Thompson v. Dalton

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SHEPARD; BAKES; DONALDSON
• Citation: Thompson v. Dalton, 520 P.2d 240, 95 Idaho 785 (Idaho 1974)
• Decision Date: 22 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 11333,11333
• Parties: Helen THOMPSON, a single woman, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Russell DALTON, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 240

520 P.2d 240

95 Idaho 785

Helen THOMPSON, a single woman, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Russell DALTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11333.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 22, 1974.

Dennis E. Wheeler, Hull, Hull & Wheeler, Wallace, for defendant-appellant. David A. Frazier, McCabe & Frazier, Coeur d'Alene, for plaintiff-respondent.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from that portion of a judgment awarding punitive damages in an action for conversion.

The following summary, most of which is not disputed by the appellant, is based on the findings and conclusions of the district court. On June 17, 1965, Andrew and Bernadine Burlingham, husband and wife, not parties to this action, executed a promissory note in favor of the First National Bank of Wallace, Idaho. The note was secured by a chattel mortgage on a mobile home. The Burlinghams executed the note and mortgage to finance the purchase of the mobile home from Russell Dalton, who conducted a trailer sales business in Kellogg, Idaho. Dalton endorsed the promissory note as guarantor.

On March 5, 1969, the Burlinghams executed a written lease of the trailer for a term of one year to plaintiff-respondent Helen Thompson. At all pertinent times, she was in lawful possession of the mobile home under the terms of the lease from the Burlinghams. Mrs. Thompson resided in the mobile home, which was located on real property owned by her. She kept various items of personal property in the mobile home including furniture, dishes, food, clothing, cash and other personal belongings.

The Burlinghams became delinquent in their payments on the promissory note to the bank. At some time between June 10, and June 20, 1969, appellant Dalton and Deputy Sheriff Charles Rust of Kootenai County, Idaho, met and spoke with respondent Thompson at the mobile home. Deputy Rust was there to collect delinquent taxes on the mobile home, which appellant Dalton paid at that time. Dalton was then prepared to take possession and remove the mobile home, but Deputy Rust advised him that he should see an attorney as Mrs. Thompson was then living in the mobile home. The court found that Rust also said to Dalton that he did not think that the mobile home could be taken from her without a court order. Appellant argues that Rust did not mention a court order, but this finding is based on substantial competent, though conflicting, evidence and will not be disturbed. Ivie v. Peck, 94 Idaho 625, 626, 495 P.2d 1110 (1972). Mrs. Thompson was visibly upset and disturbed by Dalton's threat to take possession of the mobile home.

On or about June 20, 1969, appellant Dalton spoke with Mrs. Thompson at the mobile home and stated that he was going to take possession of it, because the payments on the note and chattel mortgage were delinquent. Mrs. Thompson informed Dalton that she claimed possession of the mobile home by virtue of the lease from the Burlinghams.

There was no contact between appellant Dalton and respondent Thompson between June 20, 1969, and July 3, 1969, although Dalton alleges that he tried to telephone respondent and was unable to reach her. On July 3, Dalton paid the balance owing on the Burlinghams' promissory note to the Wallace bank. After doing so, he removed the mobile home from the property of the respondent. Meanwhile, on July 1, 1969, Mrs. Thompson had taken her daughter to Spokane, Washington, for hospitalization and remained there until the evening of July 3, when she returned home and found that the mobile home had been removed from her property, together with her personal belongings. She had no place to eat or sleep, and slept in her car that night and the following night. Mrs. Thompson did not see her personal belongings again until July 12, 1969 when appellant Dalton delivered them to the home of Mrs. Thompson's daughter in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. During the period of time between July 3, and July 12, Mrs. Thompson was without her money, food and clothing. The removal of the mobile home and her possessions caused her great mental stress and emotional disturbance.

The district court concluded that on July 3, 1969, upon payment of the balance owing on the promissory note, appellant Dalton became subrogated to the rights of the bank as chattel mortgagee of the mobile home. ¹ Because the chattel mortgage to the bank was executed before the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code in Idaho (December 31, 1967), the law in effect at the time of execution governed foreclosure procedure. I.C. §§ 28-10-101, 28-10-102. I.C. § 45-1109 provided that a chattel mortgage could be foreclosed by two methods. One was by notice and sale under a summary procedure and the other was by an action in district court, pursuant to I.C. § 6-101. These were the exclusive methods for foreclosure of a chattel mortgage under the law applicable to this case. Adair v. Freeman, 92 Idaho 773, 451 P.2d 519 (1969); Peterson v. Hailey Nat. Bank, 51 Idaho 427, 6 P.2d 145 (1931); Garrett v. Soucie, 46 Idaho 289, 267 P. 1078 (1928).

