Thompson v. Ludeman

• Decision Date: 11 January 2012
• Docket Number: Civ. 11-1704 (DWF/JJK)
• Parties: Joseph Thompson, Plaintiff, v. Cal R. Ludeman, Dennis Benson, Greg Carlson, Kevin Moser, David Prescott, Janine Herbert, Tom Lundquist, Elizabeth Barbo, Blake Carey, Brian Ninneman, Debbie Thao, Julie Rose, Allison Collins, Laurie Severson, Terry Kneisel, Elizabeth Wyatt, and Terry Barnes, each in their individual capacity and in their official capacity as employees of the department of Human Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Joseph Thompson, Plaintiff, v. Cal R. Ludeman, Dennis Benson, Greg Carlson, Kevin Moser, David Prescott, Janine Herbert, Tom Lundquist, Elizabeth Barbo, Blake Carey, Brian Ninneman, Debbie Thao, Julie Rose, Allison Collins, Laurie Severson, Terry Kneisel, Elizabeth Wyatt, and Terry Barnes, each in their individual capacity and in their official capacity as employees of the department of Human Services, Defendants.

Civ. No. 11-1704 (DWF/JJK)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

January 11, 2012

Joseph Thompson, Minnesota Sex Offender Program, 1111 Hwy. 73, Moose Lake, MN 55767, pro se.

Ricardo Figueroa, Minnesota Attorney General's Office counsel for Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JEFFREY J. KEYES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. No. 15). The case has been referred to this Court for a Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and D. Minn. Loc. R. 72.1. For the reasons discussed below, this Court recommends that Defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

In 2006, a Minnesota court found Plaintiff to be a sexual psychopathic personality (“SPP”) and a sexually dangerous person (“SDP”),^[1] and ordered his indeterminate commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”). (Doc. No. 9, Am. Compl. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff is currently civilly committed to the MSOP at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Moose Lake, Minnesota and resides in “Unit Omega” there. (Id. at 1.)

Plaintiff has commenced this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against various state employees for violations of his constitutional rights. The Defendants include the following:

• Cal R. Ludeman, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (“DHS”);

• Dennis Benson, the CEO of MSOP and a member of the clinical team;

• Greg Carlson, Program Director for the Sexual Predator Program at MSOP and a member of the clinical team;

• Kevin Moser, Assistant Program Director for the Sexual Predator Program at MSOP and a member of the clinical team;

• David Prescott, a clinical administrator at MSOP;

• Janine Herbert, a clinician at MSOP; • Tom Lundquist, Program Director for the Sexual Predator Program at MSOP and a member of the clinical team;

• Elizabeth Barbo, a clinician at MSOP;

• Blake Carey, an Assistant Group Supervisor at MSOP;

• Brian Ninneman, a unit supervisor of Unit Omega at MSOP;

• Debbie Thao, a clinician at MSOP and supervisor to Plaintiffs clinical team;

• Julie Rose, a clinician at MSOP and one of Plaintiffs primary therapists;

• Allison Collins, a clinician at MSOP and one of Plaintiffs primary therapists;

• Laurie Severson, the “security issues person in MSOP [U]nit [O]mega”;

• Terry Kneisel, Program Manager of Unit Omega;

• Elizabeth Wyatt, a security counselor in Unit Omega's third shift at MSOP; and

• Terry Barnes, a security counselor in Unit Omega's second shift at MSOP.

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-24.) Each Defendant is sued in his or her individual and official capacities. (Id. ¶ 25.)

Plaintiff alleges thirteen causes of action in his Amended Complaint, and within those causes of action he alleges violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution, violations of the Minnesota Constitution, and violations of state law. These causes of action are as follows:

(1) The First Cause of Action is for “Failure to Provide Treatment,” and is based on Defendants' “unreasonable and unwarranted failure to provide [P]laintiff the best available and most qualified treatment in violation of his rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, . . .” (Am. Compl. ¶ 197.)

(2) The Second Cause of Action is for “Unreasonable Restriction of Free Speech,” and is based on Defendants' “unreasonable and unwarranted restrictions on [P]laintiff's right to freedom of speech and expression and his right to freedom of religion in violation of his rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution . . .” (Id. ¶ 199.)

(3) The Third Cause of Action is for “Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,” and is based on Defendants' “unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of his rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States [C]onstitution . . .” (Id. ¶ 201.)

