Thompson v. Madison County Board of Education

• Decision Date: 13 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-1760.,72-1760.
• Citation: 476 F.2d 676
• Parties: Bennie G. THOMPSON et al., Individually, Etc., Plaintiffs, Evelyn K. Thomas and Wade E. Sutton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Robert E. Cox, Superintendent of the Madison County School District, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

476 F.2d 676 (1973)

Bennie G. THOMPSON et al., Individually, Etc., Plaintiffs, Evelyn K. Thomas and Wade E. Sutton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Robert E. Cox, Superintendent of the Madison County School District, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 72-1760.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 13, 1973.

Frank R. Parker, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, James M. Abram, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs-appellants.

G. Milton Case, R. L. Goza, Case & Montgomery, Canton, Miss., for defendants-appellees.

Before GODBOLD, DYER and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

DYER, Circuit Judge:

Sutton and Thomas had been employed as teachers in the Madison County, Mississippi, school district but were not offered new contracts of employment for the 1970-71 school term. In their complaint, they sought injunctive relief from the school board's allegedly racially discriminatory refusal to rehire them as public school teachers. The district court found that the refusal of the Madison County Board of Education to rehire the two plaintiffs was based on "just and proper cause." We reverse.

After the complaint was filed the district court ordered the Board to provide the plaintiffs with written notices of the reasons for their discharges, a summary of the evidence, and the names of witnesses. The order further required the Board to hold a hearing, with the opportunity to the plaintiffs to cross examine witnesses, to present evidence, to be represented by counsel, and to be informed in writing of the final determination by the Board, with a statement of the reasons and evidence relied upon to support its decision. The record of the hearing was to be transcribed and the findings were to be filed with the district court. All of the preliminaries were accomplished and, after a full evidentiary hearing before the Board, both of the plaintiffs' claims were denied.

We agree with the district court that it was the Board's responsibility, in the first instance, to provide a hearing, on notice, to the plaintiffs. And we emphasize that "the findings and decision of academic administrative bodies are to be upheld by the courts when reached by correct procedures and supported by substantial evidence." Green v. Regents of Texas Tech Univ., 5 Cir. 1973, 474 F.2d 594. When this case was set for trial, however, the parties were informed that there would be no trial in the sense of hearing witnesses or taking evidence. Instead, the court decided that it would rely on the facts as developed at the evidentiary hearing before the Board and that it would limit the formal trial to the presentation of legal argument.

Due process mandates that a judicial proceeding give the affected parties an opportunity to be heard on the allegations asserted in the complaint and to present evidence and argument on the contested facts and legal issues framed by the answer to the complaint. Before a district court adjudges, it must determine the facts for itself on the basis of the proffered evidence. It may not simply decline to hear evidence and base its conclusions solely on the transcript of a school board's hearing. In short, a court can only render a judgment after the parties have been afforded a full and fair trial on the claims properly before the court.

As a result of the district court's refusal to grant the plaintiffs a full evidentiary hearing, we are unable to determine whether the Madison County School District is still in the process of implementing the desegregation orders of this Court or whether desegregation has already been completely achieved. Consequently, we find ourselves with no record on which to predicate a decision concerning the applicability of Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 5 Cir. 1969, 419 F.2d 1211. Moreover, although the district court's opinion implies that Singleton is applicable, the court failed to make any determination whether the defendants had complied with the Singleton requirement that "objective and reasonable non-discriminatory standards" be established for selection of the teachers to be dismissed, demoted, or not rehired.

Additionally, assuming that Singleton does apply, the district court's conclusion that there was "just cause" for Sutton and Thomas not being rehired appears to be erroneously based on a subjective comparison of the plaintiffs' proficiency in the classroom with the performance of other teachers in the school district. We recognize that under certain circumstances, Singleton notwithstanding, discharges on the basis of "just cause" may be warranted without reference to the school board's pre-established objective and reasonable standards. However, "just cause" in a Singleton situation does not refer to a teacher's lack of professional credentials, his poor performance in the classroom, his failure to abide by school regulations, his lack of cooperation, or other similar explanations. These types of reasons for discharge fall directly within the scope of Singleton, and accordingly such discharges must be justified on the basis of objective and reasonable standards for dismissal previously set by the school board. If this kind of a discharge can be justified in terms of the established objective standards, it is not for "just cause"; it is simply a discharge in compliance with Singleton criteria. "Just cause" in a Singleton situation means types of conduct that are repulsive to the minimum standards of decency—such as honesty and integrity— required by virtually all employers of their employees, and especially required of public servants such as school teachers. No pre-established objective criteria are necessary to justify the discharge of a teacher whose conduct does not measure up to these minimum standards of behavior. For example, if a teacher came to school drunk, or was found stealing from the school treasury, or sexually assaulted a student, the school board could substantiate on "just cause" grounds its...