Thompson v. Madison Machinery Co.

• Court: United States State Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
• Writing for the Court: MEANS; BACON, J., and STUBBLEFIELD
• Citation: Thompson v. Madison Machinery Co., 684 P.2d 565, 1984 OK CIV APP 24 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984)
• Decision Date: 08 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 60298,60298,2
• Parties: 1984 OK CIV APP 24 Roy M. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. MADISON MACHINERY COMPANY, INC., an Oklahoma corporation, and Darrell "Curly" Stewart, Appellees

Page 565

684 P.2d 565

1984 OK CIV APP 24

Roy M. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. MADISON MACHINERY COMPANY, INC., an Oklahoma corporation and Darrell "Curly" Stewart, Appellees.

No. 60298.

Court of Appeals of Oklahoma Division No. 2.

May 8, 1984.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1984.

Released for Publication by Order of Court

of Appeals June 25, 1984.

Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County; Jane P. Wiseman, trial judge.

Appeal from order granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. Trial court found that plaintiff's cause of action fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of workers' compensation.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

Jon B. Comstock, Garrison & Comstock, Inc., Tulsa, for appellant.

Michael W. McGivern, McGivern, Scott, Gilliard & McGivern, Tulsa, for appellee Madison Machinery.

Scott T. Knowles, Wilburn, Knowles & King, Tulsa, for appellee Stewart.

MEANS, Presiding Judge.

Injured employee appeals from the trial court's sustainment of motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that the employee's injury fell within the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

On July 25, 1981, Roy Thompson was injured at work. Thompson was struck in the face with a twelve inch crescent wrench during an argument with defendant Stewart. At the time of the incident, Stewart allegedly was Thompson's co-employee as well as his employer. Stewart was part owner of defendant Madison Machinery. Although there is a dispute as to who initiated the fight, there is no dispute concerning the fact that Stewart hit Thompson with a wrench and that Thompson suffered a broken jaw.

Thompson filed a workers' compensation claim and then elected to hold that claim in abeyance while he pursued actions against both Madison Machinery and Stewart in district court.

On October 13, 1981, Thompson sued Stewart and Madison Machinery alleging that the injury he suffered was a result of a willful, wrongful, and intentional assault and battery committed by Stewart. Thompson contended that at the time of the alleged assault Stewart was acting as an agent of Madison Machinery, and that Stewart and Madison Machinery had conspired to terminate his employment. Thompson sought compensatory and punitive damages.

Both Stewart and Madison Machinery contended that Thompson was the aggressor and that Stewart merely acted in self-defense. Defendants further contended that the injury fell within the exclusive remedy of the workers' compensation laws. Madison Machinery asserted that it could not be held liable for Stewart's actions unless it had authorized or ratified his conduct.

On May 6, 1983, the trial court sustained defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that "Plaintiff's claim falls within the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act." Thompson has appealed.

Thompson raises two basic issues on appeal. He states that the nature of the employer's conduct was a substantial controversy concerning a material fact which would have precluded summary judgment. Secondly, he urges us to find that an employee who is the victim of an intentional tort is not precluded from bringing a cause of action for damages in district court.

I

Before we determine whether summary judgment was proper as to the defendants, we must address the issue of exclusiveness of Thompson's remedy. Only if we find that Thompson may maintain a common law action in tort will we need to address the question of whether a substantial controversy exists.

Defendants point to the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation for employees such as Thompson who are injured at work. This exclusiveness is stated in 85 O.S.1981 § 11, which provides in part:

Every employer subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act shall pay, or provide as required by the Workers' Compensation Act, compensation ... for the disability or death of his employee resulting from an accidental personal injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, without regard to fault as a cause of such injury .... (footnote omitted; emphasis added)

Title 85 O.S.1981 § 12, provides that the workers' compensation remedy is exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer.

Defendants rely on the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation and cite Oklahoma case law where employees injured while fighting have been allowed compensation. Defendants would have this court hold that an employee whose injury occurs during a fight is barred from bringing a common law tort action against either his employer or the aggressor who injures him.

Although the Oklahoma courts have determined that under certain circumstances employees injured while fighting are allowed to recover compensation, the issue of whether compensation is the exclusive remedy for such injuries has never been reached. Defendants would seem to imply that regardless of whether the employee's injury is the result of intentional, accidental, or negligent conduct, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy as long as the injury occurred during the course and scope of employment. This does not appear to be the law in Oklahoma.

In Burrell v. Prewitt, 445 P.2d 279 (Okla.1968), an employee injured during a fight was allowed compensation. Defendants use the Burrell case to state that workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy when injured during a fight at work. However, this court notes that the issue in Burrell concerned whether the employee could recover workers' compensation. The exclusiveness of the remedy was not even a remote issue. The employee in Burrell was injured by willful acts of a third party while the employee was trying to discharge his employment. The court did not address the question of a common law action brought by the injured employee against the aggressor.

Defendants would have workers' compensation as the exclusive remedy for both accidental and intentional injuries. We do not find this to be the law in Oklahoma. Contrary to what defendants contend, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Roberts v Barclay, 369 P.2d 808, 809 (Okla.1962), stated:

Since our Workmen's Compensation Law by its terms applies only to disability or death resulting from accidental injuries ... it may be conceded that an employee who has been wilfully injured by his employer has a common law action for damages. (emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

The Roberts court, however, determined that the plaintiff had not made sufficient allegations in his petition to withstand the defendant's demurrer. Nowhere had the plaintiff stated how he was willfully injured by his employer. Without specific allegations of willful conduct, the demurrer was properly sustained and workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy.

In an early attack on the constitutionality of the exclusive workers' compensation remedy, the court explained that the Act was designed to cover only accidental injuries. In Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 63 Okla. 52, 60, 162 P. 938, 945 (1917), the supreme court stated:

It is urged that the injuries covered by the act are only those of an accidental nature, and that the employe cannot recover thereunder for a willful injury caused by his employer, and thus he is deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The act does not undertake to regulate willful injuries of the character mentioned, but leaves the injured employe to his remedy as it existed when the act was passed.

... It embraces all kinds of accidental injuries not resulting in death, whether occurring from the negligence of the employer or not, arising out of and in the course of employment, but does not include willful or intentional injuries inflicted by the employer, nor injuries resulting from an intent upon the part of the employe to injure himself or another .... A willful or intentional injury, whether inflicted by the employer or employe, could not be considered as accidental, and therefore is not covered by the act. (emphasis added)

In United States Zinc Co. v. Ross, 87 Okla. 21, 22, 208 P. 805, 806 (1922), the court reiterated its statements from Adams, in stating that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy "unless the injury was willfully inflicted by the employer." In Hull v. Wolfe, 393 P.2d 491, 493 (Okla.1964), the court noted Adams once again and stated: "This Court declared the Act was intended to cover all accidental injuries, but did not include willful or intentional injuries whether inflicted by the employer or the employee, since same was not accidental." (emphasis added)

There is no doubt that Thompson was injured. Thompson himself first filed a workers' compensation claim and has already been awarded two weeks' compensation. Thompson has alleged that his injuries were the result of Stewart's allegedly intentional act and thus he is not precluded from bringing a common law tort action. We agree.

This court, like those before us, determines that the workers' compensation statutes were designed to provide the exclusive remedy for accidental injuries sustained during the course and scope of a worker's employment. The statutes were not designed to shield employers or co-employees from willful, intentional or even violent conduct. Having determined that Thompson is not precluded from bringing his common law action against his employer and fellow employee, we now determine whether summary judgment was...