Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
| Decision Date | 12 July 1965 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 6889. |
| Citation | 243 F. Supp. 261 |
| Parties | Fred THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. BROTHERHOOD OF SLEEPING CAR PORTERS, an Unincorporated Railroad Labor Organization, National in Scope, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Dusenbury, Dusenbury & McKenzie, Florence, S. C., for plaintiff.
Heard by the Court, with a jury, at the December, 1964 Term of Civil Court for the Florence Division, United States Courts for the Eastern District of South Carolina. Plaintiff claims that the acts of defendant Brotherhood caused him to lose his seniority as a Mail Porter, with resulting deprivation of his rightful tours of duty and opportunities for employment with the ACL Railroad. He sought actual damages for past losses, plus allowance for such losses as might accrue pending a final determination, punitive damages, and future losses. Trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars actual damages.
In due time defendant offered appropriate motion, to wit:
Hearing on the motion was postponed to convenience counsel in obtaining and studying the trial transcript.
Initiated October 18, 1964 in the Court of Common Pleas for Florence County, South Carolina, removal procedures engaged the jurisdiction of this forum. Thereafter, in December of 1961 trial was begun before a jury at Florence; at the conclusion of plaintiff's case a motion by defendant for involuntary dismissal (directed verdict) was granted.
Upon appeal the case was "Reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with the opinion of this court."1 From that opinion, this Court finds its direction:
In the present case, it appears necessary to pursue only one line of inquiry to resolve the questions of "invidious discrimination," "reasonableness," "good faith and honesty": Did the plaintiff show that he received different or substantially sub-standard representation at the hands of the Brotherhood? If so, was it because of some improper reason, such as his unsatisfactory union status? Did this treatment cause him injury? If the answers of the trier of fact to the three questions are in the affirmative, the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Defendant strongly avers that there is no evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict. In response, let us excerpt from that record.
Introduced into evidence and published was this letter:
Mr. Fred N. Thompson 310 B. So. Ravenel Street Florence, South Carolina
My Dear Brother Thompson:
Fraternally yours /s/ B. F. McLaurin B. F. McLaurin Internal Field Organizer
It is revealing to note as well another letter from Mr. McLaurin, dated November 23, 1954, addressed to all train porters, under defendant's letterhead, which stated:
It is a well-known fact that porters are off their jobs today who ordinarily would be working if they had been members in good standing in the organization.
The record is replete with testimony of the plaintiff as to how the defendant Union did not fulfill its obligation under the Act, and the Union appropriately attempted to refute. The issues were properly left to the jury.
The Court would be remiss if it did not outline a portion of the record which characterized the "aura" around the defendant Union which was being charged with a breach of its statutory duty by plaintiff.
A past officer in the local Union was being examined. The colloquy was as follows:
This Court does not suggest that this evidence is superior or controlling, but the jury had the right, the duty to consider whether, dues or no dues, the Brotherhood, as the recognized representative bargaining agent, performed, or neglected, its duty. As was said in the Circuit Court opinion:
But, any discrimination in treatment must be based upon relevant, non-invidious distinctions for, while "a wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, it is subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.
The record shows repeated efforts of plaintiff to obtain relief, protection of his job. What impact the jury gave to the reasoning that defendant knew of his complaint, and did not act in good faith, this Court will not interpret; evidently the jury believed plaintiff had a right to recover.
Various exhibits, correspondence, are in the record. The jury was strongly charged on the burden of proof. This Court now refuses to interpret the proof, as this part of defendant's motion seeks.
Sufficient evidence was presented upon which the jury could so weigh the evidence as to warrant a verdict for plaintiff. The Court will not set aside.
Portions refused were refused because either included in the General Charge or were a charge on the facts:
Request No. 5 was:
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...in the second decision in Glidden, as casting doubt upon the Glidden court's future course in such cases. Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (D.C., 1965), 243 F.Supp. 261, is cited by plaintiffs for the approving comment upon Glidden (243 F.Supp. pp. 268 and 269). However, the ......
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...105 (1967); Slenczka v. Hoover Ball and Bearing Co., 215 F.Supp. 761 (N.D.Ohio 1963). But see Thompson Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 243 F.Supp. 261, 268-270 (E.D.So.Car.1965), aff'd, 367 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960, 87 S.Ct. 1019, 18 L.Ed.2d 110 (1967) Indee......
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Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
...representing losses incurred by the plaintiff to the date of judgment and also losses which he will suffer in the future. 243 F.Supp. 261 (E.D.S.C.1965). On this appeal the union attacks the judgment principally on two grounds: first, that its motion for a judgment n. o. v. should have been......