(4) The Fourth Cause of Action is for “Invasion of Privacy,” and is based on Defendants' “unreasonable and gross invasion of [P]laintiff's privacy in violation of his rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution . . .” (Id. ¶ 203.)

(5) The Fifth Cause of Action is for “Denial of Access to Legall [sic] Materials and Counsel,” and is based on Defendants' “deprivations of [P]laintiff's constitutional right to legal materials and right to counsel in violation of his rights guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution . . .”

(Id. ¶ 205.)

(6) The Sixth Cause of Action is for “Denial of the Right to be Free from Punishment,” and is based on Defendants' “deprivation of [P]laintiff's constitutional right to be free from punishment in violation of his rights guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution . . .” (Id. ¶ 207.)

(7) The Seventh Cause of Action is for “Denial of the Right to Religion and Religious Freedom,” and is based on Defendants' “deprivations of [P]laintiff's constitutional right to religion and arbitrarily burdened his religious freedom in violation of his rights guaranteed under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution . . .” (Id. ¶ 209.)

(8) The Eighth Cause of Action is for “Denial of Less Restrictive Alternative,” and is based on Defendants' “deprivation of [P]laintiff's constitutional right to a less restrictive alternative placement [and it] is a violation of his rights guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . .” (Id. ¶ 211.)

(9) The Ninth Cause of Action is for “Denial of the Right to be Free F[ro]m Cruel and Unusual Punishment,” and is based on Defendants' “deprivations of [P]laintiff's constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his rights guaranteed under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution . . .” (Id. ¶ 213.)

(10) The Tenth Cause of Action is for “Denial of the Right to be Free from Double Jeopardy,” and is based on Defendants' “deprivations of [P]laintiff's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy in violation of his rights guaranteed under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution . . .” (Id. ¶ 215.)

(11) The Eleventh Cause of Action is for “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,” and is based on Defendants' actions, which allegedly “speak[] of the extreme and outrageous, was done either intentionally or recklessly, and cause plaintiff extreme emotional distress, which no reasonable person could be expected to endure.” (Id. ¶ 217.)

(12) The Twelfth Cause of Action is for “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress,” and is based on Defendants' actions, which allegedly “show[] [that] [P]laintiff was subje[c]ted to a zone of danger of physical impact, causing [P]laintiff to reasonably . . . fear for his own safety and . . . suffer severe emotional distress with attendant physical manifestations.” (Id. ¶ 219.)

(13) The Thirteenth Cause of Action is for “Violation of Court Ordered Treatment,” and is based on Defendants' actions, which allegedly “shows that MSOP has denied [P]laintiff court ordered treatment[,]” in violation of a court order. (Id. ¶ 221.)

In Plaintiff's sixty-one-page Amended Complaint, he cites to numerous policies, procedures, and conditions of confinement that he claims, when considered together and in context, violate his constitutional rights. In his introduction, Plaintiff characterizes his various claims as follows:

[T]he conditions of his confinement are unconstitutionally restrictive; the defendants have unconstitutionally restricted his liberty; the defendants have unconstitutionally imposed punishment without due opportunity to be released. The policies controlling the conditions of confinement are nearly identical to those for criminals serving their sentences, but [P]laintiff has already served the sentence imposed upon him. Plaintiff has a constitutional right to adequate health care and to a therapeutic environment.

. . . The defendant[s'] policies and procedures are a shocking restraint on Mr. Thompson's liberty that is intended to punish him. The defendants have failed to successfully treat and rehabilitate any single patient in the care of MSOP, since its entire existence. The Civil Commitment and Treatment Act as-applied [sic] to Mr. Thompson are so punitive in fact that it cannot be seen as civil in nature. If proven at trial, the alleged civil rights violations amount to a violation of the United States Constitution Prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the prohibition against Double Jeopardy.

(Am. Compl. at 1-2.) Plaintiff also states that “[a]lthough [he] believes that Chapter 253B is unconstitutional he is not challenging his Chapter 253 in this litigation. This litigation addresses only the treatment he has or has not received while he has been confined, the unconstitutional punishment that has been imposed on him while he has been confined, and the overly restrictive conditions under which he is confined.” (Id. ¶ 30.)

Specifically Plaintiff alleges, presumably in support of his “Failure to Provide...