Thompson v. Merrill

• Decision Date: 03 December 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:16-cv-783-ECM
• Citation: 505 F.Supp.3d 1239
• Parties: Treva THOMPSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John H. MERRILL, etc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

505 F.Supp.3d 1239

Treva THOMPSON, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.John H. MERRILL, etc., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-783-ECM

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed December 3, 2020

Aderson B. Francois, Pro Hac Vice, Danielle Lang, Pro Hac Vice, Jonathan Diaz, Joseph Gerald Hebert, Pro Hac Vice, Mark Peter Gaber, Pro Hac Vice, Molly Elizabeth Danahy, Campaign Legal Center, Jennifer J. Yun, Pro Hac Vice, Jessica Ring Amunson, Pro Hac Vice, Michael E. Stewart, Pro Hac Vice, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, Armand Derfner, Pro Hac Vice, Derfner & Altman LLC, Charleston, SC, James Uriah Blacksher, Attorney at Law, Birmingham, AL, Jason P. Hipp, Pro Hac Vice, Melissa Takara Fedornak, Jenner & Block LLP, New York, NY, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, McGuire & Associates LLC, Montgomery, AL, Pamela Karlan, Pro Hac Vice, Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA, for Plaintiffs.

James William Davis, Brad A. Chynoweth, Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick, Winfield James Sinclair, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the Court on the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 257), two motions to exclude (doc. 258 & 259), the Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on count 18 of the complaint as amended (doc. 260), and evidentiary objections by the Defendants (doc. 274).

On September 26, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging Alabama Constitution § 177 (b) and ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1(a)(3). On December 26, 2017, the Court granted in part the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, largely on mootness grounds due to the enactment of new state law, and denied the motion in part. (Doc. 80 at 28). As a result of that Order, the Plaintiffs proceeded on their claims in counts 1, 2, 11, 12, and 13. (Doc. 80 at 40).

Count 1 is a claim of intentional racial discrimination in violation of equal protection and count 2 is a claim of intentional racial discrimination in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. In count 11, the Plaintiffs claim that Ala. Const. art VIII, § 177 (b), a felon-disenfranchisement provision, imposes retroactive criminal punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. In count 12, the Plaintiffs contend that Ala. Const. art VIII, § 177 (b) constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Count 13 is an equal protection wealth discrimination claim which alleges that ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1(a)(3) violates the United States Constitution.

On March 1, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint and added counts 16, 17, and 18. (Doc. 93).¹ Count 16 is a claim that the Secretary of State's determination that ALA. CODE § 17-3-30.1 applies retroactively is contrary to the language of the statute and therefore violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Count 17 is pleaded in the alternative to count 11 and is a claim that the retroactive application of ALA. CODE § 17-3-30.1 violates the Due Process Clause. Count 18 is a claim for violation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. § 20501 et seq. (NVRA). After the Court's denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint as amended, the Plaintiffs are proceeding on these claims as well.

Upon consideration of the entire record in this case and the applicable law, and for the reasons that follow, the Defendants’ motion to exclude is due to be DENIED, the Defendants’ evidentiary objections are due to be OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part, the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, the Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is due to be DENIED, and the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims at issue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds adequate allegations to support both.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Daubert Motions

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702.

Rule 702 requires a trial judge to ensure that an expert's testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 587, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). In determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, a court must conduct a rigorous three part inquiry, considering whether: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert ; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc. , 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998).

This case is set for non-jury trial. The Court's gatekeeping role under Daubert is "more relaxed in a bench trial situation because there is less need for the gatekeeper to keep the gate when the gatekeeper is keeping the gate only for himself." Alabama State Conference for the NAACP v. Alabama , 2020 WL 579385, *1 (M.D. Ala. 2020) (citing United States v. Brown , 415 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005) ).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court shall grant a motion for "summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56 ). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence demonstrating there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of his case on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. An issue is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law." Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments , 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Non-movants must support their assertions "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed" by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).

In determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale , 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Likewise, the reviewing court must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, "mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ellis v. England , 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

A reviewing court is constrained during summary judgment proceedings from making the sort of determinations ordinarily reserved for the finder of fact at a trial. See Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. , 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted) ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict."). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable...