Thompson v. State
| Decision Date | 10 March 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 48317,48317 |
| Citation | 309 So.2d 533 |
| Parties | Winston James THOMPSON, alias Percy Young and alias Wade Moore v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Noble & Noble, brookhaven for appellant.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by John C. Ellis, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before GILLESPIE, INZER and BROOM, JJ.
Winston James Thompson was convicted in the Circuit Court of Copiah County of forgery and sentenced to eight years in the penitentiary.
According to the state's proof, defendant, using the name Wade Moore and a false address, opened a savings account in the Bank of Hazlehurst with a deposit of $105 on December 6, 1971. On February 11, 1972, defendant entered the bank in the late afternoon and presented a check payable to Wade and Mary Moore. The check was purportedly drawn by Cooper, Allen and Jones, Attorneys at Law, on the Peoples Bank of Indianola, Mississippi. Defendant told the employees of the bank that the check represented the proceeds of a settlement for the death of his child. The check showed on its face that it was for 'Fanial settlement of auto accident cause number 3-247 in Sunflower County.' (Emphasis added). It was purportedly endorsed by the payees and defendant requested that $2,000 be deposited to the savings account with the balance paid to him. This was done and defendant received the $1,840 in cash. It developed that the check was a forgery in that the account and the 'cause number' on the check were both false. Several witnesses positively identified the defendant as the person who uttered the forged check and received the money. He denied it and offered an alibi witness, making it a jury question on the issue of identification of the defendant.
I.
Defendant argues that it was error for the trial court to permit the district attorney to question the defendant about the details of his conviction of false pretenses in Jones County, Mississippi.
The question arose during the cross-examination of the defendant. After defendant admitted that he had been convicted of false pretenses in Jones County, the district attorney asked defendant if he negotiated a check at the Commercial National Bank and Trust Company in Laurel (Jones County) on February 11, 1972, which was drawn by Cooper, Allen and Jones, Attorneys at Law, on the Peoples Bank of Indianola, Mississippi, payable to Percy Young and Emma Young in the amount of $4,375, with the notation, 'For Fanial settlement of auto accident in Sunflower, Mississippi, cause number 23-467.' (Emphasis added). Defendant denied that he uttered this check but admitted that he pleaded guilty to an indictment growing out of the uttering of the check.
The two checks (the one described in the district attorney's question and the one negotiated at the Bank of Hazlehurst) were cashed on the same day and were identical except for the amount and the name of the payees. The word 'final' was misspelled on both checks.
In prosecutions for uttering forgery, evidence of similar transactions committed at or about the same time as the offense charged are admissible for the purpose of proving identity, intent, knowledge or a common scheme to defraud. Pierce v. State, 213 So.2d 769 (Miss.1968); 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 309 (1940). Accordingly, the evidence concerning the Laurel check was properly admitted.
2.
Defendant argues that he was denied due process by the exclusion of the testimony of Attorney W. S. Moore relative to the admission against penal interest made by one Davis, being in effect a confession by Davis to Moore, that he, Davis, and not the defendant, was guilty of uttering the forged checks at Laurel and Hazlehurst on February 11, 1972.
Defendant made a record in chambers...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Laumber v. United States
... ... This distinction was first made by the House of Lords in the Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H. L. 1844). Both Wigmore and McCormick state that the House of Lords ignored prior English precedent which held that declarations against penal interest were admissible as an exception to the ... See also Thompson v. State, 309 So.2d 533 (Miss.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924, 96 S.Ct. 266, 46 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975); Pitts v. State, 307 So.2d 473 ... ...
-
Flowers v. State
... ... Thompson v. State, 309 So.2d 533 (Miss.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924, 96 S.Ct. 266, 46 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975) ... Likewise, we find that our present rule, which forbids the admission into evidence at a criminal trial of a declaration by an unavailable declarant that he committed the crime ... ...
-
Com. v. Carr
... ... But reacting, like the many State courts mentioned, to an apprehension that there are hazards of fabrication or unreliability with respect to such statements that are more serious ... Jessup, 519 P.2d 913, 915-917 (Okl.1973). A few jurisdictions have chosen to adhere to the older rule. See Thompson v. State, 309 So.2d 533 (Miss.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924, 96 S.Ct. 266, 46 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975); Pitts v. State, 307 So.2d 473 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), ... ...
-
Parker v. State
... ... In the middle of evening rush hour traffic on April 26, 1983, two automobiles were traveling in a easterly direction on Division Street in Biloxi, Mississippi. A red Subaru was driven by Karl Thompson and occupied by Mark Anthony Parker and T.C. Carter, all black persons. Parker was the Defendant below and is the Appellant here. The driver and sole occupant of a blue Toyota was Darrell Jay Jones, who was white ... The occupants of the two vehicles engaged in a fatal ... ...