Thompson v. Com.
| Decision Date | 26 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 1998-SC-0277-MR.,No. 2001-SC-0869-MR.,1998-SC-0277-MR.,2001-SC-0869-MR. |
| Parties | William Eugene THOMPSON, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Appellant, William Eugene Thompson, appeals from a sentence of death imposed by the Lyon Circuit Court. Appellant was convicted of murder, robbery in the first degree, and escape in the first degree. Appellant was originally tried before a jury in Lyon County, and was found guilty and sentenced to death, twenty years, and ten years, respectively. On direct appeal, this Court reversed that conviction and remanded, determining that the trial court had refused to grant five valid strikes for cause and erroneously used a prior murder conviction still pending on appeal as an aggravator.1
Upon remand, Appellant pled guilty to all three charges. A second penalty phase trial was conducted, at which Appellant was again sentenced to death. Appellant waived jury sentencing of the non-capital offenses, and was sentenced to two consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling twenty years. The appeal in Case No. 1998-SC-0277-MR stems from the trial court's ruling that Appellant was competent to enter a guilty plea. The appeal in Case No. 2001-SC-0869-MR stems from the trial court's acceptance of Appellant's guilty plea, and the trial court's acceptance of the sentencing jury's recommendation of death.
At the time of this crime, Appellant was serving a life sentence for murder. He was transferred to the Western Kentucky Farm Center, a minimum security prison facility that includes an inmate-operated dairy farm. During the early morning hours of May 9, 1986, Appellant and his supervisor, Fred Cash, reported to work at the dairy barn. According to Appellant, he became enraged outside a calf barn while he and Mr. Cash were attempting to start some equipment. Appellant admits striking Mr. Cash once to the head with a hammer. Little is known about exactly what transpired thereafter, as Appellant claims to have "blacked out." However, the evidence reveals that Mr. Cash's skull was crushed by numerous blows to the head with a hammer and his body was dragged into a calf's stall. According to Appellant, upon realizing what he had done, he removed Mr. Cash's pocketknife, keys and wallet, and left the Farm Center in the prison dairy truck. Appellant fled to the nearby town of Princeton, where he purchased a ticket and boarded a bus bound for Madisonville. The authorities apprehended Appellant in Madisonville.
Appellant appeals as a matter of right, presenting twenty-nine claims of error. For convenience sake, we have grouped Appellant's claims into various categories. Many of Appellant's cited errors are unpreserved. Nonetheless, in light of the penalty imposed in this matter and pursuant to KRS 532.075(2), we will consider even unpreserved issues. The standard of review of unpreserved errors in a case in which the death penalty has been imposed is as follows:
Assuming that the so-called error occurred, we begin by inquiring: (1) whether there is a reasonable justification or explanation for defense counsel's failure to object, e.g., whether the failure might have been a legitimate trial tactic; and (2) if there is no reasonable explanation, whether the unpreserved error was prejudicial, i.e., whether the circumstances in totality are persuasive that, minus the error, the defendant may not have been found guilty of a capital crime, or the death penalty may not have been imposed.2
After hearing oral argument on Appellant's original appeal, we held that the trial court failed to hold the competency hearing required by KRS 504.100(3) before accepting Appellant's guilty plea.3 Instead of reversing Appellant's conviction, we remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether a retrospective competency hearing was possible and, if possible, to hold the hearing.4 On remand, the trial court concluded that it was possible to hold a meaningful retrospective competency hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Appellant was competent to enter a guilty plea. As provided for in our order, Appellant now appeals the trial court's ruling, which has been consolidated with his appeal from his guilty plea and sentence.5 We first address the trial court's finding that holding a retrospective competency hearing would not violate Appellant's due process rights.
In our opinion and order remanding the case for a retrospective competency hearing, we provided significant guidance to the trial court. "The test to be applied in determining whether a retrospective competency hearing is permissible is whether the quantity and quality of available evidence is adequate to arrive at an assessment that could be labeled as more than mere speculation."6 Further, we stated that
[a] retrospective competency hearing, may satisfy the requirements of due process provided it is based on evidence related to observations made or knowledge possessed at the time of trial. Other factors bearing on the constitutional permissibility of a retrospective hearing include: (1) the length of time between the retrospective hearing and the trial; (2) the availability of transcript or video record of the relevant proceedings; (3) the existence of mental examinations conducted close in time to the trial date; and (4) the availability of the recollections of non-experts—including counsel and the trial judge—who had the ability to observe and interact with the defendant during trial.7
Based on the quantity and quality of the evidence available, the trial court concluded that a meaningful retrospective competency hearing could be held. This evidence included the written transcript of the January 12, 1995 hearing in which Appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered an unconditional guilty plea. The record also contains the competency evaluation report by Dr. Candace Walker, who was the psychiatric expert from the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) who examined Appellant prior to the January 12 hearing. Additionally, the trial judge, who was the same judge who accepted Appellant's guilty plea, had available his own recollections of the hearing and his own observations of Appellant's behavior as well as that of trial counsel. Finally, the record contains defense counsels' assertions that Appellant was competent to plead guilty.8
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence available to conduct a meaningful competency hearing on remand.9 We now turn to the retrospective hearing itself.
To be competent to plead guilty, a defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."10 Competency determinations are made based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.11 A review of the evidence introduced at the retrospective competency hearing shows that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling that Appellant was competent to plead guilty on January 12, 1995.
The trial court reviewed Dr. Walker's competency evaluation report. The report was completed and transmitted to defense counsel and the trial court a few days before the January 12 hearing. The report concluded that Appellant was competent to plead guilty. During the retrospective hearing, the trial court—relying on the record from the January 12 hearing—noted that defense counsel had agreed with the report's conclusion and had affirmatively stated that competency was no longer an issue for the defense. The trial court reviewed the Boykin colloquy it held with Appellant before accepting his guilty plea. The trial court heard the testimony of the Commonwealth's Attorney who prosecuted the case against Appellant. And finally, the trial court reviewed the deposition of Dr. Walker made in preparation for the retrospective hearing and introduced into evidence. In the deposition, Dr. Walker was extensively questioned by the Commonwealth and cross-examined by the defense. Little of this evidence places Appellant's competency in doubt and most of it supports the trial court's ultimate ruling that Appellant was competent to plead guilty. Thus, we conclude that the trial court's ruling was supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, was not clearly erroneous.12 Finally, we note that competency claims raised on appeal may be based on violations of both procedural and substantive due process.13 "A procedural competency claim is based upon a trial court's alleged failure to hold a competency hearing, or an adequate competency hearing, while a substantive competency claim is founded on the allegation that an individual was tried and convicted while, in fact, incompetent."14 "Claims involving these principles raise similar but distinct issues: the issue in a substantive competency claim is whether the defendant was in fact competent to stand trial, but the issue in a procedural competency claim is whether the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing."15 Thus, the underlying trial court error, which was a failure to hold the competency hearing required by KRS 504.100 or a hearing that was adequate to protect Appellant's due process rights, concerned a violation of procedural due...
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