Thompson v. South Carolina Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse
| Citation | 267 S.C. 463,229 S.E.2d 718 |
| Decision Date | 26 October 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 20295,20295 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Parties | , 85 A.L.R.3d 692 Perry Frank THOMPSON, Commanding Officer, State Highway Patrol, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE, and William J.McCord, Director, the South Carolina Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, inhis Official Capacity, Defendants. |
Deputy Atty. Gen. Joseph C. Coleman, Columbia, for plaintiffs.
Deputy Atty. Gen. Victor S. Evans and Asst. Attys. Gen. Edwin E. Evans and George C. Beighley, Columbia, for defendants.
We are called upon in the original jurisdiction of the court in this declaratory judgment action to determine the constitutional validity of Act No. 1213 of the Acts of the General Assembly for 1974, the Uniform Alcohol and Intoxication Treatment Act (the Act).
The plaintiffs are the Commanding Officer of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, the Director of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, and the President of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Officers' Association. The action is brought in both an individual capacity and an official capacity, representing generally peace officers charged with the duty of enforcing the criminal laws of this State as well as administering the Act here under attack.
The defendants are the South Carolina Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse and its director. This commission is a part of the executive branch of the state government.
The defendants have first raised the question of the standing of these plaintiffs to bring the action, arguing the absence of a substantial interest in the subject matter. While it is the general rule, as stated in Greenville County Fair Ass'n v. Christenberry, 198 S.C. 338, 17 S.E.2d 857 (1941), that public officials may not contest the validity of a statute, the rule is not an inflexible one and we are of the opinion that the questions involved are of such wide concern, both to law enforcement personnel and to the public, that the court should determine the issues in this declaratory judgment action.
The conflicts between § 16--558, Code of Laws for South Carolina (1968) As amended (1975 Supp.) (public disorderly conduct or shooting, etc.) and the Act here under attack, bring about the peace officers' dilemma which has resulted in this challenge of the Act.
Section 16--558 reads in pertinent part as follows:
It is a statewide statute applying to all municipalities and counties. Its validity is not in contest.
The challenged Act is patterned after the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act and is designated as such in the title; however, it is greatly different in many regards and has experienced several deletions and additions in the legislative process.
The Act first declares it to be 'the policy of this State that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution because of their consumption of alcoholic beverages, but rather should be afforded a continuum of treatment in order that they may lead normal lives as productive members of society.'
It also declares ( § 8) that '(n)o county, municipality or other political subdivision may adopt or enforce a local law, ordinance, resolution or rule having the force of law that includes drinking, being a common drunkard or being found in an intoxicated condition as one of the elements of the offense giving rise to a criminal or civil penalty or sanction.'
Although these provisions of the Act conflict with the retention of § 16--558, they do not expressly or impliedly repeal § 16--558 () and, therefore, § 16--558 remains the law of the entire state of South Carolina notwithstanding the declaration of policy and § 8.
Section 9 limits the application of the entire Act to certain counties and municipalities in verbiage as follows:
The Act imposes upon peace officers in counties and municipalities with participating alcohol and intoxication treatment programs, the duty of taking 'alcoholics,' 'incapacitated persons' and 'intoxicated persons,' (as defined in the Act) into protective custody, and delivering them to treatment facilities, shelters, hospitals, or 'an appropriate destination.' 'Protective custody' is not defined in the Act and we find no definition of it in Words and Phrases or Black's Law Dictionary. The Act stipulates that it is not an arrest. Persons so apprehended may not be prosecuted for public drunkenness. They may not be detained for treatment of an alcoholic problem unless they volunteer to stay, but they may be kept in protective custody temporarily during a sobering-up or drying-out process, and then released.
Such persons may be committed under other provisions of law (Act No. 1230 of 1968) after a judicial hearing. This Act (1230) provides for the admission and commitment of alcohol and drug addicts to treatment facilities. It does not deal with public drunkenness short of addiction.
The Act does not change the criminal law in any municipality or county; rather it grants immunity from prosecution and directs that any municipality or county participating in the Alcohol and Intoxication Treatment Program refrain from enforcing the criminal law as such and, in lieu of prosecution, encourage the violator to voluntarily undergo treatment. In those counties which do not have a treatment program approved, § 16--558 would be enforced in the usual fashion, resulting in fine or imprisonment upon conviction.
There can be no doubt but that the legislature, under its plenary power, can enact any statute not violative of the constitution. Accordingly, it may elect to treat public drunkards as criminals or, on the other hand, may treat such persons as patients in need of assistance. The heart of the issue presented to us is: does the proposed treatment of persons violating § 16--558 as patients in one county or municipality and as criminals in others, violate either the constitution of this State or of the United States?
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the Act is void under both constitutions, because (a) 'it constitutes Act No. 1213, a special law, where a general law can be made applicable' (South Carolina Constitution, Art. III, § 34), and (b) 'it denies to persons in those parts of the state that are, or might, be exempt from its provisions equal protection of the law.' (South Carolina Constitution, Art. I § 3 and United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment.)
Article III, § 34, of the South Carolina Constitution provides:
'The General Assembly of this State shall not enact local or special laws concerning any of the following subjects or for any of the following purposes, to-wit:
(Several specified subjects are here enumerated.)'
Subsection IX of § 34 continues by stating:
'In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.'
Article I, § 3 of the same Constitution provides as follows:
The Fourteenth Amendment...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh
...of equal protection is "difficult to define and not susceptible of exact delimitation." Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 472, 229 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1976). We have previously written: [T]he constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws requi......
-
Sloan v. Greenville County
... ... , a Political Subdivision of the State of South Carolina, Dozier Brooks, Scott Case, C. Wade ... [of standing] is not an inflexible one." Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol & Drug Abuse, ... South Carolina Public Service Commission, 288 S.C. 304, 342 S.E.2d 403 (1986) ... We find ... ...
-
CAFE v. SC DEPT. OF LABOR, LICENSING
...when an issue is of such public importance as to require its resolution for future guidance. See Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 229 S.E.2d 718 (1976) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing because the questions involved were of such wide concer......
-
Jowers v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control
...to challenge the Act as applied." Return to Petition for Rehearing, filed Aug. 24, 2017, at 4 (citing Thompson v. S.C. Comm'n on Alcohol & Drug Abuse , 267 S.C. 463, 229 S.E.2d 718 (1976) ).15 Two, the State asserts it could bring "a common law challenge to the reasonableness of the withdra......