Thompson v. State, 18846

• Citation: 251 S.C. 593,164 S.E.2d 760
• Decision Date: 04 December 1968
• Docket Number: No. 18846,18846
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: William B. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina et al., Respondents.

Page 760

164 S.E.2d 760

251 S.C. 593

William B. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina et al., Respondents.

No. 18846.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 4, 1968.

Jack F. McGuinn, G. Raymond McElveen, Jr., Columbia, for appellant.

Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Edward B. Latimer, Emmet H. Clair, Asst. Attys. Gen., Columbia, for respondents.

MOSS, Chief, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of The Honorable John Grimball, Resident Judge of the Fifth Circuit, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the prisoner, William B. Thompson, to the custody of the South Carolina Penitentiary, where he is presently serving a sentence of forth years, imposed upon him on April 20, 1965. It appears from the record that the appellant herein was indicted and charged with the crime of assault with intent to ravish, a capital offense. Section 16--72 of the Code. When this case was called for trial the defendant upon his arraignment entered a plea of 'not guilty'. Thereafter, the defendant withdrew the aforesaid plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty of an assault with intent to ravish with a recommendation to the mercy of the court. The aforesaid plea was accepted without a jury being impaneled and this procedure was authorized by Section 17--553.4 of the cumulative supplement to the Code.

William B. Thompson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 26, 1966. The writ was duly issued and dismissed after a full hearing. At the hearing the appellant was represented by court appointed counsel. This is an appeal from the order dismissing the habeas corpus proceeding.

The first ground of appeal is that the arrest of the appellant was unlawful due to the fact that no warrant was ever issued and such was necessary in order to give the General Sessions Court jurisdiction of the crime with which the appellant was charged. It appears from the record that a Ministerial Recorder of Richland County issued a warrant of arrest on November 1, 1964, charging the appellant with the crime of 'attempted rape and burglary.' The appellant was indicted at the December 1964 Term of General Sessions Court for Richland County and charged with the crime of assault with intent to ravish and it was to this indictment that the plea of guilty with a recommendation to mercy was entered by the appellant.

It is the apparent position of the appellant that even though the office of Ministerial Recorder of the City of Columbia was established by the General Assembly, Section 15--1058 et seq. of the 1962 Code of Laws, there was no constitutional authority authorizing such an office and hence no such judicial office existed with the authority to issue a warrant in this case. It is unnecessary for us to decide the aforesaid question because the grand jury of Richland County was authorized to indict for any crime, which was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Magistrate or other inferior court, whether or not there has been prior proceedings before a Magistrate and an arrest warrant issued. State v. Walker, 232 S.C. 290, 101 S.E.2d 826, and the cases therein cited. It follows that the grand jury was authorized to indict the appellant for the crime of assault with intent to ravish and without any procedure before any inferior court.

It is next contended by the appellant that his plea of guilty, while represented by counsel, was tainted by statements made by him to law enforcement officers, allegedly involuntary, or coerced by fear and misrepresentation so as to render that plea involuntary and in violation of due process of law. It is further contended by the appellant that he was unlawfully deprived of the right of counsel at the time his alleged confession was obtained.

A person seeking relief by writ of habeas corpus has the burden of sustaining the allegations of his petition by a preponderance of the evidence. Bailey v. MacDougall, 247 S.C. 1, 145 S.E.2d 425. The burden upon the appellant here was to show that his plea of guilty was influenced by the evidence of the confession or his alleged illegal detention.

It appears from the record that the appellant was arrested without a warrant immediately following the commission of the crime with which he was charged. The appellant did make certain statements to the arresting officers following his incarceration but such statements were more of an exculpatory than inculpatory nature. The record shows that the mother of the appellant immediately employed counsel. A preliminary hearing was held and attended by such counsel. The record established also that the appellant was arraigned on January 20, 1965, and, such time was represented by retained counsel. The case was not called for trial until April 20, 1965, and at that time he was represented by the same attorney by appointment of the court along with a second attorney. At the time the appellant entered a plea of guilty of the crime of assault with intent to ravish he did so after full consultation with his attorneys and members of his family. The trial judge found that this plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily entered. The evidence amply sustains this finding of fact. The appellant testified that he talked with his attorneys at various times prior to the entry of his plea of guilty and he was told of the possible sentences that he might receive if found guilty. We quote the following from the testimony of the appellant:

'Q. * * * And you decided to enter a plea of guilty to the charge...