Thompson v. State, WD 76794.
| Decision Date | 09 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 76794.,WD 76794. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Tyreese R. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Damien de Loyola, Assistant Appellate Defender, Kansas City, MO, for Appellant.
Chris Koster, Attorney General, Daniel N. McPherson, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Before Division One: MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge, and LISA WHITE HARDWICK and KAREN KING MITCHELL, Judges.
Tyreese Thompson appeals the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of his Rule 24.0351 motion for post-conviction relief. Thompson claims that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and seek to suppress evidence discovered as a result of Thompson's allegedly illegal seizure. Thompson further claims that counsel also failed to advise Thompson of the possibility of suppression; thus, Thompson's plea was rendered involuntary and unknowing. The State argues that Thompson waived his claims when Thompson entered a voluntary and knowing guilty plea. We affirm.
On May 6, 2011, Thompson was riding in a maroon GMC Sonoma driven by Caci Clizer and owned by Clizer's father. They stopped at Speedy's Convenience Store in St. Joseph, Missouri, so that Thompson could purchase some soda. Clizer parked the car facing the store, so that the only manner of egress was to put the car in reverse. After Thompson exited the store, Clizer asked him to drive. At the same time, law enforcement officers Zack Craft and Brett Coy were dispatched to Speedy's to investigate a possible drunk driver. An unidentified caller had advised that a woman driving a maroon GMC Sonoma may be intoxicated and could be found at Speedy's. After Thompson sat in the driver's seat and prepared to start the car, he noticed a police cruiser with its emergency lights on parked behind him, blocking his exit. An officer approached the driver's side of the vehicle and asked for Thompson's license and registration. Thompson advised the officer that his license was suspended.
The officer then had Thompson move to the passenger seat and had Clizer exit the vehicle in order to perform a field sobriety test, which she ultimately passed, suggesting that she was not intoxicated. The officer then sought and received permission from Clizer to search the vehicle. The officer found both marijuana and a large amount of currency in the car, and both Thompson and Clizer were arrested.
Thompson was later charged with the class B felony of possession of a controlled substance ( more than five grams of marijuana) with intent to distribute, in violation of section 195.211.2 Thompson entered a plea agreement with the State whereby, in exchange for Thompson's guilty pleas to the charge arising from the search described above and two other drug charges arising from a separate case,3 the State agreed not to seek enhancement based upon Thompson's prior felony record and to recommend concurrent sentences on all charges as well as those for which Thompson was already serving time.
Thompson submitted plea petitions to the court for both cases4 in which he acknowledged the nature of the charges against him, as well as the corresponding ranges of punishment. Thompson claimed that he “told [his] lawyer all the facts and circumstances known to [him] about the charges made against [him] in the information.” Thompson further acknowledged his understanding that he did not have to plead guilty, and that by pleading guilty, he was waiving:
The petition closed with the following assertion: “I offer my plea of guilty freely and voluntarily and with full understanding of all the matters set forth in the information and in this petition.”
At the plea hearing, Thompson reiterated his understanding of his rights as outlined in the plea petitions and that he was waiving them by pleading guilty. Thompson again denied the existence of any promises or threats, apart from the plea agreement he entered with the State. Thompson indicated that he was satisfied with plea counsel's representation and that there was nothing more he wanted plea counsel to do for him before entering his guilty pleas. Thompson advised the court that it was his decision to plead guilty and that he was doing so because he was, in fact, guilty of the charges. The court accepted Thompson's pleas, finding that they were entered knowingly and voluntarily. The court then sentenced Thompson in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement to concurrent seven-year terms of imprisonment on each charge.
Thompson thereafter filed pro se Rule 24.035 motions for each drug case.5 Appointed counsel filed an amended motion, alleging (among other claims) that plea counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and file a motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the search of the maroon GMC Sonoma on May 6, 2011. Specifically, the amended motion alleged that the officer's action of parking the police cruiser with active emergency lights behind the Sonoma, blocking its exit, constituted an illegal seizure, and that everything that followed (including the search that led to the marijuana forming the basis for the charge) was fruit of the poisonous tree. The amended motion alleged that plea counsel failed not only to investigate the suppression issue but also to advise Thompson of the possibility of seeking suppression. Thompson claimed that, had he known he had a valid ground for suppression, he would not have pled guilty, but would have sought a trial.6
The motion court denied Thompson's motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding that Thompson failed to allege facts that, if true, would warrant relief and that Thompson's claims were refuted by the record. Thompson appeals.
Appellate review of the motion court's denial of a Rule 24.035 motion is “limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the [motion] court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 24.035(k). We presume that the motion court's findings are correct; thus, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating clear error. Baumruk v. State, 364 S.W.3d 518, 525 (Mo. banc 2012). “ ‘The [motion] court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing the entire record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm impression a mistake has been made.’ ” Scott v. State, 414 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Mo.App. W.D.2013) (quoting Scarborough v. State, 363 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Mo.App. S.D.2012) ).
Thompson raises four points on appeal, all related to plea counsel's alleged failure to investigate, advise Thompson about, and seek suppression of evidence due to an allegedly illegal seizure. The State argues in response to all claims that Thompson waived his right to challenge the admissibility of the State's evidence when he voluntarily and knowingly entered his guilty pleas. Thompson argues that his pleas did not result in waiver insofar as Thompson was unaware that the circumstances of his seizure would have supported legal grounds for suppression. He claims that his lack of awareness rendered his subsequent pleas involuntary and unknowing. But because Thompson failed to allege sufficient facts to entitle him to relief, we affirm the motion court's decision to overrule Thompson's motion without an evidentiary hearing.
“A post-conviction movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if: (1) he alleges facts that, if true, would warrant relief; (2) the allegations are not refuted by the record; and (3) the movant was prejudiced by the alleged errors.” Id. “A hearing is not required if the court determines that ‘the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Rule 24.035(h) ).
Here, the motion court found that Thompson was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he failed to allege facts that, if true, would warrant relief and because his allegations were refuted by the record. These findings are not clearly erroneous.
“A conviction after a plea of guilty normally rests on the defendant's own admission in open court that he committed the acts with which he is charged.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). “That admission may not be compelled, and since the plea is also a waiver of trial—and ... a waiver of the right to contest the admissibility of any evidence the State might have offered against the defendant —it must be an intelligent act ‘done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’ ” Id. (quoting Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) ) (emphasis added). And “when the defendant ... admits his guilt, ... he assumes the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment...
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