Thompson v. Safety Council of Southwest Louisiana

• Decision Date: 12 June 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 94-2132.
• Citation: 891 F. Supp. 306
• Parties: Gregory T. THOMPSON v. SAFETY COUNCIL OF SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

891 F. Supp. 306

Gregory T. THOMPSON v. SAFETY COUNCIL OF SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA.

Civ. A. No. 94-2132.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division.

June 12, 1995.

Marjorie R. Esman, Bordelon Hamlin & Theriot, New Orleans, LA, Thomas Lawrence Lorenzi, Walter Marshall Sanchez, Lorenzi & Sanchez, Lake Charles, LA, William P. Quigley, New Orleans, LA, Jane Johnson, E. Ann Cisney, Student Atty., New Orleans, LA, for plaintiff.

J. Michael Veron, Scofield Gerard Veron Hoskins & Soileau, Lake Charles, LA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM RULING

TRIMBLE, District Judge.

Before the Court is a limited objection to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation filed by the Safety Council of Southwest Louisiana in the above-captioned matter. The Court agrees with the recommendation of the Magistrate, but will briefly respond to the arguments raised by the objection.

The plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana law asserting violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, section 8 of the Louisiana Constitution. In September of 1993, the plaintiff plead no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Judge Thomas Quirk sentenced plaintiff to probation and required him to pay a fine, do community service work, and complete substance abuse and driver training programs. Plaintiff failed to pay his fine, and in June of 1994 Judge Quirk responded by ordering him to attend church once a week as a condition of his probation. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Quirk delegated to the defendant, the Safety Council of Southwest Louisiana (Safety Council), the responsibility of enforcing his sentence. Plaintiff also alleges that he asked an employee of the Safety Council about the kinds of churches that were acceptable and was told that he should attend a Christian church.

In order to verify his attendance at church, the defendant gave plaintiff a set of cards, one of which he was to have signed by a church official each week. In October of 1994, plaintiff was given an additional six month supply of cards. On November 29, 1994, the plaintiff appeared before Judge Quirk and was advised that he had completed his sentence in October of 1994, and that he was no longer required to attend church.

THE MAGISTRATE'S RECOMMENDATION

Defendant brought a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the motion, defendant contended that the plaintiff's § 1983 claim is barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The Magistrate concluded that the Safety Council served as executor of a facially valid court order and, as such, enjoyed absolute quasi-judicial immunity for those acts prescribed by Judge Quirk's sentence.

However, plaintiff's complaint averred that the Safety Council imposed additional requirements on the plaintiff's sentence by allegedly specifying that the church attended be Christian, and by sending plaintiff additional cards in October, the month he completed his sentence. The Magistrate stated,

Because these actions were allegedly not prescribed by Judge Quirk's sentence absolute quasi-judicial immunity does not require dismissal at this point. Whether or not these claims have any basis in fact is a question that cannot be resolved on the pleadings. Neither party briefed the question of whether qualified immunity would bar these claims and that issue is not reached.

To the extent that the Safety Council was executing a facially valid court order, this court finds that it is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

Accordingly, it is recommended that all claims against the Safety Council be dismissed except the claims that the Safety Council went beyond the scope of Judge Quirk's sentence in requiring that plaintiff attend a Christian church and in requiring that plaintiff attend church for the period of time that it did.

THE OBJECTION

The Safety Council bases its objection on several grounds. First, it argues that the plaintiff has failed to allege that he would not have attended a Christian church but for the alleged remark of Safety Council personnel. Additionally, the Safety Council asserts that the form given to plaintiff to be signed by a church official evidenced the fact that any denomination of church would have been satisfactory. Finally, the Safety Council contends that the additional supply of cards allegedly sent to plaintiff was at most a negligent, clerical error. Such negligence, defendant maintains, would not "deprive the Safety Council of its quasi-judicial immunity or give rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." (Defendant's Objection, paragraph 4). For the following reasons the Court finds no merit in these contentions.

In order for the plaintiff's claim to withstand the motion to dismiss, the Court must examine the complaint to determine if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action. For the purposes of this motion, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true.¹ The complaint will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). To state a § 1983 claim, plaintiff must allege facts which show deprivation of right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law by a person acting under color of state law. Lopez v. Department of Health Services, 939 F.2d 881 (9th Cir.1991).

In his complaint, plaintiff has set forth the fact that he was forced by court order and the Safety Council to attend a Christian church. This allegation is sufficient to set forth a cause of action under § 1983 for violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law.² The fact that Plaintiff may have chosen to attend a Christian church each week of his own volition and without an order of the court or the alleged denominational specification of the Safety Council does not remove the order or the Safety Council guideline from Constitutional scrutiny.³

The fact that the church attendance form does not specify that the church attended should be Christian does not negate the allegation that the Safety Council verbally imposed an additional condition on plaintiff's parole sentence. As stated above, on a motion to dismiss the allegations of the complaint are taken as true.

The defendant has also argued that the Safety Council committed only negligence, not a constitutional violation when it sent the additional cards to the plaintiff. The Court recognizes that in some instances a negligent act is not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). However, the issue of whether negligence is sufficient is dependent on the provision of the Constitution alleged to have been violated. Edwards v. Cabrera, 861 F.Supp. 664 (N.D.Ill.1994), see also Daniels, supra. The defendant has cited no case in which it was held that the First Amendment may not be violated by mere negligence, and this Court knows of no such case. The plaintiff's complaint does not allege a state of mind on the part of the Safety Council; however, even if negligence is not sufficient to prove a constitutional violation under the First Amendment, it cannot be said that plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would be sufficient.

Accordingly, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the Magistrate, and

IT SHALL BE ORDERED that all claims against the Safety Council be dismissed except the claims that the Safety Council went beyond the scope of Judge Quirk's sentence in requiring that plaintiff attend a Christian church and in requiring that plaintiff attend church for the period of time that it did.

JUDGMENT

For the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge previously filed herein, and in the Memorandum Ruling of this date, and after an independent review of the record, and a de novo determination of the issues, and consideration of the objections filed herein, and having determined that the findings are correct under applicable law;

IT IS ORDERED that all claims against the Safety Council are dismissed except the claims that the Safety Council went beyond the scope of Judge Quirk's sentence in requiring that plaintiff attend a Christian church and in requiring that plaintiff attend church for the period of time that it did.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

WILSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

Presently before the court is the defendant's "Motion to Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted." (Doc. 3). This motion has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana law asserting violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 8 of the Louisiana Constitution. In September of 1993 the plaintiff plead no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Judge Thomas Quirk sentenced plaintiff to probation and required him to pay a fine, do community service work, and complete substance abuse and driver training programs. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Quirk delegated the defendant, the Safety Council of Southwest Louisiana (Safety Council), the responsibility of enforcing his sentence as a "de facto probation officer for the Lake Charles City Court." Amended Complaint ¶¶ 6 & 13. Plaintiff failed to pay his fine as required, and this resulted in plaintiff appearing before Judge Quirk on June 21, 1994. On that occasion Judge Quirk ordered plaintiff, as a condition of his probation, to attend church once a week. Amended Complaint ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that he asked an...