Thompson v. Clark

• Decision Date: 04 April 2022
• Docket Number: 20-659
• Parties: Larry THOMPSON, Petitioner v. Pagiel CLARK, et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

142 S.Ct. 1332

Larry THOMPSON, Petitioner

v.Pagiel CLARK, et al.

No. 20-659

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued October 12, 2021

Decided April 4, 2022

Amir H. Ali, Washington, DC, for Petitioner

John D. Moore, New York, NY, for Respondents.

Jonathan Y. Ellis for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting Petitioner.

Amir H. Ali, Counsel of Record, Devi M. Rao, Christina N. Davis, Damilola G. Arowolaju, Elise M. Baranouski, Elizabeth A. Bixby, Perry R. Cao, Roderick & Solange, Macarthur Justice Center, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Richard Dearing, Counsel of Record, Devin Slack, John Moore, Anna W. Gottlieb, Kevin Osowski, Melanie T. West, Georgia M. Pestana, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Respondents.

Justice KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.

Larry Thompson was charged and detained in state criminal proceedings, but the charges were dismissed before trial without any explanation by the prosecutor or judge. After the dismissal, Thompson alleged that the police officers who initiated the criminal proceedings had "maliciously prosecuted" him without probable cause. App. 33–34. Thompson sued and sought money damages from those officers in federal court. As relevant here, he advanced a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution.

To maintain that Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983, a plaintiff such as Thompson must demonstrate, among other things, that he obtained a favorable termination of the underlying criminal prosecution. Cf. Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 484, and n. 4, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). This case requires us to flesh out what a favorable termination entails. Does it suffice for a plaintiff to show that his criminal prosecution ended without a conviction? Or must the plaintiff also demonstrate that the prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of his innocence, such as an acquittal or a dismissal accompanied by a statement from the judge that the evidence was insufficient?

We conclude as follows: To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for purposes of the Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Thompson satisfied that requirement in this case. We therefore reverse the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

Larry Thompson lived with his fiancée (now wife) and their newborn baby girl in an apartment in Brooklyn, New York. In January 2014, Thompson's sister-in-law was also staying there. The sister-in-law apparently suffered from a mental illness. One day that January, the sister-in-law called 911 and claimed that Thompson was sexually abusing his one-week-old baby daughter. Two Emergency Medical Technicians promptly responded. When the EMTs arrived at the family's apartment, Thompson asked the EMTs why they were there and denied that anyone had called 911. The EMTs left and informed the police of the situation.

The EMTs and four police officers then returned to the apartment. When they arrived, Thompson told them that they could not come in without a warrant. The police officers nonetheless entered and, after a brief scuffle, handcuffed Thompson. The EMTs followed the officers into the apartment and examined the baby. After finding red marks on the baby's body, the EMTs took the baby to the hospital for evaluation. The marks turned out to be a case of diaper rash. The medical professionals found no signs of abuse.

Meanwhile, the police officers arrested Thompson for resisting their entry into the apartment. Thompson was taken to a local hospital and then to jail. While Thompson was in custody, one of the police officers prepared and filed a criminal complaint charging Thompson with obstructing governmental administration and resisting arrest. Thompson remained in custody for two days. A judge then released him on his own recognizance.

Before trial, the prosecution moved to dismiss the charges, and the trial judge in turn dismissed the case. The prosecutor did not explain why she sought to dismiss the charges, nor did the trial judge explain why he dismissed the case.

After the criminal prosecution ended, Thompson brought suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the police officers who had arrested and charged him. Thompson alleged several constitutional violations, including a Fourth Amendment claim for "malicious prosecution." App. 33. Thompson asserted that the officers "maliciously prosecuted" him and "subjected him to an unlawful, illegal and excessive detention" in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id ., at 34.