The district court found and concluded that at the time of taking the mobile home from the real property of respondent Thompson, Dalton failed to comply in any respect with the requirements of I.C. § 45-1110 ² and 45-1111 ³ which governed the duties of the chattel mortgagee in a summary foreclosure proceeding.

The district court further found that because Mrs. Thompson was lawfully in possession of the mortgaged mobile home, she was entitled to contest Dalton's right to foreclose under the provisions of I.C. § 45-1115, ⁴ and that when appellant Dalton took possession of the mobile home and Mrs. Thompson's personal belongings, he violated her property rights.

Except where noted, the above narrative is conceded to be correct by appellant Dalton, including his complete failure to comply with the proper procedures for foreclosing a chattel mortgage. However, the district court made the following further findings to which appellant assigns error. Dalton intentionally engaged in wrongful conduct toward Mrs. Thompson, either with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or under such circumstances that any reasonable person should have known that such would result. As a direct and natural result of Dalton's wrongful acts, respondent suffered emotional shock, mental trauma, degradation and humiliation. Dalton's conduct was gross and outrageous and a conscious and wilful disregard of Mrs. Thompson's rights. In depriving Mrs. Thompson of a place of shelter, Dalton's actions threatened her safety. When Dalton removed the mobile home and Mrs. Thompson's personal possessions, he was engaged in a business practice.

Based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court awarded Mrs. Thompson $1.00 nominal damages for invasion of her property rights, $1,000 damages for mental trauma and emotional shock, and $5,000 punitive damages. On this appeal, Dalton contests only the award of punitive damages. He contends that either this is not a proper case for the award of punitive damages or alternatively, that the punitive damages award of $5,000 was excessive.

This Court has employed a variety of formulas for characterizing the type of conduct which warrants the imposition of punitive damages. The one most frequently invoked originated in the early case of Unfried v. Libert, 20 Idaho 708, 728-729, 119 P. 885, 891 (1911) where this Court said:

'As we understand the rule of exemplary or punitive damages, they cannot be recovered unless the evidence shows clearly that the action of the wrongdoer is wanton, malicious or gross and outrageous, or where the facts are such as to imply malice and oppression * * *.

'We think the general rule recognized by the weight of authority is, that exemplary or plenary damages may be allowed where the injury complained of is attended by acts of the wrongdoer which show wilful malice, fraud or gross negligence.' (Emphasis added)

More recent cases have spoken in terms of 'conscious and wilful disregard of (plaintiff's) rights.' Jolley v. Puregro, 94 Idaho 702, 708, 496 P.2d 939, 945 (1972), and '(arbitrary action) without regard for (plaintiff's) rights and interests.' White v. Doney, 82 Idaho 217, 224, 351 P.2d 380, 384 (1960). Contrary to appellant's assertions, there is no overwhelming significance attached to the word 'malice' and its omission from the findings of the district court does not invalidate the award of punitive damages in the instant case. See the instruction to the jury on punitive damages approved by this Court in Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 906-907, 453 P.2d 551 (1969). See also Douglas v. Humble Oil & Refining Company, 251 Or. 310, 445 P.2d 590, 592 (Or.1968).

We consider that Dalton's conduct can properly be characterized as gross and outrageous and a conscious and wilful disregard of Mrs. Thompson's rights.

Appellant contends that the district court erred in refusing to amend its findings of fact to include certain circumstances which allegedly have a bearing on the property of the district court's award of punitive damages. He suggests that the following factors negate the conclusion that his conduct was gross, outrageous or oppressive. First, during their conversation on June 20, 1969, Dalton had suggested that Mrs. Thompson attempt to obtain a loan and purchase the trailer herself. If Mrs. Thompson were relying on this part of their conversation, as a possible opportunity to save her home, then Dalton's actions in removing it without further warning would seem to suggest irresponsibility, rather than concern for Mrs. Thompson's well-being. Secondly, appellant points out that he had only Mrs. Thompson's oral assurances regarding the existence of the lease, and that he had never seen her inside the trailer. We consider that appellant had ample notice of Mrs. Thompson's occupation and possession of the trailer. There is no requirement in Idaho that a one year lease of personal property be...