Thompson v. Judy

• Decision Date: 19 April 1909
• Docket Number: 1,891.
• Citation: 169 F. 553
• Parties: THOMPSON v. JUDY, Bourbon County Jailer.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

169 F. 553

THOMPSON v. JUDY, Bourbon County Jailer.

No. 1,891.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 19, 1909

H Myers and E. Dickson, for appellant.

A. C Cassatt, for appellee.

Before LURTON and SEVERENS, Circuit Judges, and TAYLER, District judge.

SEVERENS Circuit Judge.

On March 30, 1907, J. D. McClintock obtained a judgment in the circuit court of Bourbon county, Ky., against Wyatt A Thompson for $1,500, damages for a false and malicious libel published in a newspaper by the defendant and others in April, 1906. On June 24, 1907, Thompson filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, and listed the said claim of J. D. McClintock as one of his liabilities. McClintock afterwards proved his claim in the case. On October 8, 1907, Thompson received his discharge in bankruptcy. On October 14, 1907, a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum was issued from the Bourbon circuit court, and was executed on October 22, 1907, by the arrest of said Thompson, who was delivered into the custody of George W. Judy, jailer of Bourbon county.

On October 23, 1907, Thompson filed his petition in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the indebtedness upon which the capias was issued, namely, the judgment for damages for libel, had been discharged in bankruptcy. The writ was issued against Judy, the jailer of Bourbon county, and the petitioner was admitted to bail. Thereafter Judy filed his response, setting forth the proceedings in the circuit court of Bourbon county, and on final hearing Judge Cochran, who was presiding in the court below, held that the judgment in question was not discharged by proceedings in bankruptcy, and ordered that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed and the petitioner be remanded to the state custody. From that order this appeal is taken.

The sole question in the case is whether the proceedings in bankruptcy operated to discharge the liability of the petitioner, which was the foundation of the judgment of the Bourbon circuit court, and the solution of it depends upon the construction of section 17 of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428)), which is as follows:

'Sec. 17. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as (1) are due as a tax levied by the United States, the state, county, district, or municipality in which he resides; (2) are liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations, or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another; (or for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female, or for criminal conversation); (3) have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy; or (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.'

The foregoing is section 17 of the act as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, Sec. 5, 32 Stat. 798 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 1026). That part of clause 2 which excepts from the operation of the discharge 'liabilities' for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another is the provision here involved. That clause in the original act was the same, except that instead of the word 'liabilities' the word 'judgments' was employed. And the matter in dispute is, What was the consequence of the amendment which substituted 'liabilities' for 'judgments'?

Before the amendment, a liability for such a cause was not excepted unless it had been reduced to judgment. By the amendment it is excepted without being reduced to judgment. The contention of the appellant is that when a judgment has been obtained the liability is merged therein, and the claim no longer adheres to the liability, but is transmuted into another species of right, which was excepted by the original act, but, since the amendment, is no longer excepted. But not withstanding the ingenuity of the argument by which this contention is sought to be maintained, we are of opinion that the intention of Congress was to declare that such liability should be excepted whether a judgment had been rendered upon it or not. The general doctrine of merger of the cause of action by judgment cannot, of course, be disputed. No suit or proceeding can thereafter be brought upon the original liability, but only for the enforcement of the judgment. The power of the court cannot be again invoked to adjudicate the question of liability. It is for the interest of the public that litigation shall come to an end, and the inconvenience of preserving the original liability as a continuing cause of action would be great. The pursuit must proceed along the line adopted, and the satisfaction of the claim must be sought through the judgment. But this rule of law prevails only to the extent that the reason for it exists. It does not prevent the recognition in the judgment of the attributes of the original cause of action. For the purposes of relief, the judgment embodies those attributes and gives ground for their enforcement. The rights of the parties are established, and are in no wise diminished thereby. So, when the judgment is general in form, it is often necessary to go behind it and see upon what liability it is founded, to the end that the characteristics of the cause of action may be impressed upon it. Such instances will recur to the mind of every lawyer. Indeed, Congress required this in this identical act when it excepted judgments for the particular causes of action mentioned in clause 2 of section 17. Now, we cannot resist the impression that Congress in making this amendment was looking to the substantial nature of the liability, and regarded the question as to whether a judgment had been rendered upon it as immaterial, that its intrinsic nature had not been altered and was in reality the cause of action intended by the original exception, and that Congress meant to protect that from the discharge. Apparently the requirement in the original act that the claim should have been reduced to judgment was intended to obviate the delay which a proceeding in the bankruptcy court for the liquidation of the damages would involve. And, finally, it would seem that in plain English a judgment on such a cause of action is a 'liability' therefor.

But the appellant raises another question, which is whether a willful and malicious libel is an injury 'to the person or property of another,' and argues that by this language is meant a physical injury to his person, and not merely an injury to a right which the law attaches to the person. The question is therefore one of construction. It is true that in modern parlance the words 'personal injury' are often used to designate a physical injury to the party. But usually, when there is any attempt to put the matter into legal phraseology, these and equivalent words are understood to import the meaning in which they have long been used by recognized authorities,...