Thompson v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1984
• Citation: 460 So.2d 1264
• Parties: Wilson Dale THOMPSON v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY. 82-1067.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1264

460 So.2d 1264

Wilson Dale THOMPSON v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY.

82-1067.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 30, 1984.

J. Doyle Fuller, Montgomery, and Michael D. Cook, Lanett, for appellant.

W.F. Horsley, Opelika, for appellee.

EMBRY, Justice.

This is a declaratory judgment action.

The circumstances from which it arises are as follows: Leroy Dean bought a vehicle from Scott Langley for use in the pulpwood business. A bill of sale evidencing the transfer was prepared. Langley took a mortgage on the vehicle and filed a UCC-1 financing statement. Several months later, Dean decided to quit the pulpwood business and sell his truck.

William Scott Veasley and Dean discussed the possibility of Veasley's acquiring the truck and taking over the pulpwood business. Veasley subsequently approached Langley to inquire about the possibility of his assuming Dean's mortgage. Langley told Veasley he could not make a decision prior to discussing the matter with Dean. According to Veasley, Langley did, however, tell him he could go ahead and use the truck and begin operations prior to Langley's completion of the "paperwork."

Several weeks later, and before title to the truck was transferred to Veasley, he was operating the truck when it collided with another vehicle. Wilson Dale Thompson and Johnnie L. Yates were injured in the accident. Both subsequently brought suit against Veasley. Yates sued Veasley, claiming damages for personal injury. He also named his own uninsured motorist insurance carrier, American Interstate Company of Georgia (American Interstate), as a defendant. Thompson sued Veasley and named Scott Langley as a codefendant. He claimed Langley was liable as the owner of the vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Langley.

Subsequently, Langley's insurance carrier, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, filed this declaratory judgment action. It sought a determination of no coverage or duty to defend Veasley in the action filed against him by Thompson. Langley's policy of insurance extended coverage against liability for personal injuries arising out of the "ownership, maintenance and use" of a motor vehicle "owned, hired or borrowed" by Langley. The same policy of insurance contained an omnibus clause which extended the coverage of the policy to any person using such "owned, hired or borrowed" vehicle with the permission of the named insured. Hartford named Veasley, Thompson, and Langley as defendants to the suit. It later amended to strike Langley as a defendant and to name, as additional defendants, Johnny and Deborah Yates and American Interstate Insurance Company of Georgia.

American Interstate filed a counterclaim against Hartford, alleging Veasley was entitled to coverage under the policy issued by Hartford and requesting that the court declare Veasley was not an uninsured motorist at the time of the accident.

After hearing all the evidence, the trial court determined Langley did not own the vehicle Veasley was driving when the accident occurred and Veasley did not qualify as an additional insured under Langley's liability insurance policy.

Thompson raises two issues on appeal from the trial court's declaratory judgment. First, he contends the trial court erred in determining the existence of a justiciable controversy. Second, he alleges error in that court's determination that Hartford's policy does not extend coverage to Veasley under the facts of this case.

I

Thompson strongly contends that Hartford has not presented a justiciable controversy. He argues there is no justiciable controversy because Veasley has not requested that Hartford defend him in the actions filed by Yates and Thompson. Hartford contends, and we agree, that proof of justiciable controversy is evidenced by the pleadings in this action.

It is well settled that a declaratory judgment action may be brought by a liability insurer to have a court declare whether or not it is liable to defend a suit. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hearn, 233 Ala. 31, 170 So. 59 (1936). See Federated Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 393 So.2d 1386 (Ala.1981), for a complete discussion of the declaratory judgment action's use relative to insurance policy disputes. Even in regard to insurance policy disputes, however, the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action must prove the existence of a justiciable controversy. This is because the declaratory judgment statutes, at §§ 6-6-220 to 6-6-232, Code 1975, do not empower a court to decide abstract propositions or to give advisory opinions. Wallace v. Burleson, 361 So.2d 554 (Ala.1978). Thompson contends that because Veasley has not requested a defense from Hartford, the trial court's determination in this case amounts to an advisory opinion as to proper legal relations should a controversy arise regarding Hartford's liability.

A "justiciable controversy" is a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. The record in this case indicates the defendants to...