim.

As a result of EDS' reservation of rights, Appellants filed a motion with the court requesting appointment of a defense arbitrator. ² The two arbitrators then chose a third, and a preliminary hearing was held to determine whether the panel had jurisdiction over an uninsured motorist claim because of the uncertain position of EDS. The record indicates that the panel determined that an intentional act was involved, thereby leaving Appellants without an insurance claim against EDS. The arbitration panel then deferred the hearing on damages to a later date. Subsequent to that decision, General Accident (Appellants' uninsured carrier) offered a settlement of $190,000.00 which Appellant Debra Thompson accepted. The arbitration was never concluded as a result of this settlement.

Appellants then continued to pursue the initial negligence claim against Appellees. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Appellants were estopped from arguing a negligence theory of recovery because of their settlement with their uninsured motorist carrier on an intentional tort theory. Appellees asserted that Appellant had been fully compensated by the settlement. This appeal arose. We affirm.

Appellants raise three issues in their appeal. First they claim that there were genuine issues of material fact unresolved, and therefore it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment. Next, they claim that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not applicable to them because their claim was not successfully maintained, but rather settled. And finally, they claim that the subrogation rights of General Accident have been extinguished improperly by the grant of summary judgment.

Our standard of review in this case is as follows:

The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding whether the moving party has met this burden, the court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The court's responsibility is to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists; the court may not resolve such an issue. Moreover, the court should not enter summary judgment unless the case is free from doubt.

Weiss v. Keystone Mack Sales, Inc., 310 Pa.Super. 425, 430, 456 A.2d 1009, 1011 (1983) (citations omitted).

In reviewing the entry of summary judgment by the trial court, however, we will not overturn that decision unless there has been an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. Tonkovic v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 407 Pa.Super. 522, 595 A.2d 1269 (1991).

It is well-settled that although plaintiffs recover from their own uninsured motorist coverage carrier, they may nonetheless maintain an action against the third party tortfeasor. Bethea v. Forbes, 519 Pa. 422, 548 A.2d 1215 (1988). What is at the heart of Appellants' claim in our case is the interaction between this well-settled principle and another well-settled principle: that "a party to an action is estopped from assuming a position inconsistent with his assertion in a previous action, if his contention was successfully maintained." Associated Hospital Service v. Pustilnik, 497 Pa. 221, 439 A.2d 1149 (1981) (quoting Geisey v. Cogan, 118 Pa.Super. 464, 466, 179 A. 865, 866 (1935)). The interaction of these two principles becomes important in our case because Appellants' established at the preliminary arbitration hearing that their injuries were the result of "intentional" conduct on the part...