Thompson v. Thalacker, C 95-0244-MWB.

• Decision Date: 24 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. C 95-0244-MWB.,C 95-0244-MWB.
• Citation: 950 F.Supp. 1440
• Parties: Mitchell Lee THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. John THALACKER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

950 F.Supp. 1440

Mitchell Lee THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. John THALACKER, Respondent.

No. C 95-0244-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division.

December 24, 1996.

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office in Iowa City, IA, for Petitioner Mitchell Lee Thompson.

William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Iowa, for Respondent John Thalacker.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING "MOOTNESS"

BENNETT, District Judge.

                                               TABLE OF CONTENTS
                  I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 1441
                      A. Procedural Background ...................................................... 1442
                      B. Factual Background ......................................................... 1444
                 II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS ................................................................ 1445
                      A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ................................................ 1445
                         1. Subject matter jurisdiction and "mootness"............................... 1446
                         2. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction ............................... 1447
                      B. "Mootness" And "Collateral Consequences" ................................... 1449
                         1. Enhanced punishment ..................................................... 1450
                         2. § 1983 claim preclusion and the collateral consequences doctrine ........ 1451
                III.  CONCLUSION .................................................................... 1453
                

While an inmate at a state reformatory, petitioner filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 against the warden of the reformatory, alleging violation of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, because he was deprived of an impartial factfinder during two separate prison disciplinary actions. Prior to the resolution of this habeas corpus action, the petitioner was discharged from prison, then rearrested and charged with new, unrelated felony counts. Before this court may address the merits of the former inmate's claim, it must first determine whether this § 2254 action is moot, owing to the petitioner's discharge from prison, or still a live "case" or "controversy"¹ based on collateral consequences that may stem from the prison disciplinary actions.

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 20, 1995, petitioner Mitchell Lee Thompson, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Thompson has been represented throughout this action by Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, in Iowa City, Iowa. The respondent, John Thalacker, was at all relevant times the warden of the Iowa Men's Reformatory (IMR), at Anamosa, Iowa. Respondent Thalacker is represented by William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Iowa. In this habeas corpus action, Thompson alleges violations of his due process rights in two prison disciplinary actions under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments on the ground that the administrative law judge involved was not an impartial factfinder.

The disciplinary proceedings in question gave rise to three different challenges. First, Thompson appealed to the Iowa Department of Corrections, but his appeal was denied on March 27, 1992. Second, on July 14, 1992, Thompson was granted leave to file a civil rights action in forma pauperis in this federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That action was stayed on May 4, 1993, to allow exhaustion of claims in a state post-conviction relief action. Following completion of state post-conviction relief proceedings, cross-motions for summary judgment were filed in the § 1983 action on one of the claims not also presented in the present habeas corpus action, a claim for return of property.² Third, and much later, the petitioner also filed the present habeas corpus action on July 20, 1995.

Although Thompson was in prison at the time he filed this habeas corpus petition, he has since been discharged, then rearrested on new charges. The question the court must answer in order to decide whether it can reach the merits of this habeas corpus action is, what is the effect of Thompson's release from prison and subsequent rearrest on the "mootness" of this habeas corpus action? In order to answer this question, the court must examine the interplay between habeas corpus and § 1983 actions, as well as the interplay, if any, between discipline during prior incarceration and enhancement of penalties during future incarceration.

A. Procedural Background

On March 3, 1992, the IMR Adjustment Committee found Thompson guilty of violating an IMR disciplinary rule prohibiting possession of a "debt list." On March 5, 1992, the IMR Adjustment Committee found Thompson guilty of violating another IMR disciplinary rule against unauthorized possession of property. On November 17, 1993, in what was to be a precursor to the present federal habeas corpus action, the Iowa District Court in and for Jones County held a hearing on Thompson's application for post-conviction relief under Chapter 822 of the Iowa Code. Thompson sought relief on three main issues: (1) that the two disciplinary hearings violated his right to procedural and substantive due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, because the disciplinary committee did not make a good faith determination regarding the veracity of witnesses and there was insufficient evidence of guilt on which to base a trustworthy decision; (2) the Administrative Law Judge was not an impartial factfinder and violated Thompson's right to an impartial disciplinary hearing; and (3) the "some evidence" standard of proof used by the disciplinary committee violated Thompson's due process rights. The second of these claims is now at issue in this habeas corpus action. The state district court held that Thompson's right to due process was not violated and there was adequate evidence to support the committee's findings in both disciplinary actions against Thompson. The state district court also held that the neutrality of the administrative law judge was not impaired when his prior dealings with Thompson were tied to his ministerial duties and were not personal. The state district court therefore affirmed the decision of the Iowa Department of Corrections and denied Thompson's application for post-conviction relief. However, the court did find that the Adjustment Committee erred in confiscating Thompson's property.

On May 24, 1995, the Iowa Supreme Court, in a de novo review, affirmed the decision of the Iowa district court. Ruling on both prison disciplinary actions, the Iowa Supreme Court held that Thompson was not denied due process of law by the IMR Adjustment Committee. As to the claim now at issue in this federal habeas corpus action, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not have a preexisting personal bias against Thompson, and thus the ALJ was not required to recuse himself from the proceedings. Thompson v. State, 533 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1995).

Having properly exhausted all of his state court post-conviction remedies, Thompson filed this action in federal court on July 20, 1995, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, again challenging the disciplinary actions.³ Thompson's application for a writ of habeas corpus seeks relief from both prison disciplinary actions on one issue. That issue is Thompson's assertion that his right to an impartial disciplinary hearing was violated when the ALJ for both disciplinary actions, Larry Brimeyer, failed to recuse himself, despite knowledge that Thompson had written to an Iowa District Court Judge asking that the judge hold Brimeyer in contempt of court for not honoring a court order entered December 9, 1991, in unrelated proceedings. As relief, Thompson seeks to invalidate the results of the disciplinary proceeding by asking this court to restore his prior status, set aside the disciplinary sanctions, and expunge the disciplinary reports.

Upon initial review, on August 29, 1995, the court granted Thompson leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to a scheduling order filed on November 11, 1995, all briefs and arguments on the merits of the habeas corpus action were to have been filed by January 2, 1996. However, Thompson was discharged from the IMR on December 9, 1995, and the action languished. On January 26, 1996, the court ordered the parties to file the required briefs within fourteen days or be subject to dismissal for lack of prosecution or mootness.

In response to the court's "wake-up" order, respondent filed, on February 9, 1996, a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the action was moot.⁴ Thompson's attorney filed a petitioner's status report on February 16, 1996, stating that he was not in contact with his client and requesting an extension to ascertain Thompson's interest in the litigation. On March 7, 1996, counsel informed the court that Thompson desired to continue the litigation and was being held pending trial on felony charges in Mason City, Iowa. Thompson seeks to maintain his habeas corpus action under the doctrine of collateral consequences. Thompson asserted in his status report that the allegedly improper prison disciplinary actions will have a negative collateral impact on his potential future incarceration in Iowa. In addition, he contends dismissal of this habeas corpus action will have a negative impact on his § 1983 action.

In response to the status report, the court granted an extension for Thompson's attorney to dismiss the action voluntarily or to file a brief limited to the issue of mootness. On April 11, 1996, petitioner filed such a brief. Thompson contends that his physical release from the IMR does not render this habeas corpus action moot, because the collateral consequences of the prison disciplinary actions render this habeas corpus action a live "case" or "controversy." U.S. CONST., Art. III., § 2 cl. 1. Thompson argues that his possible immediate reentry into the Iowa penal system due...