Thompson v. Silver Beach Towers Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:14cv217/MCR/CJK |
| Parties | TAYLOR THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. SILVER BEACH TOWERS PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Plaintiff, Taylor Thompson, who is proceeding pro se, filed this action against his former employer, Silver Beach Towers Property Owners Association, Inc., asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, 12203; Florida Workers' Compensation Law, § 440.105, Fla. Stat.; and Florida's Private Sector Whistleblower Act ("Whistleblower Act"), §§ 448.101-448.105, Fla. Stat. Plaintiff claims he is a qualified individual with a disability based on a back injury he sustained at work. According to plaintiff, defendant discriminated against him by "denying [he] was injured on the job" and requiring him to terminate the assistant manager upon whom he relied to perform his job duties following his injury. Plaintiff also asserts he was terminated in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and reporting alleged Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") violations in violation of Florida's Workers' Compensation Law and the Whistleblower Act, respectively. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 49), arguing there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to any of plaintiff's claims and it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Having carefully considered the motion and response, the undersigned recommends defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted.
Defendant is the master association for two high-rise condominiums located in Destin, Florida. Doc. 1 at pg. 2. Defendant hired plaintiff as its Beach Operations Manager on or about June 26, 2011. Id. As Beach Operations Manager, plaintiff's responsibilities included "ensuring the beach was set up and broken down on a daily basis, collect[ing] daily revenue, reservations, scheduling [] employees, and payroll." Doc. 49-2 at pg. 3. Plaintiff claims to have been injured on the job on June 16, 2012 "while carrying chairs on the beach." Doc. 49 at pg. 7. Specifically, plaintiff claims he had a "torn disc" in his back. Doc. 49-2 at pg. 12. He filed a workers' compensation claim two days after the injury. Doc. 1 at pg. 3. He also sought treatment for the injury and was allowed to return to work on light duty with certain restrictions.1 Doc. 1 at pg. 2. After the restrictions were imposed, plaintiff required assistance performing his job. Doc. 49-4 at pg. 3. To that end, he relied on the assistant manager, Brandon Kortum, until Kortum was terminated on December 10, 2012. Id.
Shortly after Kortum's termination, on December 19, 2012, Steven Chamberlain, the association manager, and Steve Odom, a member of the association's board of directors, made an unannounced visit to plaintiff's work site.Doc. 49 at pg. 2. Chamberlain and Odom found thirty-two empty beer cans and a partially empty bottle of liquor in the warehouse. Id. Plaintiff admitted the beer cans and liquor bottle were his and explained he was given permission to store personal items on the premises. Doc. 49-2 at pg. 5. Chamberlain and Odom interviewed Kortum regarding the incident, and Kortum admitted consuming alcohol with plaintiff on the job site. Doc. 49 at pg. 2. Based on its discovery of the beer cans and liquor bottle, as well as Kortum's admission, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment.2 Doc. 49 at pg. 1.
After he was terminated, plaintiff began working for Gilligan's Watersports and Harbor Watersports as a "dock hand" and "deck hand." Doc. 49-2 at pg. 14. Plaintiff's duties included "rent[ing] out pontoons and wave runners to people on dolphin tours and serving as a deck hand on a para sailboat." Id. Despite the nature of his subsequent employment, plaintiff claims his condition improved only minimally; he acknowledges, however, that he has not pursued further medical treatment. Doc. 49-2 at pg. 15. On May 7, 2014, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual disputebetween the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law, and it is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is not appropriate "if a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts." Jeffrey v. Sarasora White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th Cir. 1995). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(a) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must view all the evidence, and all factual inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993). A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position will not suffice to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fat and thereby preclude summary judgment. Walker v. Darby 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Moreover, "the nonmoving party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through speculation, conjecture, or evidence that is 'merely colorable' or 'not significantly probative.'" Vega v. Invsco Group, Ltd., 432 F. App'x 867, 869-70 (11th Cir. 2011).
"The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against persons with disabilities." Dulaney v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 11-12585, 2012 WL 2037724, at *2 (11th Cir. Jun. 6, 2012). Claims of discrimination under the ADA may be proved through direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is "evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact [in issue] without inference or presumption." Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal marks omitted) (emphasis in original). In this case, plaintiff has no direct evidence of discrimination; instead, he relies wholly on circumstantial evidence to support his claim. The court, therefore, must consider plaintiff's claim under the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See Smith v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 14-12566, 2015 WL 3635417, at *3 (11th Cir. June 12, 2015) ().
Under this framework, the plaintiff has the burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that he (1) has a disability; (2) is qualified for the job, with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) was unlawfully discriminated against because of his disability. Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). "The ADA defines 'disability' to include: '(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;3 (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.'" Id. at 1357 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)). "Essential to either claim, according [to] EEOC regulations, is a showing that [the] plaintiff was 'significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.'" Id. at 1359 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis in original)). "The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." Id. "Thus, an impairment must preclude—or at least be perceived to preclude—an individual from more than one type of job, even if the job foreclosed is the individual's job of choice." Id.
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a rebuttable presumption arises that the employer unlawfully discriminated against him and the burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Brooks v. Cnty. Com'n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006). A trier of fact does not have to believe the employer's proffered reason in order to find the employer has met its burden, "[f]or the burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage." St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). Nor is an employer required to persuade the court its reason is "legitimate." Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds, Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006). The employer is required only topresent evidence which, taken as true, permits a reasonable factfinder to conclude there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 509; Cooper, ...
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