Thompson v. Skaggs
| Decision Date | 11 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:22-cv-682 |
| Parties | EDWARD THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. JAMES SKAGGS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Edward Thompson, an incarcerated person proceeding in forma pauperis and without the assistance of counsel, has filed a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1-1 4). He alleges that James Skaggs, a corrections officer at Ross Correctional Institution, violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1-1). He seeks compensatory damages. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID 17).
The matter is currently before the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct the initial screen required by law. 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS:
1. that Thompson be permitted to PROCEED at this time on his excessive force claim against Skaggs in his individual capacity.
2. that the remaining claims, including any claims against Skaggs in his official capacity, be DISMISSED.
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, ” and is also proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to conduct an initial screen of his Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss the Complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Court must construe the complaint in plaintiff's favor, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, a complaint that consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In the interest of justice, this Court is also required to construe a pro se complaint liberally and to hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (). Even with such a liberal construction, a pro se complaint must still adhere to the “basic pleading essentials.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Specifically, a pro se “complaint ‘must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements' to recover under some viable legal theory.'” Barhite v. Caruso, 377 Fed.Appx. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Thompson sues Skaggs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1-1 (“Complaint”), PageID 11). To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Thompson alleges that Skaggs is a corrections officer and suggests that he is employed by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”). (Complaint, PageID 10). It appears that the events described in the Complaint occurred after Skaggs suspected Thompson of swallowing contraband in October 2020. (Id., PageID 13, 15, 24). According to Thompson, after a search of his cell and his person, Skaggs ordered him to open his mouth. (Id., PageID 13, 20). Thompson complied, raising his hands, opening his mouth, and sticking out his tongue. (Id., PageID 13). Skaggs then sprayed mace directly into Thompson's throat and eyes, causing him to choke and causing temporary blindness and other injuries. (Id., PageID 13, 17).
Thompson says he was not resisting before or after the incident. (Id., PageID 13, 15). Thompson was then taken for medical care and placed on “[defecation] watch” for two days, after which he was held in “the hole” for a week. (Id., PageID 13-14).
Thompson identifies two main issues in his Complaint. First, he raises an apparent excessive force claim against Skaggs under the Eighth Amendment. (Id., PageID 11, 13, 15, 17, 19-20). Second, Thompson alleges that his personal property was not properly secured in the aftermath of this incident and was lost or stolen, presumably in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. (Id., PageID 14, 1719).
Thompson sues Skaggs in both his official and individual capacities. (Id., PageID 10). He seeks damages for physical and emotional injuries, as well as compensation for his lost property-$200, 000 in total. (Id., PageID 17).
At this point in the case, without the benefit of an answer or briefing from the parties, it appears that Thompson should be permitted to proceed with his excessive force claim against Skaggs in his individual capacity. The remainder of Thompson's claims, for the reasons discussed below, should be dismissed.
As noted above, Thompson sues Skaggs in his official capacity, as well as in his individual capacity. (Complaint, PageID 10). The official capacity claims for monetary damages cannot proceed, as such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 270 (6th Cir. 2018); U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
“The Eleventh Amendment ‘denies to the federal courts authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a state without its consent.'” Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)). “The [Supreme] Court has held that, absent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court.” Maben, 887 F.3d. at 270, (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985)). Thus, “because Ohio has not consented to suits in federal court nor has Congress abrogated Ohio's immunity under § 1983, ” the State of Ohio is immune from suit. Smith v. DeWine, 476 F.Supp.3d 635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020). Although Thompson has not directly sued the State of Ohio here, he has sued an employee of the State of Ohio.
The State of Ohio's immunity extends to suits for monetary damages against state employees who are sued in their official capacity, because such a suit is the same as a suit against the state itself. See Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 355 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165) (“An official capacity claim filed against a public employee is equivalent to a lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent represents.”).
Moreover, “claims against the state and its agencies cannot be maintained under § 1983 [because] these entities are not suable ‘persons' for purposes of § 1983.” Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 417 n.11 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1989)). State employees acting in their official capacities also are not suable “persons” under § 1983, because, as noted above, such a suit is the same as a suit against the state. Walz v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., No. 1:11-cv-103, 2012 WL 252803, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 25, 2012).
Corrections Officer Skaggs is a state employee. (Complaint, PageID 10). See White v. Bragg, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2005-Ohio-488, ¶ 16, 2005 WL 299818 (). Thus, Thompson's claims for monetary damages against him in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and necessarily fail because he is not in that capacity a suable “person.” Accordingly, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Thompson's claims against Skaggs in his official capacity be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
As mentioned above, Thompson alleges that his personal property was not properly secured in the aftermath of the incident with Skaggs and was lost or stolen, presumably in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. (Complaint, PageID 14, 17-19). Thompson says:
None of my property was documented, no property slip was brought to me to sign and my property was not taken to the vault at all. It was placed in a closet in the C-Section of Housing Units 5A and 5B....My property was [later] located in a closet after it has been ransacked and undocumented. I submitted a theft/loss report to Sgt. Taylor in 5B housing unit but heard nothing about it.
(Id., PageID 14). There is no further information in the Complaint about who allegedly took Thompson's property.
Thompson fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Any claim against other inmates for taking Thompson's personal property cannot succeed under § 1983, because a § 1983 claim is only available against a person acting under color of state law. Hunt, 542 F.3d at 534. A § 1983 claim is generally not available against private actors. Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507,...
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