Thompson v. Gorcyca
| Decision Date | 07 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-10727 |
| Parties | EDWARD THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. LISA O. GORCYCA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
In his amended complaint, pro se Plaintiff Edward Thompson makes claims arising from state court proceedings. [ECF No. 9].[1] As directed by the Court, Defendants Lisa O. Gorcyca, Oakland County, Friend of the Court and Nancy T. Carniak (collectively, "the Oakland County defendants") moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [ECF No. 30]. Thompson has responded. [ECF No. 31].
Defendant Jennifer Paine filed no answer to Thompson's amended complaint and the Clerk of Court thus entered a default against her. [ECF No. 27]. But the Court has an independent duty to ensure subject matter jurisdiction over claims before it. In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 953 F.3d 890, 893-94 (6th Cir. 2020); Blaszczyk v. Darby, 425 F.Supp.3d 841, 845 (E.D. Mich. 2019). And the entry of default should be vacated if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Murdock v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc., No. 03-CV-73744-DT, 2003 WL 25816431, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 23, 2003); Golden v. Nat'l Fin. Adjusters, 555 F.Supp. 42, 45 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Thompson's claims, the entry of default against Paine should be vacated, and the complaint should be dismissed.
In his amended complaint, Thompson asks the Court to find that Judge Gorcyca of the Oakland County Court erred and denied him due process during his divorce and custody proceedings. [ECF No. 9, PagelD.78-91]. He says that he is an American of African ancestry and that Judge Gorcyca granted personal protection orders (PPO) to white women who had little evidence to support their allegations, but denied him a PPO. [ECF No. 9, PagelD.73, 78].
Thompson asserts that Judge Carniak, a Michigan district judge, wrongfully evicted a tenant from a property belonging to him based on a false claim of Latasha Thompson, his ex-wife. [Id., PagelD.93-95]. After the eviction, Thompson sued Latasha for breach of contract in Oakland County Circuit Court, but Judge Cheryl A. Matthews (a nonparty) dismissed the complaint. [Id., PagelD.95-96].
Thompson reported to the Oakland County Sheriff's Office that Latasha had waived all claims to the Oxford property, but Judge Gorcyca then clarified in an order that she had granted Latasha all of Thompson's property. [Id., PagelD.97-98]. Thompson asserts that Judge Gorcyca acted without jurisdiction and failed to enforce agreements he had with Latasha. [Id., PagelD.98-99]. He also accuses Judge Gorcyca of not disclosing that "she was performing duties under a Title IV-D contract"[2] or that she was "receiving kickbacks from Oakland County and attorneys." [Id., PagelD.98].
Paine is an attorney who apparently represented Latasha during the divorce and custody proceedings. [ECF No. 9, PagelD.76]. Thompson claims that Paine "was instrumental in the fraud and due process violations" against him, threatened him and tried to intimidate him. [Id., PagelD.76, 80, 87]. And he says that Paine falsely said that she had served him with a motion to show cause. [Id., PagelD.98].
Counts I to VI of Thompson's complaint allege violations of "Title 18 of the Civil Rights Act" and "Title 42 of the Civil Rights Act." [ECF No. 9, PagelD.100-109]. He specifies no statutes under those titles. [Id.].
As relief, Thompson requests compensatory, punitive and statutory damages; an award for the market value of rents from the Oxford property; an order voiding for lack of jurisdiction all the State court judgments and orders about Thompson's property; sole custody of his son; "[a]n order closing the child support account, removing arrears, reimbursing Thompson for all monies ordered, garnished, stolen or seized, plus the 66% matching federal funds"; and an order removing the occupants of the Oxford property. [ECF No. 9, PagelD.109-110].
A plaintiff must show that the court has "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," or that jurisdiction is proper because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Thompson claims both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. [ECF No. 9, PagelD.73]. But he states only claims under federal civil rights laws. [Id., PagelD.100-109]. Thus, the question is whether the Court has federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.
The Oakland County defendants' motion to dismiss relies on Thompson's pleadings and thus makes a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction. Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 440 (6th Cir. 2012). Because the defendants are making a facial attack, the Court must accept the allegations in Thompson's amended complaint as true. Id.
Thompson's allegations must plead a colorable claim supporting subject matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006). "Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction when an asserted federal claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 629 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). And though courts give a more liberal reading to pleadings filed by pro se litigants than to those drafted by lawyers, a pro se complaint still must plead facts showing that Court has jurisdiction. Christen berry v. White, No. 3:20-CV-176-TAV-DCP, 2020 WL 6371174, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2020).
Thompson fails to state a colorable claim supporting subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Thompson's child custody claims. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 1985) (same). Prior binding decisions foreclose Thompson's requests that this Court award him custody of his son and relieve him of orders to pay child support.
Second, the Oakland County defendants rightly argue that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the state court judgments. That doctrine applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Court has no jurisdiction "to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments." Id. at 283.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), [3]which gives the Supreme Court limited jurisdiction to review a decision of a state's highest court. See Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 2010) ). The doctrine is based on "the negative inference that, if appellate court review of such state judgments is vested in the Supreme Court, then it follows that such review may not occur in the lower federal courts." Id. at 309. And the intent is to "prohibit end-runs around state court judgments that might occur when parties go into federal court essentially seeking a review of a state-court decision." Id.
But the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is "limited in scope" and does not "bar 'a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court.'" VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 282). Rooker-Feldman applies "[i]f the source of the plaintiff's injury is the state-court judgment itself." Id. "If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party's actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim." McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). But if "a third party's actions are the product of a state court judgment, then a plaintiff's challenge to those actions are in fact a challenge to the judgment itself." Id. To assess the source of a plaintiff's claimed injury, the Court must consider the plaintiff's claims for relief. VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 402.
In McCormick, the court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the plaintiff's claims that the defendants committed fraud and misrepresentation in divorce proceedings. 451 F.3d at 392. The doctrine also did not preclude claims that the defendants failed to make the plaintiff a party to litigation to prevent her from asserting her property rights. Id. The court held that these claims did not assert an injury caused by the state court judgments themselves. Id. "Instead, Plaintiff asserts independent claims that those state court judgments were procured by certain Defendants through fraud, misrepresentation, or other improper means." Id.
B.
In response to the Oakland County defendants' motion to dismiss, Thompson states that he [ECF No. 31 PagelD.1949]. ...
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