Thompson v. Thomas Candor.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1871
• Citation: 1871 WL 8127,60 Ill. 244
• Parties: LEWIS W. THOMPSONv.THOMAS CANDOR.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

60 Ill. 244

1871 WL 8127 (Ill.)

LEWIS W. THOMPSON

v.THOMAS CANDOR.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1871.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Mercer county.

Mr. C. J. BARTELSON, Mr. LEWIS W. THOMPSON, for the appellant.

Messrs. BASSETT & CORNELL, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE THORNTON delivered the opinion of the Court:

This bill was filed for the cancellation of a deed.

Willits and Thompson were proprietors of the town of Aledo, and, for the purpose of the establishment of an institution of learning, to be called the ““Mercer Collegiate Institute,” proposed to donate the tract of land in controversy, and a large sum of money. On Willits and Thompson's addition to the town the land was designated as “Mercer Collegiate Institute.” The institution was to be under the control and management of the Old School Presbyterian Church, and the deed was executed to the Mercer Collegiate Institute on the 13th of February, 1858, and placed in the hands of Thompson who was then one of the trustees. Willits died in March, 1858, and the deed was not delivered to the acting secretary of the board of trustees until in March of the following year.

In the meantime, and before the death of Willits, a part of the subscription in money had been paid, and the trustees had commenced and prosecuted the erection of a building. The basement was nearly completed before his death, and the work was superintended by Thompson. Before the filing of the bill, in 1868, the brick work had been finished, the chapel plastered and heated, some other rooms completed, and a school kept in the building for a number of years. The chapel was used as a place of worship by the Presbyterian church, and one room was occupied by the janitor, and others by the teachers and their families.

In 1865 the building and grounds were leased to one Williams, and he obligated himself to complete the building, and to keep therein a school of such character as should be approved by the trustees, for at least nine months in each year; and at the commencement of the suit the property was in the possession of the lessee of the corporation.

In 1868 the heirs of Willits quit-claimed their interest in the land to appellant.

Appellant, whose bill was dismissed by the court below, contends:

First--That there was no delivery of the deed to the Mercer Collegiate Institute.

Second--That there was no organization or incorporation of the Institute, and therefore the deed was void for want of a grantee.

Third--That the property conveyed was a donation, and reverts on account of the acts of the grantee.

Delivery need not be made by the grantor himself, nor is it indispensably requisite that it be made to the grantee. If delivery be made to any person for the use of the grantee, and is absolute and not on condition, his assent is presumed from the fact that the deed is beneficial to him. Bryan v. Wash, 2 Gilm. 557.

The only question in this case is, as to the delivery by Willits. He and Thompson were the grantors, and the latter, at the time of the execution of the deed, and with the knowledge of Willits, was one of the acting trustees, and had been selected to superintend the erection of the college building. Thompson testified that the deed came into his hands as one of the grantors; but he further said, that there was no conversation between him and Willits about the deed, and he presumed that it was the understanding that he should deliver it.

If this delivery to Thompson was, in fact, no delivery, and not intended as such, why was it executed and left in the possession of the trustee who was the superintendent of the work, and interested in the perfection of the title? Why were no directions given, nor conditions mentioned, as to the delivery? This omission raises a presumption in favor of delivery. Verplank v. Sterry, 12 Johns. 535.

From the evidence, it is an irresistible conclusion that...