Thompson v. Louisville & N.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1890
• Citation: 8 So. 406,91 Ala. 496
• Parties: THOMPSON v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

8 So. 406

91 Ala. 496

THOMPSON v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 25, 1890

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; JAMES B. HEAD, Judge.

This action was brought by the appellant, Thompson, as administrator of J. R. Thomas, deceased, against the appellee, and sought to recover damages for an injury suffered by his intestate on account of the alleged negligence of the defendant, which resulted in his death. Among others, the court gave, at the defendant's request the following charge: "No. 17. If the evidence leaves the jury in doubt and uncertainty as to whether the accident or the poison caused the death of the plaintiff's intestate, and because of such doubt the evidence fails to produce in the minds of the jury a proper conviction or satisfaction that his death was caused by the injury he received at the time he fell from the car, and not from the poison, then you must find for the defendant;" to which the plaintiff duly excepted. There were verdict and judgment for defendant, and the plaintiff brings this appeal.

Hewitt, Walker & Porter, for appellee.

COLEMAN J.

The suit is brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been wrongfully inflicted by the defendant on J. R Thomas, an employe, on the 22d day of September, 1889, and from which, it is charged, the death of said employe resulted on the 29th September, 1889. The section of the Code (section 2591) under which this suit is brought provides that the personal representative may sue if such injury "results" in the death of the servant of employe. The section so often construed by this court provides that the suit may be brought by the representative to recover damages for the injury, whereby the death was "caused." Code, § 2589. "Cause" is that which produces an effect. "Result" is the effect of one or more concurrent causes. The same principles of law are alike applicable in either case. The testimony of skillful physicians tended to show that the injury inflicted was mortal, and the injured party would have died from the effects of the injury "in a short time." There was evidence also tending to show the wounds were not "necessarily mortal." The evidence showed that by mistake the wife of the deceased, who was his nurse, gave to him internally four or five grains of corrosive sublimate, which had been left by the physician to be used as a wash, and not to be given internally. It was proven that the poison would have caused the death of a well person, and it was in evidence that the poison was the immediate cause of death. The testimony of the physicians further tended to show the wound was of such a character "that it may have hastened the death;" "may have caused him to die sooner from the effects of the corrosive sublimate than if he had not received the wound;" "that the corrosive sublimate administered to Thomas would have produced death 'quicker,' in a man in Thomas' condition from the wounds received by him, than in a well man." Among others, the court charged the jury that, under the evidence in this case, the death of plaintiff's intestate must have resulted either from the injury he received or from the poison he took. The injury and poison cannot both be the cause of his death. Further, that his death could not be the result of the injury, and, at the same time, the result of the poison. Further, that if he died from the effects of the poison, then they must find for the defendant, although his death was accelerated by reason of the injury received; or if he died "sooner" from the effects of the poison than he would have died, if he had not been injured."

In the case of Railroad Co. v. Jones, 83 Ala. 376, 3 South Rep. 902, the court declared that although Mrs. Jones had pneumonia, from which she would ultimately have died, yet, if the injury caused by the negligence of the railroad, under the rules above declared, contributed and hastened her death, the corporation would not be guiltless. "That the railroad would not be exempt from liability for such an injury unless her death was solely the result of bad health." It does not follow that, because a man cannot die but once, there cannot be two or more concurrent, cooperative, and efficient causes to effect the one killing. A person may be killed by "beating and starving." There may be contributing causes. 3 Greenl. Ev. § 141. If, as the testimony tended to show, the injury received was mortal, and caused decedent to die "sooner" or "quicker" from the effects of the poison than he would have died, had he not been injured, it is difficult to perceive how the poison can be regarded as the "sole" cause of his death at the time it occurred. If he would have lived longer without the injury than with the injury, the injury necessarily contributed to and accelerated his death, and was a part of the cause, causing death at the time it occurred. It is not intended by the court to assert the doctrine that, if a party inflict an injury not mortal, and, by, the intervention of other causes, death results, the party inflicting the injury in all cases shall be held responsible for the death. The first cause may or may not be regarded as the proximate cause of a result according to the facts of the case. Bowles v. State, 58 Ala. 338, and authorities cited; 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 668; 1 Shear. & R. Neg. § 125; Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44; Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469; and many others. Railroad Co. v. Buck, 49 Amer. Rep. 170; Railway Co. v. Kemp, 48 Amer. Rep. 136; Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U.S. 249. The court ought not to have charged the jury, as a conclusion of law, that death did not and could not have resulted from both causes, the injury and the poison, in the face of the testimony of the physicians examined as witnesses to the effect that the death of the decedent was "accelerated" by the injury, or that the injury may have caused him...