Thompson v. Kansas City Public Service Co.
Decision Date | 10 January 1938 |
Citation | 114 S.W.2d 145,232 Mo.App. 1124 |
Parties | MARTHA JEAN THOMPSON, BY NEXT FRIEND, RESPONDENT, v. KANSAS CITY PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, APPELLANT |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court.--Hon. Darius A. Brown, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Judgment affirmed.
Joe Miniace, James R. Sullivan and Hume & Raymond for respondent.
Charles L. Carr, Watson, Ess, Groner, Barnett & Whittaker and E. E Ball for appellant.
The plaintiff, and infant, by her next friend, brought this suit to recover damages for personal injuries. She had a verdict and judgment in the sum of $ 4000. The defendant has appealed.
The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff shows that defendant was a common carrier of passengers for hire by street car; that on September 29, 1934, plaintiff then about five and one-half months old, was carried in the arms of her mother on board one of defendant's street cars; that the mother, after paying the usual fare, took two, three, or four steps toward the back of the car when the car started forward "with a sudden and unusual violent lurch and jerk," and she was thrown to the floor of the car and plaintiff was thrown under a seat in the car and severely injured, the substance of defendant's evidence was that the street car moved forward slowly in the usual and ordinary manner.
The defendant says this is not a res ipsa loquitur case for the reason the accident could have been occasioned by the "sole negligence and awkwardness" of plaintiff's mother.
The petition charged general negligence. The answer was a general denial. There is nothing in plaintiff's evidence tending to show any negligence on the part of plaintiff's mother. The evidence for the plaintiff shows that the sudden and unusual jerk and lurch of the street car was the sole and direct cause of plaintiff's injuries. There is no claim that plaintiff's mother knew or had means of knowing the cause of the sudden starting of the street car. Nor is there anything in the record indicating that the defendant in the trial contended that the pleadings and proof did not bring the case within the res ipsa loquitur rule. Nor is there anything in the record indicating that defendant in the trial contended there was any evidence tending to show that the accident was caused or contributed to by the "negligence and awkwardness" of plaintiff's mother.
The supreme court en banc held that the doctrine res ipsa loquitur applies "when (a) the occurrence resulting in injury was such as does not ordinarily happen if those in charge use due care; (b) the instrumentalities involved were under the management and control of the defendant; (c) and the defendant possesses superior knowledge or means of information as to the cause of the occurrence." [McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 542, 46 S.W.2d 557.]
Other cases announce the same rule. [Williams v. San Francisco Ry. Co., 85 S.W.2d 624; Zimmerman v. Kansas City Public Service Company, 41 S.W.2d 579.]
Considering the record, we will determine the appeal from the theory that the case is governed by the res ipsa loquitur rule.
Plaintiff's main instruction, after submitting preliminary matters, told the jury that if it found the street car was caused or allowed to suddenly start with an unusual and violent lurch and jerk, and as a direct result thereof plaintiff was thrown to the floor of the street car and injured, "then you are instructed that such facts (if you believe them to be true) are sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which the jury may infer that the defendant was negligent, and you may so find, unless you find and believe from other facts and circumstances in evidence that said sudden start, if any, with an unusual and violent lurch and jerk, if any, of said street car, was not due to the negligence of the defendant."
Counsel cite many cases in support of their claim that the instruction was erroneous, but rely mainly on the following cases: Kennedy v. Phillips, 319 Mo. 573, 5 S.W.2d 33; McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557, and cases cited therein.
The main instruction in the present case is similar to the instruction condemned in the Kennedy case. In speaking of the latter instruction the court said:
The ruling in the Kennedy case undoubtedly sustains many of the contentions of the defendant with respect to the main instruction in the case at bar. The holding in the Kennedy case has been weakened, if not overruled, in latter cases to which reference will hereinafter be made.
In the McCloskey case the court considered and held erroneous an instruction which told the jury upon finding certain facts, "then the court instructs you that the presumption is that the falling over of said radiator was occasioned by some negligence of defendants, their agents or servants, and the burden of proof is case upon defendants to rebut this presumption of negligence and show by a preponderance of the evidence that the falling over of said radiator was not caused by negligence of defendants, their agents or servants, and unless you further find from the evidence that the falling over of said radiator could not have been prevented by defendants, their agents or servants, by use of ordinary care, then your verdict must be in favor of plaintiff and against defendants."
In discussing the instruction, the court said:
The instruction under consideration does not say what inferences must or should be drawn from the evidence, nor does it say the burden of proof was on the defendant. On the contrary, the jury was in effect told that if it found facts sufficient to bring the case within the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, then it could from such facts infer that defendant was negligent, and that it could so find, unless it believed from other facts that the defendant was not negligent. The instruction does not single out any fact or comment on or argue any fact in evidence. It does, however, advise the jury as to the legal effect of the evidence provided it found that evidence to be true.
The court in the case of Stanton v. Jones, 332 Mo. 631 59 S.W.2d 648, 651, quotes with approval from the case of Ward v. Fessler, 252 S.W....
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