Thompson v. State, 49S00-0012-CR-786.

• Decision Date: 16 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 49S00-0012-CR-786.,49S00-0012-CR-786.
• Parties: Vanessa K. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

765 N.E.2d 1273

Vanessa K. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 49S00-0012-CR-786.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 16, 2002.

Kurt A. Young, Nashville, IN, Attorney for Appellant. Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cecelia K. Hemphill, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

DICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, Vanessa K. Thompson, was convicted of murder¹ for the 1998 killing of sixteen-year-old Shanna Sheese.² In this appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's denial of her request for an in camera review of the mental health records of one of the State's witnesses. We affirm.

The defendant admits that viewed in the abstract, the evidence presented by the State is sufficient to support her conviction. Br. of Appellant at 14-15. She maintains, however, that given the lack of any physical evidence tending to connect her with the crime, the credibility of the witnesses testifying against her is the crucial determinant. She argues that two of the primary witnesses against her suffered from severe mental illness, and that the testimony is thus inherently improbable and incredibly dubious.

In addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, and determine therefrom whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Marcum v. State, 725 N.E.2d 852, 863 (Ind.2000). The "incredible dubiosity" doctrine applies where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt. White v. State, 706 N.E.2d 1078, 1079-80 (Ind.1999).

Applying the appropriate standard of review, the evidence shows that the victim was killed by a blunt force injury to her head. After the murder, the defendant admitted to one acquaintance that she had hit the defendant on the head, knocking her unconscious. To another, she admitted that she crushed the victim's head with a brick. The defendant personally testified that she was a crack cocaine user who sold drugs and was a prostitute working for Malcolm Wilson, her boyfriend. Two witnesses stated that the defendant told them of her jealousy regarding the victim's relationship with Wilson. The defendant also recounted that she and the victim had argued over "Malcolm." Shortly before the victim's death, one witness, acquainted with both the defendant and the victim, observed the defendant, Wilson, one other woman, and one other man in Wilson's white pickup truck. Seeking to purchase cocaine from Wilson, the witness walked to the truck and noticed protruding from under a tarp in the back of the truck some feet in tennis shoes that looked like those usually worn by the victim. When the defendant said, "She saw, she saw" and pulled the tarp over the shoes, Wilson replied, "No she didn't cause if she says anything, we know where it came from." Record at 297.

From this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The incredible dubiosity doctrine does not apply because the evidence was not from a single witness and because there was not an absence of circumstantial evidence of guilt. Acknowledging that "such evidence would appear damaging," Br. of Appellant at 17, the defendant asserts that the evidence is incredibly dubious because two of the State's witnesses were addicted to crack cocaine, engaging in prostitution to support the habit, and two were suffering from "bipolar" mental illness severe enough to warrant use of medications. She presented medical testimony regarding bipolar disorders generally and the symptoms present during the manic state of the disorder.

As noted above, however, in reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we cannot reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility but must look only to the evidence favorable to judgment. The defendant's challenges to the credibility and weight of the incriminating witnesses was presented to the jury, and we find no proper grounds to set aside its verdict. We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict.

The defendant's second claim is that the court abused its discretion when it denied, without a hearing or in camera review, her request to review the mental health records of one of the State's principal witnesses. She argues that, because the witness was receiving treatment for mental illness and was under medication, "such records might have shown [the witness] to be so impaired as to be unworthy of belief." Br. of Appellant at 20.

Less than a week before the jury trial was to commence, the...