Thompson v. Daniel Gutierrez & Titusville Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 27 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:16-cv-1996-Orl-40TBS |
| Parties | RASHAD B. THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. DANIEL GUTIERREZ and TITUSVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This case comes before me on Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, which I construe as a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 7). Upon due consideration I respectfully recommend that the motion be denied and this case be dismissed without leave to amend.
An individual may be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis if he declares in an affidavit that he "is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Before a plaintiff is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is obligated to review the complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[,]" or ... "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is deficient, the Court is required to dismiss the lawsuit sua sponte. See id.
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. As a general matter, an action must be dismissed if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Parties seeking to invoke a federal district court's jurisdiction must show that the underlying claim is based upon either diversity jurisdiction1 or the existence of a federal question (i.e "a civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332. A federal district court "has the obligation to review sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction" and if jurisdiction is found to be lacking, the court cannot proceed, and its sole remaining duty is to state that it lacks jurisdiction and dismiss the case. Fla. Wildlife Fed'n., Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff must also sufficiently plead the elements required for each cause of action alleged. "A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a "pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Although district courts apply a "less stringent standard" to the pleadings submitted by a pro se plaintiff, even pro se litigants must allege the essential elements of their claims for relief. See Eidson v. Arenas, 910 F. Supp. 609, 612 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has observed that "a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public ... lacks an economic incentive to refrain fromfiling frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Still, the Supreme Court cautions that a case should only be dismissed as frivolous if it relies on meritless legal theories or facts that are clearly baseless. See id. at 327.
On November 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff claims that he was injured by Defendants when they illegally intercepted, recorded, and disseminated a phone call between his father, Ricardo D. Thompson and a minor female on March 7, 1997 (Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff alleges that the record of the phone call was used to arrest his father on sex abuse charges in Illinois in May, 1997 (Id.). Plaintiff concedes that his father's counsel did not challenge the legality of the phone call interception and a Florida state-court judge found the recording admissible at trial (Id.). Plaintiff maintains that he was 22 months old when his father was convicted and now sues for loss of consortium under Section1983. Although the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's position, his complaint is deficient for a number of reasons, any one of which is sufficient grounds upon which to base dismissal.
"[S]tanding is a threshold test that, if satisfied, permits a federal court to proceed to the question of whether a plaintiff has a cause of action." Florida Ass'n of Med. Equip. Dealers v. Apfel, 194 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Access for the Disabled, Inc. v. Square, LLC, Case No. 6:07-cv-193-Orl-28JGG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99118, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2007) . In determining whether a plaintiff has standing, a district judge must consider many factors. Foremost is whether the plaintiff suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest," otherwise known as an "injury infact." Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
By suing Defendants over their involvement in the interception and dissemination of the phone call and the resulting arrest of his father, Plaintiff is in reality challenging his father's conviction (Doc. 1 at 12-13). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any action taken by either of the Defendants caused him injury in fact sufficient to establish his own standing. Plaintiff attempts to conflate his claim with what he anticipates would be a cause of action his father would raise under the circumstances. For example, he alleges that Defendants are liable for violating his "civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for consequential, compensatory, and punitive damages exceeding $1 million ..." (Id. at 8). He even refers to his father as "Plaintiff" numerous times throughout his complaint (Id. at 1, 9, 11, 15). Despite his averments, Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge his father's conviction. Thus, Plaintiff is unable to allege a basis for standing that is adequate to sustain a cause of action in this Court.
Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cognizable cause of action within the jurisdiction of this Court. Section 1983 established a federal cause of action for damages against those who, acting under color of state law, deprive or cause the deprivation of the federal rights of any citizen or other person under their jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The purpose of § 1983 "is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)). Section 1983 is a vehicle for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred, it does not create new substantive rights. Baker v.McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979). The Court must therefore consider the specific federal rights Plaintiff claims he was deprived of by Defendants. In other words, the viability of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim hinges on the sufficiency of his constitutional and other federal claims. Plaintiff attempts to ground his § 1983 claim in a cause of action for loss of consortium (Doc. 1 at 5, 8, 13-14), but he has failed to provide a statutory basis for his entitlement to this right. Regardless of whether Plaintiff provides a statutory basis for his allegations, his cause of action still dies because loss of consortium claims generally, are state-based claims and cannot serve as the foundation of a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review final judgments of state courts. The doctrine takes its name from two Supreme Court cases in which it was applied. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In Rooker, the plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court seeking to have a state court judgment, which had been affirmed by the state's highest court, "declared null and void" on the grounds that it violated the United States Constitution. 263 U.S. at 414-15. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction and on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 415. The Supreme Court emphasized that state courts are competent to decide issues of federal law that happen to arise in proceedings within their jurisdiction, and any mistakes the state court happened to make in resolving federal questions "did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding." Id. Congress granted the Supreme Court, among the federal courts, exclusive appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions. Id. at416, see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (). The Supreme Court held that the suit, which was "merely an attempt to get rid of the judgment for alleged errors of law committed in the exercise of [the state courts'] jurisdiction," was not within the "strictly original" jurisdiction of federal district courts. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.
In Feldman, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected petitions from two applicants for admission to the District of Columbia bar. The applicants asked the court to waive its rule that all attorneys admitted to practice in the District must have graduated from an accredited law school....
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