Thompson v. State, 1339

• Decision Date: 04 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 1339,1339
• Citation: 496 P.2d 651
• Parties: Henry Allen THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 651

496 P.2d 651

Henry Allen THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 1339.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

May 4, 1972.

Henry Allen Thompson, in pro. per.

G. Kent Edwards, Atty. Gen., Juneau, Harold W. Tobey, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Eastaugh, Asst. Dist. Atty., Anchorage, for appellee.

Before BONEY, C. J., and CONNOR, BOOCHEVER, RABINOWITZ and ERWIN, JJ.

OPINION

BONEY, Chief Justice.

On December 14, 1964 Henry Allen Thompson was indicted and arrested on felony counts of forgery, burglary and larceny. At the arraignment Thompson entered pleas of not guilty, and bail was set at $2500. He was unable to meet bail and thus remained in jail from the date of his arrest.

During the trial Thompson changed his plea to guilty as to the count of forgery. The counts of burglary and larceny were subsequently dismissed. On April 7, 1965 he received an indeterminate sentence of one to twenty years pursuant to the indeterminate sentencing statute in effect at that time. ¹

On June 4, 1965, the superior court heard and denied Thompson's motion for suspension of the sentence. He immediately filed a 'Notice of Appeal' which the superior court treated as an application to vacate sentence under Criminal Rule 35(b) ² because the applicant had previously entered a guilty plea. Upon denial of the motion, he appealed to this court for a determination of the voluntariness of his guilty plea. The case was remanded to the superior court for a factual hearing pursuant to Criminal Rule 35. ³ The refusal of that court to grant the requested relief after it had made findings of fact was affirmed on appeal to this court. ⁴ At all stages, Thompson was represented by counsel.

In September 1967, Thompson again applied to the superior court for post-conviction relief. The superior court denied the requested relief, and he again appealed to this court. We remanded the case for an adjudication in accordance with Criminal Rule 35(g) or 35(h). ⁵ On June 6, 1970, after due consideration, the superior court denied Thompson's application. From that decision Thompson now appeals.

On his second application for post-conviction relief, and on this appeal, Thompson presents two constitutional issues:

(1) He argues that the imposition of a possible 20-year sentence for forgery is cruel and unusual punishment, contrary to the protections of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and to the protections of article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution.

(2) He further argues that the denial of credit for presentence detention time is an invidious discrimination against impecunious defendants unable to post bail, and hence in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, and article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution.

In Merrill v. State ⁶ we held that, under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(i), ⁷ any ground for relief not raised in the original, supplemental or amended application will not be considered in a subsequent application unless the court finds 'sufficient reason' for the failure to make the assertion in the first application. If the applicant is represented by counsel in the first application, there will be no presumption in his favor, and he will incur the burden of showing sufficient reason for his earlier failure to raise he issue. ⁸ Because the instant case represents Thompson's second request for post-conviction relief, he must demonstrate sufficient reason for not having raised the present issues in his earlier application. As we noted in Merrill, when faced with a successive application, 'the courts of this state stand ready to make a diligent search through the records and files of the case in order to discover if a sufficient reason exists for the failure of the applicant to raise the claim of error at an earlier stage of the proceedings.' ⁹

Thompson would have us find sufficient excuse for his not having raised the cruel and unusual punishment issue earlier in his claim that Faulkner v. Alaska, ¹⁰ a case decided subsequent to his first application, has produced an intervening change in the law which will substantially alter the outcome of his case. ¹¹ The state responds that Faulkner is not new law because it applied the same test that was set forth in Green v. State, ¹² a case decided prior to Thompson's first application.