To prevail on that claim under Second Circuit precedent, Thompson had to show that his criminal prosecution ended not merely without a conviction, but also with some affirmative indication of his innocence. See Lanning v. Glens Falls , 908 F.3d 19, 22 (2018). Thompson could not put forth any substantial evidence that would explain why the prosecutor had moved to dismiss the charges or why the trial court had dismissed the charges. Therefore, the District Court ruled that Thompson's criminal case had not ended in a way that affirmatively indicated his innocence. The District Court granted judgment to the defendant officers on that Fourth Amendment claim. Notably, the District Court also opined that the relevant Second Circuit precedent "can and should be changed" to say that a favorable termination occurs so long as the prosecution ends without a conviction. 364 F.Supp.3d 178, 181, 196–197 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adhered to its precedent in Lanning and affirmed the dismissal of Thompson's Fourth Amendment claim. 794 Fed.Appx. 140 (2020).

The Courts of Appeals have split over how to apply the favorable termination requirement of the Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. In addition to the Second Circuit, some other Courts of Appeals have held that a favorable termination requires some affirmative indication of innocence. See, e.g., Kossler v. Crisanti , 564 F.3d 181, 187 (CA3 2009) (en banc); Cordova v. Albuquerque , 816 F.3d 645, 649 (CA10 2016). By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a favorable termination occurs so long as the criminal prosecution ends without a conviction. See Laskar v. Hurd , 972 F.3d 1278, 1282 (2020). This Court granted certiorari to resolve the split. 592 U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1682, 209 L.Ed.2d 263 (2021).

II

A

In 1871, Congress passed and President Grant signed the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Section 1 of that Act, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, created a species of federal tort liability for individuals to sue state and local officers for deprivations of constitutional rights.

In this case, Thompson sued several police officers under § 1983, alleging that he was "maliciously prosecuted" without probable cause and that he was seized as a result. App. 33–34. He brought a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, sometimes referred to as a claim for unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process. This Court's precedents recognize such a claim. See Manuel v. Joliet , 580 U.S. 357, 363–364, 367–368, 137 S.Ct. 911, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017) ; Albright v. Oliver , 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion); see also id., at 290–291, 114 S.Ct. 807 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). And following this Court's precedents, the District Courts and Courts of Appeals have decided numerous cases involving Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Pitt v. District of Columbia , 491 F.3d 494, 510–511 (CADC 2007) ("[N]early every other Circuit has held that malicious prosecution is actionable under the Fourth Amendment to the extent that the defendant's actions cause the plaintiff to be ‘seized’ without probable cause"); Kossler , 564 F.3d at 186–187 ; Sykes v. Anderson , 625 F.3d 294, 308–309 (CA6 2010) ; Durham v. Horner , 690 F.3d 183, 188 (CA4 2012) ; Myers v. Koopman , 738 F.3d 1190, 1194 (CA10 2013) ; Winfrey v. Rogers , 901 F.3d 483, 491–493 (CA5 2018) ; Lanning , 908 F.3d at 28 ; Jordan v. Waldoboro , 943 F.3d 532, 545 (CA1 2019) ; Williams v. Aguirre , 965 F.3d 1147, 1157 (CA11 2020).¹

The narrow dispute in this case concerns one element of the Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. To determine the elements of a constitutional claim under § 1983, this Court's practice is to first look to the elements of the most analogous tort as of 1871 when § 1983 was enacted, so long as doing so is consistent with "the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue." Manuel , 580 U.S., at 370, 137 S.Ct. 911 ; see also Nieves v. Bartlett , 587 U.S. ––––, ––––, 139 S.Ct. 1715, 1726, 204 L.Ed.2d 1 (2019) ; Heck , 512 U.S. at 483, 114 S.Ct. 2364.²

Here, as most of the Courts of Appeals to consider the question have determined, the most analogous tort to this Fourth Amendment claim is malicious prosecution. See Kossler , 564 F.3d at 186 ; Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308–309 ; Durham , 690 F.3d at 188 ; Myers , 738 F.3d at 1194 ; Lanning , 908 F.3d at 28 ; Jordan , 943 F.3d at 545. That is because the gravamen of the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution, as this Court has recognized it, is the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause. And the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause is likewise the gravamen of the tort of malicious prosecution.

In American courts as of 1871, the malicious prosecution tort generally allowed recovery against an individual who had initiated or caused the initiation of criminal proceedings despite having "no good reason to believe" that criminal charges were "justified by the facts and the law." T. Cooley, Law of Torts 180 (1880) (Cooley); see also 1 F. Hilliard, The Law...