Thompson v. Dugan, Civ. A. No. 76-3096.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1977 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 76-3096. |
| Citation | 427 F. Supp. 342 |
| Parties | Leroy THOMPSON v. J. D. DUGAN, Bureau of the Public Debt, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Leroy Thompson, pro se.
Alexander Ewing, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
Plaintiff, Leroy Thompson, a frequent pro se litigator in this Court, instituted this suit on October 7, 1976. He seeks replacement of United States Savings Bonds which he had purchased in the late 1940's while in the armed forces, and which he alleges were lost or stolen sometime prior to 1965. Thompson has named as defendants J. D. Dugan, of the Bureau of Public Debt; C. Gardner, Director, Division of Transactions and Rulings and the Disbursement and Control Division, Indianapolis, Indiana; the Department of the Treasury; and the United States. Thompson also seeks compensatory and punitive damages from these defendants for injury caused him by their refusal to replace the bonds. The United States Attorney, on behalf of all defendants, has filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (2) the claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401.
Accompanying defendants' motion were certified copies of correspondence between Thompson and the Department of the Treasury and between the Department of the Treasury and other agencies relating to the bonds purchased by Thompson. In response to the motion to dismiss, Thompson filed a "Motion in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit." In as much as both sides have submitted and rely on materials beyond the pleadings, I will treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56, as Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) provides. See 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶¶ 12.08-12.10. I conclude that the claims are time barred, and that defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The facts relevant to the instant motion are largely undisputed. Resolving the disputed issues of material fact against the moving parties, as I am required to do under Rule 56, the facts may be stated as follows.
In 1946 while serving in the United States Army, Thompson signed an agreement to purchase a $25 savings bond each month, apparently through payroll deductions. The agreement continued through 1947, resulting in the purchase of at least sixteen $25 bonds. The bonds were to be issued in Thompson's name as sole owner, payable to him, or, on his death, to his mother, Nellie Thompson. Most, although not all, of the bonds were incorrectly issued in that they were issued payable to either Thompson or his mother. No later than 1965, Thompson discovered that the bonds were missing. On at least two occasions in 1964 or 1965 he reported that fact to the Veterans Administration. On November 8, 1973, Thompson wrote to the Department of the Treasury to report the bonds as missing, and to request that he be reimbursed for the bonds. Extended correspondence between Thompson and the Department of the Treasury over the next two and one half years revealed that all of the bonds purchased by Thompson except one had been redeemed. None of the bonds were redeemed by Thompson or with his permission.
The applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), provides:
"Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues."
Generally a statute of limitations gives rise to a defense which may be waived by the defendant. In the case of suits against the United States, however, because of its sovereign immunity and the fact that it may be sued only upon express congressional authorizations, limitations and conditions upon such authorizations to sue are strictly construed and exceptions are not implied. The limitations statute in suits against the United States is jurisdictional and the running of the statutory period extinguishes the claim. Crown Coat Front Co. v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Frey v. Woodard
...659, 51 S.Ct. 284, Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686, 47 S.Ct. 289, 71 L.Ed. 472 (1927), Thompson v. Dugan, 427 F.Supp. 342, 344 (E.D.Pa.1977), Binn v. United States, 389 F.Supp. at 988, Hammond v. United States, 388 F.Supp. 928, 930 (E.D.N.Y.1975). The time wit......
-
Begay v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. (pnm)
...other limitations and conditions upon authorizations to sue are strictly construed; exceptions are not implied. See Thompson v. Dugan, 427 F.Supp. 342, 344 (E.D.Pa.1977). This six-year statute of limitations has been applied in civil actions against the United States brought by members of a......
-
State v. Sharafeldin
...(1988); Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217 (5th Cir.1996); Girard v. United States, 455 F.Supp. 502 (D.N.H.1978); Thompson v. Dugan, 427 F.Supp. 342 (E.D.Pa.1977); Huntington Steel Corp. v. United States, 153 F.Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y.1957).4 In Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 77 S.C......
-
Flickinger v. United States, Civ. A. No. 81-913.
...423 F.Supp. 571, 577 (W.D. Mo.1976) (limitation provision of FTCA not to be extended by equitable considerations); Thompson v. Dugan, 427 F.Supp. 342, 344 (E.D.Pa.1977) (exceptions to the limitation provision not to be implied); Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir.), cer......