In Green v. State we held that neither the United States nor the Alaska Constitution's ¹³ prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment were violated by statutes providing for a possible shorter minimum sentence for first degree murder than for second degree murder. ¹⁴ The court stated the applicable test as follows:

Only those punishments which are cruel and unusual in the sense that they are inhuman and barbarous, or so disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice may be stricken as violating the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Such punishments would also be void under article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution which declares that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. ¹⁵

In Faulkner v. State, Justice Dimond applied the test articulated in Green v. State to invalidate a thirty-six year sentence ¹⁶ imposed for a single spree of bad check writing. ¹⁷ Justice Rabinowitz concurred, arguing that this court has the power to review sentences. ¹⁸ He agreed, however, with that part of Chief Justice Nesbett's dissent in which the Chief Justice expressed his views on the cruel and unusual punishment issue. ¹⁹ Thus, while no opinion was fully acceptable to more than one member of our then three-man court, a majority of two justices specifically rejected the application of the Green v. State test.

We fail to see, therefore, how Justice Dimond's remarks can be said to represent a change in the law in Alaska when they were expressive of the views of a minority of the court. ²⁰ Thompson has been unable to justify his failure to raise, on his first application, the cruel and unusual claim.

Thompson next argues that Merrill v. State and Criminal Rule 35(i) should not preclude our consideration of the equal protection issue involving credit for presentence incarceration because the case of Sobell v. United States ²¹ was decided after his first application. While recognizing that Sobell v. United States is not a change in the law of Alaska, he argues that it was the first case in the nation in which a court favorably passed upon the precise question presented in his case, and that under these circumstances he can be excused for not having earlier been aware of the issue.

We disagree that Sobell v. United States was either the first ruling on the issue, or that it passed upon the precise question presented in the case before us. The court there explicitly avoided the constitutional question of presentence detention and decided the case on the basis of the federal statute and the pronouncements of the trial judge. Sobell v. United States was an outgrowth of an earlier case in another circuit, Stapf v. United States ²² and the recognition by Congress of inequities in the federal bail system. ²³ Finally, even if we could recognize Sobell or Stapf as representing an intervening change in the law, we are moved to decision by the fact that it is not a change which affects the law of this jurisdiction.

While we hold, therefore, that Thompson has failed to establish sufficient reason for his not having raised the issue in his first application for post-conviction relief, we nonetheless conclude that he should be granted credit against his sentence for his presentence time served. We agree with the Colorado Supreme Court that fairness dictates that such credit be given. ²⁴ Our legislature, subsequent to Thompson's sentencing, recognized the inequity of denying credit for presentence time and enacted AS 11.05.040(a) requiring that credit be given for time served pending trial, sentencing, or appeal. ²⁵ We conclude that denying Thompson credit would work an injustice which we are capable of avoiding by relaxing our rules. ²⁶

The sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to superior court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

RABINOWITZ, Justice, with whom, ERWIN, Justice, joins, concurring.

I concur in the court's holding that Thompson should be granted credit for the period he was incarcerated prior to being sentenced. On the other hand, I find I am unable to join the majority in its reliance upon Merrill v. State, 457 P.2d 231 (Alaska 1969), and Criminal Rule 35(i) as the basis for failing to reach the merits of Thompson's application for post-conviction relief. I entertain doubts as to the constitutionality, under either the federal or Alaska Constitutions, of the requirement of Criminal Rule 35(i) that any ground for relief not raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application for post-conviction relief will not be considered in a subsequent application unless the court finds sufficient reason for the failure to make the assertion in the first application.

Since I am of the further view that the sentence imposed was not tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment, I concur in the overall result reached by the court in this case.

1 AS 11.05.060 then provided:

Courts imposing prison sentences for felonies shall sentence the defendant to the minimum and maximum term of imprisonment provided by law. (Ch. 43 § 3 SLA 1964)

This sentencing scheme was repealed in 1965. (Ch. 68 § 1 SLA 1965)

2 At that time, Alaska R.Crim.P. 35(b) provided:

(b) A prisoner in custody under sentence of the District Court for the District (Territory) of Alaska or the superior court of the State of Alaska claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the Constitution or laws of Alaska, or that the court was without...