Thompson v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County

• Citation: 68 Cal.Rptr. 530,262 Cal.App.2d 98
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 10 May 1968
• Parties: Eddie Leon THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 32959.

Page 530

68 Cal.Rptr. 530

262 Cal.App.2d 98

Eddie Leon THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 32959.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

May 10, 1968.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 27, 1968.

Alan Saltzman, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Evelle Younger, Dist. Atty., Harry Wood, Chief, Appellate Division, and Robert J. Lord, Deputy Dist. Atty., for real party in interest.

McCOY, Associate Justice. ^*

Petitioner is defendant in a criminal action, number A229289, now pending in the Superior Court for Los Angeles County, in which he is charged with possession of marijuana in violation of section 11530 of the Health and Safety Code. The information was filed February 15, 1968. On March 4, according to the minutes for that day, 'Defendant's motion for dismissal under Section 995 Penal Code and motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Section 1538.5 Penal Code (were) argued and both denied.'

On April 3, 1968, defendant filed the petition now before us for a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to suppress certain evidence or, in the alternative, for a writ of prohibition restraining that court from taking any further proceedings on the charge now pending against him. We issued an alternative writ commanding the respondent court to vacate its order denying defendant's motion under section 1538.5 and to grant that motion or to show cause why it had not done so. No return to that writ was filed by the respondent or by the real parties in interest. When the matter was called for hearing on the return day the petitioner and the People submitted the matter without oral argument.

We have concluded that alternative writ was improvidently issued and should now be discharged and that the petition should be denied because of the failure of petitioner to present an adequate petition and a proper record upon which this court might base a decision on the merits.

Section 1538.5, added to the Penal Code in 1967 (Stats.1967, ch. 1537), provides that '(a) A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on the ground that: (1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable; or (2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because (i) the warrant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence obtained is not that described in the warrant; (iii) there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; (iv) the method of execution of the warrant violated federal or state constitutional standards; or (v) there was any other violation of federal or state constitutional standards.' When a search warrant is involved 'the motion should first be heard by the magistrate who issued the search warrant' (subd. (b)), and 'If the property or evidence relates to a felony offense initiated by a complaint, the motion may be made * * * at the preliminary hearing' (subd. (f)). It is further provided that '(c) Whenever a search or seizure motion is made in the municipal, justice or superior court as provided in this section, the judge or magistrate shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion.'

Subdivision (i) of section 1538.5 provides that 'If the property or evidence obtained relates to a felony offense initiated by complaint and the defendant was held to answer at the preliminary hearing, or if the property or evidence relates to a felony offense initiated by indictment, the defendant shall have the right to renew or make the motion in the superior court at a special hearing relating to the validity of the search or seizure which shall be heard prior to trial and at least 10 days after notice to the people unless the people are willing to waive a portion of this time. The defendant shall have the right to litigate the validity of a search or seizure de novo on the basis of the evidence presented at a special hearing. After the special hearing is held in the superior court, any review thereafter desired by the defendant prior to trial shall be by means of an extraordinary writ of mandate or prohibition filed within 30 days after the denial of his motion at the special hearing.'

We note further that, under subdivision (m), 'The proceedings provided for in this section, Section 995, Section 1238, and Section 1466 shall constitute the sole and exclusive remedies prior to conviction to test the unreasonableness of a search or seizure where the person making the motion for the return of the property or the suppression of evidence is a defendant in a criminal case and the property or thing has been offered or will be offered against him.' ¹

Although section 1538.5 leaves much to be desired for the sake of clarity, it seems abundantly clear that a motion 'for the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing ² obtained as a result of a search or seizure' may be made Only on one or more of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a), and that the grounds upon which the motion is based must be presented to the trial court, so that an appellate court may know whether the points thus made are well taken. On this point it seems to us that the procedure is the same as that which must be followed in making a motion under section 995. As the court said in People v. Damazoni, 65 Cal.App. 252, 254--255, 223 P. 1003, 1004, in a case arising under that section: 'There is not before us a reviewable record upon the question whether the court did or did not err in denying the motion to set aside the accusatory pleading. As seen, the grounds of the motion are not stated, and it is, of course, impossible for us to say whether the court committed error in its action in denying the motion. All that the record shows as to this matter is the following: 'The defendant now interposes a motion to set aside the first count of the information.' * * * It is a proposition requiring no discussion that, in order that a defendant may avail himself of the right to have an information filed against him set aside, the ground or grounds upon which he bases that right must be presented so that the court may know whether the point thus made by him is or is not well taken. It would seem that authorities in confirmation of this proposition need not be cited.' It also seems clear that the judge who hears the motion 'shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion' (subd. (c)), including, of course, the transcript of the preliminary hearing. As noted above, subdivision (i) provides that 'The defendant shall have the right to litigate the validity of a search or seizure do novo on the basis of the evidence presented at a special hearing.' As we read this provision, it means that the defendant has the right to litigate the validity of the search or seizure do novo in the superior court and then, if his motion to suppress is denied, to seek a review thereof by a writ of mandate or prohibition, as provided in the closing sentence of subdivision (i), or on an appeal from the judgment after his conviction as provided in subdivision (m).

We are satisfied that when the defendant whose motion to suppress has been denied elects to relitigate the question by seeking an extraordinary writ, this court may consider the validity of the search or seizure Only on the basis of the motion made by defendant and denied by the trial court and then Only 'on the basis of the evidence presented at (the) special hearing.' To put it otherwise, when, in such a case, a defendant seeks an extraordinary writ to review the decision of the trial court, this court must be sufficiently advised of the motion and of the grounds upon which it was made, ³ and must be furnished with a transcript of the evidence presented at the special hearing. In the absence thereof, this court would have no record before it on which to base a decision on the merits, much less on which to determine whether an alternative writ should issue.

When a petition for an extraordinary writ is filed with an appellate court within 30 days after the denial of the defendant's motion (§ 1538.5, subd. (i)), the responsibility for furnishing that court with a copy of the transcript of the proceedings at the special hearing rests with the defendant. Section 1539 of the Penal Code, which was added by the same act of the Legislature in 1967, provides: '(a) If a special hearing be held in the superior court pursuant to Section 1538.5, * * * the judge * * * must proceed to take testimony in relation thereto, and the testimony of each witness must be reduced to writing and authenticated by a shorthand reporter in the manner prescribed in Section 869. (b) The reporter shall forthwith transcribe his shorthand notes pursuant to this section if any party to a special hearing in the superior court files a written request for its preparation with the clerk of the court in which the hearing was held. The reporter shall forthwith file in the superior court an original and as many copies thereof as there are defendants (other than a fictitious defendant) or persons aggrieved. The reporter shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 869. In every case in which a transcript is filed as provided in this section, the county clerk shall deliver the original of such transcript so filed with him to the district attorney immediately upon receipt thereof and shall...