Thompson v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 719,719
• Citation: 488 A.2d 995,62 Md.App. 190
• Parties: Gary THOMPSON v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 190

62 Md.App. 190

488 A.2d 995

Gary THOMPSON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 719, Sept. Term, 1984.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 11, 1985.

Philip Utter (Nancy Cook, Assigned Public Defender, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for appellant.

Richard B. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Kurt T. Schmoke, State's Atty. for Baltimore City and Jamie Hochberg, Asst. State's Atty., for Baltimore City, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MOYLAN, WEANT, and ROSALYN B. BELL, JJ.

MOYLAN, Judge.

The appellant, Gary Thompson, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by Judge Robert M. Bell, sitting without a jury, of 1) possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; 2) possession of methadone; 3) possession of narcotics paraphernalia (hypodermic syringes); 4) possession of paraphernalia (packaging material); and 5) possession of marijuana. Upon this appeal, he raises two contentions:

1) That the evidence was not legally sufficient to support the convictions; and

2) That evidence seized from his briefcase should have been suppressed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

All of the incriminating evidence was found in the course of a seach, pursuant to a search and seizure warrant, executed on Room 270 of the Town House Motel, 5810 Reisterstown Road, on February 26, 1981. The room was registered to one Harriet Oliver, a close friend of the appellant. The appellant was not present at the time of the search. The appellant was found to be in joint possession of the contraband. The attributes of joint possession were well spelled out by us in Folk v. State, 11 Md.App. 508, 511-512, 275 A.2d 184 (1971):

"It is well-settled that the proscribed possession of marihuana or of narcotic drugs under the Maryland law need not be sole possession. '[T]here may be joint possession and joint control in several persons. And the duration of the possession and the quantity possessed are not material, nor is it necessary to prove ownership in the sense of title.' ...

Nor is it necessary, in order to be found in joint possession of a contraband drug, that the appellant have a 'full partnership' in the contraband." (Citation omitted).

We have no difficulty in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to permit the fact finder to draw the inference that the appellant was exercising constructive dominion and control over the contraband that was seized. The appellant was no stranger to the motel room in question. The police had actually been in the motel room for another purpose, not here pertinent, shortly before the execution of the search and seizure warrant. At the time of that earlier entry, Harriet Oliver and the appellant were standing in close proximity to a dresser, but moving away from it, as the police entered. There was cocaine, in the obvious course of being made ready for distribution, in open view on that dresser. There were two bottles of manite, a substance used as a cutting agent for cocaine, on the same dresser. Four hypodermic needles, some syringes, and three bottle caps with cotton were also found on the dresser. There were twelve white envelopes for packaging and a stocking for straining cocaine, also on the dresser. In addition to evidence of manufacturing and distributing, there was evidence of personal use of the cocaine as well. There was a mirror, a razor blade, and straws for snorting cocaine. The straws contained cocaine residue. Both methadone and marijuana were observed in the general area.

The police, who were there initially only for the purpose of executing an arrest warrant for Harriet Oliver, did not seize any of this evidence at the time of their initial observation of it.

They arrested Harriet Oliver, a second female by the name of Ms. Buice, and the appellant, transporting them immediately to the Northern District. The scene in which the appellant was observed was then frozen until the police returned not long thereafter, with a full search and seizure warrant based upon those earlier observations. The further search revealed papers indicative of financial transactions, a gun, and a briefcase taken from beneath the bed. The briefcase contained a picture of the appellant and a piece of paper bearing his name. The room itself, moreover, contained both men's and women's clothing. In addition to the three human occupants at the time of the first entry, the room was also occupied by three dogs. When the officers mentioned taking the dogs to an animal shelter, the appellant spoke up and stated that he would have someone pick them up. The appellant's wife eventually claimed the dogs from the animal shelter.

A motel employee indicated that she had called Room 270 earlier in that day to pass on complaints about the barking dogs. That employee indicated that sometimes a woman answered the phone in the motel room but sometimes a man did. That employee further described a thin black man in his middle 30's or early 40's, matching generally the description of the appellant, as the man who had paid the rent on the room during the month of February.

In Folk v. State, supra, we analyzed the many cases affirming findings of joint possession and summarized the common denominator characteristics, at 11 Md.App. 518, 275 A.2d 184:

"The common thread running through all of these cases affirming joint possession is 1) proximity between the defendant and the contraband, 2) the fact that the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of the defendant, 3) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in which the contraband is found, or 4) the presence of circumstances from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband."

We hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to permit Judge Bell to infer that the appellant had an adequate nexus with the contraband to sustain the verdicts in this case.

Standing as to the Briefcase

We turn to the suppression issue. Clearly, the papers and photograph found in the briefcase under the bed, linking the appellant with the room, were evidentiary items of real significance. The appellant asserts that he had Fourth Amendment standing in this briefcase, that was both seized and searched. Indeed, the appellant's argument, at the suppression hearing, focused narrowly on this standing in the briefcase, in contrast to a virtual concession of nonstanding in the larger motel room itself:

"I have no argument as to presence, whether or not the defendant has standing to contest the search and seizure warrant, the items that were found in the motel room. I would like to advise the court in addition to the other evidence found in the motel room, there was a briefcase, a closed briefcase, found in the motel room, which was subsequently seized pursuant to the warrant and subsequently opened and in there was found marijuana and a slip or piece of paper with the name of the defendant. My suppression motion goes to everything as an advocate for my client, but specifically my suppression motion also goes to the validity of the seizure of the briefcase because ... there is no question that my client does at least have standing as to the briefcase."

We agree with the appellant as to his standing to challenge the search of the briefcase. When the officers were initially searching the motel room, they were searching both the room at large and all containers within it for "controlled and dangerous substances and the items used in their manufacture, distribution and use." Without suggesting that it would have made any difference, we note that the officers had no reason to believe that the briefcase under the bed was the special property of the appellant, as distinguished from any other closet, drawer, box, suitcase, or purse examined in the course of the larger search. The reasonableness of the police behavior has nothing, however, to do with standing to object. The reasonableness of police conduct, assessed from their subjective point of view in light of the facts available to them at the time of the search, bears only upon the merits of Fourth Amendment satisfaction. Standing to object, on the other hand, is assessed objectively in terms of the actual, historic facts that are developed at the time of the suppression hearing itself.

At the suppression hearing, it was developed that the appellant's photograph and identification papers were in the briefcase. We conclude that this was enough to entitle him to standing to litigate the constitutional propriety of the search of that briefcase. Standing to object, however, by no means suggests that the appellant will win upon the Fourth Amendment merits; it simply entitles him to litigate the Fourth Amendment merits.

Standing as to the Motel Room

Standing as to the briefcase does not necessarily imply standing as to the motel room itself. The Fourth Amendment interest there must be independently established. The ultimate demonstration (at the suppression hearing) of a proprietary interest in the briefcase does not necessarily imply an ultimate demonstration (at the suppression hearing) of a proprietary interest in the motel room. The appellant here failed utterly, following the State's timely challenge, to establish any standing in the motel room itself. All that came out at the suppression hearing was that the room was registered to Harriet Oliver. The appellant clearly, on the facts made available to Judge Bell before he was called upon to rule, had demonstrated no proprietary interest in the motel room itself. Nor did the appellant have any derivative standing in the place searched by virtue of being legitimately on the premises, as a guest, licensee, or invitee, at the time of the critical search in issue. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960).

To be sure, some of the evidence ultimately...